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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CLASH OF DISCOURSES: THE U.S. NATIONAL DEBATE ON  
RELATIONS WITH HAITI, 1789-2004 
 
 
Pakin, Esra 
 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Nur Bilge Criss 
 
 
November 2008 
 
 
 
This dissertation is a historical-comparative analysis of the rhetorical forms and 
frames that have shaped United States-Haitian relations, departing from the 
predominantly action-oriented perspective of international relations literature. The 
study expounds continuity and change in official foreign policy discourse as “The 
United States” and “Haiti” were reinterpreted through time. It also displays how 
these constructions of “self” and “other” have been contested within the public and 
political domain. This work is a contribution not only for its elaboration on the 
mostly unattended public, press and congressional critique of Haitian policy, but also 
for shedding further light on the role of African Americans in U.S. foreign policy 
making.  
 
 
 
Keywords: The United States, Haiti, discourse, foreign policy, rhetoric, immigration, 
intervention
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ÖZET 
 
 
SÖYLEMLER ÇATIŞMASI: HAİTİ İLE İLİŞKİLER ÜZERİNE AMERİKAN 
ULUSAL TARTIŞMASI, 1789-2004 
 
 
Pakin, Esra 
 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
 
 
Kasım 2008 
 
 
 
Bu doktora tezi, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri-Haiti ilişkilerini şekillendiren dilsel 
biçim ve çerçevelerin tarihsel-karşılaştırmalı bir analizi olarak, uluslararası ilişkiler 
literatürüne hakim olan eylem ağırlıklı perspektiften ayrılır. Çalışma, “Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri” ve “Haiti” ifadelerinin zaman içerisinde yeniden yorumlanması 
üzerine resmi dış politika söyleminde gözlemlenen süreklilik ve değişiklikleri 
detaylıca ortaya koymaktadır. İlave olarak, bu “ben” ve “öteki” kurgularının politik 
düzlemde ve kamuoyu nezdinde ne şekilde eleştirildiğini de gözler önüne 
sermektedir. Eser, akademik araştırmalarda nispeten gözardı edilmiş kamuoyu, 
medya ve parlamenter karşı-söylemlerine yaptığı vurgunun yanısıra, Amerikan dış 
politika yapım sürecinde Afro-Amerikalıların rolüne ışık tutmasıyla da literatüre 
katkıda bulunmaktadır.  
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Haiti, söylem, dış politika, retorik, 
göç, müdahale 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. 1 Case Study and Objective 
This dissertation is a historical-comparative analysis of the rhetorical forms and 
frames that have shaped United States-Haitian relations. It is a departure from the 
predominantly action-oriented perspective of international relations, focusing on the 
rhetoric behind state behavior. Regarding foreign policy as representations of 
national identity, the study expounds continuity and change in foreign policy rhetoric 
as identity is re-interpreted through time. It also displays how constructions of 
identity have been contested within the public and political domain.1 By examining 
foreign policy rhetoric in socio-historical context, this study aims to answer a number 
of questions. 
-Can rhetorical history contribute to a fuller understanding of foreign 
policymaking and national identity? 
-How did the basic American principles become ingrained in foreign policy, and 
how were these reconceptualized and utilized by official and oppositional 
fronts?
                                                 
1
 Lene Hansen. Security as Practice: Discouse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 
2006), 30. 
 2 
-What were the content and degree of concerns regarding Haiti that the United 
States administrations dealt with in their respective times? Were these 
unanimously shared by other political figures involved and the public opinion?  
-Does foreign policy rhetoric feed upon and/or reflect domestic concerns as 
well? 
While there exists a growing literature on the use of metaphors in political 
speech, informed analyses of foreign policy rhetoric are neither many nor exhaustive. 
Most importantly, exploration of patterns of rhetoric quality in different political 
contexts is clearly neglected. Existing academic literature on American foreign 
policy rhetoric involves studies conducted on the annual messages to Congress (later, 
State of the Union addresses), inaugural addresses, or even on one single address or 
other document, and they mostly cover policy rhetoric in the foundational era or in 
the Cold War by textually examining the public addresses of presidents. This is 
affirmed by Theodore Windt’s observation that contemporary studies in presidential 
rhetoric are “primarily critical and fall into four categories: criticism of single 
presidential speeches, criticism of rhetorical movements, development and criticism 
of genres of presidential speeches, and miscellaneous articles on various ancillary 
topics.”2  
 This dissertation aims to be comprehensive in that it will attempt to cover 
both public and private communications. The reason being, rhetorical activity exists 
not only in the public addresses of the foreign policy elite, but also in the more 
private communication among policymaking groups. Although political rhetoric has 
much more to do with the shaping of public opinion, this process also takes place 
within the official framework itself. The political domain is never a single, composite 
                                                 
2
 Quoted in Martin J. Medhurst. “A Tale of Two Constructs: The Rhetorical Presidency Versus 
Presidential Rhetoric” in Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency, Martin J. Medhurst, ed. (College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 1996), xx.   
 3 
body with a consensus over policy decisions. Hence official discourse also works 
within the establishment for indoctrination purposes in view of differences of opinion 
among political actors.3 
Hence, while analyzing the various means in which Haiti was narrated in the 
United States foreign policy discourse, this dissertation does not only look at official 
statements. Due consideration is given to counterdiscursive strategies. Such 
perspective enables the problematization of the identity profile drawn by the 
establishment as regards itself and the other countries with which the United States is 
in touch. Put differently, this study aspires to arrive at a better understanding of the 
room for maneuver that the official position enjoys by analyzing the “argumentative 
space” in which a policy is shaped. It is true that as every discourse adds up to or is 
changed to a degree by outside influences, highlighting the adjustments in the official 
discourse would be very revealing.4 However, it is highly problematic to gauge the 
degree with which the official position adapts itself in relation to criticisms. Stability 
or change in policy discourse may as well stem from various other internal and 
external constraints not addressed by the oppositional discourse. In very succint 
terms, this study analyzes how the hegemony of the official discourse is challenged 
by the opposition through looking at a wide array, if not every one, of sources in the 
form of public addresses, correspondence, parliamentary debates, pro-establishment 
as well as critical media and non-governmental organization (NGO) propaganda.  
While appreciating their influence and contribution to public and official opinion, 
this work refrains from attributing changes in the establishment discourse fully to the 
vigor of oppositional arguments. 
                                                 
3
 Hansen. Security as Practice, 32. 
4
 Hansen. Security as Practice, 61; Gearóid Ó Tuathail. “Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: 
the case of the United States’ response to the war in Bosnia,” Political Geography 21 (2002), 601, 
606. 
 4 
Conceptual analysis of policy discourse and counterdiscourses reveals the 
vulnerability and flexibility of the decisionmaking process. Focusing only upon 
official statements to understand foreign policy making would yield a less proficient 
work. Such a perspective encapsulates oppositional discourses only as long as they 
are attended to within the official discourse.5 Counterdiscourses may bring to light 
the points that the official language evades, challenge the metaphors it attaches to the 
United States and the rest, and highlight the “instabilities and slips” in policy 
articulations used for multi-interpretability and consensus purposes.6 Accordingly, a 
more professional analysis of foreign relations is attainable through the display of 
hidden or marginalized stories. This dissertation is a contribution also in terms of 
highlighting the hitherto understudied role of African Americans in foreign 
policymaking. The plight of Haitians was extensively covered in black dailies and 
magazines in the United States, forming public opinion and contributing to the 
abolitionist efforts in the United States and the withdrawal of U.S. occupational 
forces from Haiti in 1934.7 The Congressional Black Caucus joined these efforts in 
the early 1970s, with its Democratic representatives constituting the foremost active 
force for Haitian rights in the Cold- and post-Cold War periods. 
Parenthetically, neither the establishment nor the oppositional forces were 
unanimous in their respective arguments. There is not a clear-cut correlation between 
a rhetorical stance and the actors’ occupation, party affiliation or race. An 
administration, for example, could as well be challenged by the ruling party’s fellow 
senators and representatives. In a similar vein, some black Americans were apathetic 
toward the Haitian cause, with some supporting an imperialist American foreign 
                                                 
5
 Hansen. Security as Practice, 74. 
6
 Hansen. Security as Practice, 42; Tuathail. “Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning,” 607, 617, 
620. 
7
 See Henry Lewis Suggs. “The Response of the African American Press to the United States 
Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,” Journal of African American History (January 2002), 70-82.  
 5 
policy. Haiti also gradually receded from the agenda of the black press in the Cold 
and post Cold War periods. 
This dissertation is handicapped in terms of sources regarding the earlier 
stages of United States-Haitian relations. This results both from the late appearence 
and limited circulation of the critical press on the issue, as well as their frequent 
suppression by the establishment. As an example, the public was told little about the 
U.S. occupation of Haiti between 1915-1934 and, except in The Nation, very few 
exposés of the occupation was carried by the press.8 Press effectiveness was also 
curbed by official coercion and censorship as seen in the Espionage and Sedition 
Acts of 1917 and 1918 respectively.9 Critical media and non-governmental 
propaganda became much more effective and available as time proceeded. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
This dissertation offers a rhetorical history of the United States-Haitian 
relations, using the historical-comparative approach for analysis. The historical-
comparative approach puts historical time and cross-cultural variation at the center of 
research. While this approach mainly uses qualitative techniques, it is open to 
quantitative techniques as well. It allows the use of different data types in 
combination, including primary and secondary sources, running records, and 
recollections. Historical-comparative research is useful to study, especially related 
with the task at hand, which is long-term political/societal change. A historical-
comparative research links the micro- and macro-level processes; that is, it begins 
with the individuals, but also incorporates the link between the individuals’ qualities, 
behaviors and the context. The researcher may focus on what occurs in one nation or 
                                                 
8
 Donald B. Cooper. “The Withdrawal of the United States from Haiti, 1928-1934,” Journal of Inter-
American Studies 5:1 (January 1963), 86, 88. 
9
 Suggs. “The Response of the African American Press to the United States Occupation of Haiti,” 74. 
 6 
a set of nations and may examine a given topic either across time, at one time in 
history or at present.10 This dissertation will look at past contexts in one nation across 
time for sequence and comparison.  
 As Kathleen J. Turner stated, historical research provides an understanding of 
rhetoric as a “process rather than as simply a product,” and helps to appreciate the 
commonalities and differences of rhetorical situations.11 Since history consists of 
symbols created by people, rhetorical perspective can contribute particular insights to 
an understanding of history. In David Zarefsky’s words 
 
 
The economic historian might view human conduct from the perspective of the 
market, the political historian from the mobilization of interest and power, the 
intellectual historian from the standpoint of the evolution of ideas, and the rhetorical 
historian from the perspective of how messages are created and used by the people 
to relate to one another.12 
 
 
 
Rhetorical study of history encompasses more than just chronicling of the past. Here, 
the focus of interest is the rhetorical use of the past in the construction, especially of 
political arguments, in order to reveal the much less obvious techniques by which 
particular views prevailed over time.13 
Rhetoric is a comprehensive discipline for studying “discursive” practices 
regardless of subject matter. If “discourse” is associated with meaning-making by 
various actors, rhetoric is related with “that art or talent by which the discourse is 
adapted to its end.”14 As Moya Ann Ball contends, “a rhetorical perspective 
                                                 
10
 W. Lawrence Neuman. Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 4th ed. 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000) Chapter 14: “Historical-Comparative Research,” 381-398. 
11
 Kathleen J. Turner. “Introduction,” in Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases, Kathleen J. 
Turner, ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 6, 9. 
12
 David Zarefsky. “Four Senses of Rhetorical History,” in Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and 
Cases, Kathleen J. Turner, ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 30. 
13
 Thomas Ricento. “The discursive construction of Americanism,” Discourse and Society 14:5 
(2003), 614. 
14George Campbell. The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Online edition), 1776, 1. Retrieved from 
http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/Ulman1/Campbell/Book1/Book1-1.htm 
 7 
ultimately props us to ask what persuasive discourse means in its historical 
context.”15 Some actors have differential power on representational practices based 
on language. On the other hand, it is true that the discursive process is interactive, 
and cannot be limited to enunciations by a few key actors. Nevertheless, while any 
rhetorical utterance is made in a socio-institutional context, and is therefore open to 
contestation, the principals of the foreign policymaking community are dominant 
over meaning-making.16 Those “subjects authorized to speak and to act” in the case 
of the United States are, principally, the president, the secretary of state, and the 
secretary of defense. It is these personalities that draw the contours of foreign policy, 
as well as the identity of a country. In turn, these realities are contested in public and 
political fronts, bringing forth new realities that compete for acknowledgement. 
In sum, this dissertation analyzes the discourses of major foreign policy 
makers and their opponents by looking at the constructions and strategies of their 
respective arguments. It sees policymaking as a “constant discursive struggle over 
the criteria of classification, the boundaries of problem categories, [and] 
interpretation of common experiences,” that is, it focuses on the politics of 
representation.17 Within the framework of foreign policymaking, politics of 
representation is related with “how foreign policymakers make sense of international 
crises, how they construct stories to explain these crises, how they develop strategies 
for handling these crises as political challenges, and how they conceptualize 
                                                 
15
 Moya Ann Ball. “Political Language and the Search for an Honorable Peace: Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson, Their Advisers and Vietnam Decision Making,” in Beyond Public Speech and Symbols: 
Explorations in the Rhetoric of Politicians and the Media, Christ’ le De Landtsheer and Ofer 
Feldman, eds. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 38. 
16
 Carol Bacchi. “Policy as Discourse: what does it mean? Where does it get us?” Discourse 21:1 
(2000), 52. 
17
 Frank Fischer and John Forrester. “Editors’ Introduction,” in The Argumentative Turn in Policy 
Analysis and Planning, Frank Fischer and John Forrester eds. (London: Duke University Press, 1993), 
2. 
 8 
‘solutions’ to these crises.”18 As written history is representational, looking at “how 
certain terms and concepts have historically functioned within discourse” helps 
illuminate the social and political imagination in the discourses of leading policy 
figures.19  
Analysis of discursive/representational practices involves “a heterogeneous 
mix of approaches, perspectives and strategies.”20 No consensus exists on the 
appropriate methods and criteria for their study, but predicate analysis (linking of 
certain qualities to particular objects) and metaphorical analysis are regarded as 
suitable for the study of language practices in policy texts.21 Presupposition 
(background knowledge that is taken to be true) and subject positioning (opposition, 
identity, similarity, complementarity) are among other mechanisms that supplement 
these analyses.22 These linguistic tools provide a more solid analytical base for 
locating and identifying policy strategies, and reveal the rhetorical dimensions of 
narrative discourse. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
There are relatively few academic studies dealing comprehensively with 
political rhetoric in international relations literature. These mostly comprise 
theoretical articles written from critical, constructivist or post-structural perspectives 
of international relations.23 Much of the contribution comes from linguistics and 
                                                 
18
 Tuathail. “Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning,” 603. 
19
 David Campbell. Writing security:United States foreign policy and the politics of identity 
(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 6. 
20
 Tuathail. “Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning,” 605. 
21
 Milliken. “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 226, 231, 235. 
22
 Doty. “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” 306. 
23
 Among examples see Jutta Weldes and Diane Saco. “Making State Action Possible: The United 
States and the Discursive Construction of ‘The Cuban Problem’, 1960-1994,” Millennium: The 
Journal of International Studies 25:2 (1996), 361-395; David Campbell. Writing Security: United 
States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); 
Jennifer Milliken. The Social Construction of the Korean War: Conflict and its Possibilities 
 9 
communication studies,24 as well as quantitative analyses within political science 
premises.25 There are also works in the disciplines of history, geography and 
religion.26 Nevertheless, narrowness of the research focus unites these sources under 
                                                                                                                                          
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) and Roxanne Lynn Doty. “Foreign Policy as Social 
Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of  U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” 
International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993), 297-320; Amy Skonieczny. “Constructing NAFTA: Myth, 
Representation and the Discursive Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Studies 
Quarterly 45 (2001), 433-454; Ronald Bleiker. “A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: U.S. foreign policy and 
the Korean nuclear crisis,” International Affairs 79:4 (2003), 719-737; Peter Howard. “Why Not 
Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games and U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Studies 
Quarterly (2004), 805-828. However, several works deserve special credit for the extensive research 
they entail on the issue of American foreign policy traditions. These studies do not present exhaustive 
quotational investigation, but they question the linguistic shifts in U.S. foreign policy. See Walter A. 
McDougall. Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); David Hastings Dunn. “Isolationism revisited: seven persistent 
myths in the contemporary American foreign policy debate,” Review of International Studies 31 
(2005), 237-261 and Michael Dunne. “‘The Terms of the Connection:’ Geopolitics, Ideology and 
Synchronity in the History of US Foreign Relations,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16:3 
(October 2003), 463-481. 
24
 Among examples see James R. Andrews. “Oaths Registered in Heaven: Rhetorical and Historical 
Legitimacy in the Inaugural Addresses of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln,” in Doing Rhetorical  
History: Concepts and Cases, Kathleen J. Turner, ed. (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 
1988); Moya Ann Ball. “Political Language and the Search for an Honorable Peace: Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson, Their Advisers, and Vietnam Decision-Making,” in Beyond public speech and 
symbols: explorations in the rhetoric of politicians and the media, Christ’le De Landtsheer and Ofer 
Feldman, eds. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000); Nicholas Howe. “Metaphor in Contemporary 
American Political Discourse,” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 3:2 (1988), 87-104; John M. Jones 
and Robert C. Rowland. “A Covenant-affirming jeremiad: The post-presidential ideological appeals of 
Ronald Wilson Reagan,” Communication Studies 56:2 (June 2005), 157-174; Martin J. Medhurst. 
Eisenhower’s War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership. (East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 
1994); Hal W. Bochin. Richard Nixon: Rhetorical Strategist (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); 
Robert L. Ivie. “Tragic Fear and the Rhetorical Presidency: Combating Evil in the Persian Gulf,” in 
Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency, Martin J. Medhurst, ed. (College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 1996); Tim Rohrer. “The Metaphorical Logic of (Political) Rape: The New Wor(l)d Order,” 
Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 10:2 (1995), 115-137; Mary E. Stuckey. “Competing Foreign Policy 
Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids After the Cold War,” Western Journal of Communication 59 (Summer 
1995), 214-227; Denise M. Bostdorff. “George W. Bush’s post-September 11 rhetoric of covenant 
renewal: upholding the faith of the greatest generation,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 89:4 (November 
2003), 293-320; Stephen Smith, ed. Bill Clinton on Stump, State and Stage: The Rhetorical Road to 
the White House (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1994). 
25
 Among examples see Lyn Ragsdale. “The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980,” 
American Political Science Review, 78 (December 1984); Matthew C. Moen. “The Political Agenda 
of Ronald Reagan: A Content Analysis of the State of the Union Messages,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 18 (1988), 775-785; Jeffrey E. Cohen. “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,”  
American Journal of Political Science 39 (February 1995), 87-107; Roland Paris. “Kosovo and the 
Metaphor War,” Political Science Quarterly 117:3 (2002), 423-450; Kathyrn Olson. “Democratic 
Enlargement’s Value Hierarchy and Rhetorical Forms: An Analysis of Clinton’s Use of a Post-Cold 
War Symbolic Frame to Justify Military Interventions,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34:2 (2004) 
307-340; Jon Roper. “The Contemporary Presidency: George W. Bush and the Myth of Heroic 
Presidential Leadership,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34:1 (2004) 132-142. 
26
 Among examples see Eric Foner. The Story of American Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1998); John O’Loughlin and Richard Grant. “The Political Geography of Presidential 
Speeches, 1946-87,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80:4 (1990), 504-530 and 
Cynthia Toolin. “American Civil Religion from 1789 to 1981: A Content Analysis of Presidential 
Inaugural Addresses,” Review of Religious Research 25:1 (September 1983), 39-48. 
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one common denominator. They restrict themselves either to one theme, case or 
presidency, examined through a limited number of policy statements.  
It is much harder to find sources when it comes to American foreign policy 
discourse regarding Haiti. The few scholarly treatments of the issue belong to 
history, with special reference to Afro-American and Hispanic American 
subdisciplines.27 Moreover, they are not at all inclusive to deal with the evolution of 
discourse throughout 1789-2004. This dissertation’s primary contribution lies in its 
scope, covering all Unites States-Haitian diplomatic history through a vast 
documentary search. One of the challenges was to narrow them down for the 
purposes of this work. The methodological test cases follow predicate and 
metaphorical analyses as well as presupposition and subject positioning venues. 
 
1.4 Haitian history until independence28 
 Modern Haitian history begins in 1492 when Christopher Columbus landed 
on the east coast of Hispaniola, and claimed this Caribbean island for Spain. After 
                                                 
27
 Among examples see Alfred Hunt. Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano 
in the Caribbean (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Charles H. Wesley. “The 
Struggle for the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as Independent Republics,” The Journal of Negro 
History 2:4 (October 1917), 369-383; Selig Adler. “Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetration,” The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 20:2 (May 1940), 198-226; Harold T. Pinkett. “Efforts to 
Annex Santo Domingo to the United States, 1866-1871,” The Journal of Negro History 26:1 (January 
1941), 12-45; Joseph Robert Juarez. “United States Withdrawal from Santo Domingo,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 42:2 (May 1962); Donald B. Cooper. “The Withdrawal of the United 
States from Haiti, 1928-1934,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 5:1 (January 1963), 83-101; Donald 
R. Hickey. “America’s Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti,” Journal of the Early Republic 2:4 
(Winter 1982), 361-379; Daniel Brantley. “Black Diplomacy and Frederick Douglass’ Caribbean 
Experiences, 1871 and 1889-1891: The Untold History,” Phylon 45:3 (3rd Qtr., 1984), 197-209; Henry 
Lewis Suggs. “The Response of the African-American Press to the United States Occupation of Haiti, 
1915-1934,” Journal of African American History, (2002), 70-82 and Mary A. Renda. Taking Haiti: 
Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001). 
28
 Tim Matthewson. A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations during the Early 
Republic (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 1-17, 48-50; Hans Schmidt. The United States Occupation of 
Haiti 1915-1934, 2nd print (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 19-23; John R. 
Ballard. Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti 1994-1997 (Westport: 
Praeger Publishers, 1998), 3-12. For a detailed account of Haitian history, please refer to Phillippe 
Girard. Paradise Lost: Haiti's Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Third World 
Hotspot (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
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the 1520s however, Spanish interest in Hispaniola waned upon the discovery of vast 
reserves of gold and silver in Mexico and South America. Thence, the island fell 
prey to British, Dutch and French pirates. The French began to settle on the island 
beginning from 1625, and by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 Spain finally ceded the 
western third of the island to France. The new French colony was named Saint 
Domingue (later Haiti).   
 Through sugar, coffee and cotton exports, the French part of the island 
prospered, becoming the richest colony in the Western Hemisphere vis-à-vis the 
Spanish part called Santo Domingo (later the Dominican Republic). On the other 
hand, not all people enjoyed this prosperity. The hierarchical caste system in Saint 
Domingue was composed of Europeans, the gens de couleur (free people of color 
mostly of mulatto29 background), and slaves whose import dated back the Spanish 
rule. On the eve of the French Revolution, the population was made up of over 90 
percent slaves. The more educated and wealthy free mulattoes comprised about 
20,000 people out of a total of 519,000 people. The whites amounted to only 40,000. 
Against the backdrop of the French Revolution, the gens de couleur and later the 
slaves sought for expanded rights and freedoms, revolting against the government 
beginning in October 1790. Eventually, the freedom of all slaves within the French 
borders came in 1793, followed by another proclamation next year ending slavery 
throughout the French empire. Nevertheless, signs of reimposition of slavery 
appeared with Napoleon Bonaparte in power as of 1799. Upon the rebelling slave 
leader Toussaint L’Ouverture’s capture and execution by the French forces, Jean 
Jacques Dessalines resumed from where the former had left, and defeated the French 
in November 1803. On January 1, 1804 the nation proclaimed its independence, and 
                                                 
29
 A person of mixed white and black ancestry. 
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adopted the republican form of government with Dessalines as the first president. 
The French colonial name was discarded, and the aboriginal name “Haiti” was 
adopted, meaning the land of mountains. However, the segmented nature of Haitian 
society continued after independence. This would constitute one of the main reasons 
for the political and socio-economic problems in Haiti in the following centuries. The 
power vacuum with the departure of the French, mulatto-black rivalry, and rise of 
military dictatorships as well as relative alienation in international diplomacy and 
foreign trade became the foremost obstacles crippling the new republic. This is a 
chronologically stretched period between the 18th and 21st centuries, like the synopsis 
below suggests. However, a survey of history as well as a survey of U.S. rhetoric 
needs to be consulted. 
 
1.5 Synopsis 
1.5.1 The pre-Cold War period (1789-1945) 
 Three elements are essential in understanding the discourse of early United 
States-Haitian relations at the political and public levels: i) slavery and “white man’s 
burden,” ii) relations with European powers, and iii) stability and order particularly 
in Haiti, and in the Caribbean in general. Hence, portrayal of Haiti and its criticisms 
depended on both internal and external elements.  
The Haitian Revolution30 (1791-1803) is a historical landmark for a number 
of reasons. It is the first anticolonial racial war to break off the French domination, 
the first instance of mass emancipation in a slave society, and the only slave revolt to 
                                                 
30
 Haiti is referred to in the United States records as “St. Domingo,” “Hayti,” and finally “Haiti” in 
chronological order. In secondary sources and sometimes also in official accounts, the “island of San 
Domingo” is referred to as Hispaniola, whereas “Santo Domingo,” stands for Hispaniola, Saint 
Domingue/Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Currently, Santo Domingo is the capital of the 
Dominican Republic. The author does not make any alterations in the authentic usage, making 
explanations as to the true meaning of reference when necessary.   
 13 
end up in a modern state.31 It is these characteristics of the revolution that the United 
States sought to avoid recognition (contrary to the European powers, even France)32 
since, until 1862 and also much later afterwards in more subtle forms, the United 
States was a country which endorsed slavery and segregation with respect to color. 
According to Alfred W. Hunt: “No issue having to do with slavery and the role of 
blacks in American society was discussed at so many different times, in so many 
different ways, for so many different reasons as the lessons of the Haitian 
Revolution.”33 In the face of the Haitian Revolution, “our suffering brethren” –
namely, the white Frenchmen, were given aid whereas the anti-administration camp 
raised criticism either along the sacred lines of “all men are created equal” or with 
fear that those “cut-throat Negroes” accompanying their masters would instil the 
spirit of insurrection among American slaves. Abolitionists hailed Haiti as “the city 
on a hill.” Whenever it seemed that the slavery’s doom was clear, Haiti was couched 
by the official camp in much favorable terms, whose republican form of governance, 
mild climate and fertile territory would prove the most suitable resettlement place for 
freed slaves.  
Even after the abolition of slavery in the United States and recognition of 
Haiti, the black Republic was viewed according to the “white man’s burden” 
mentality. The Haitians were regarded as incapable of shaping their destiny unless 
aided by white guidance. It was also within this context that annexationist or 
occupational schemes came into view to “civilize” Haiti. Though a Republic, Haiti 
was officially depicted as unqualified for self-determination for being “savage” and 
                                                 
31
 Tim Matthewson. “Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 140:1 (March 1996), 22. 
32
 King Charles X of France recognized Haiti on April 17, 1825. The recognition was ratified on June 
6, 1838. Britain recognized Haiti in 1833. 
33
 Alfred W. Hunt. Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988), 190. 
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“inferior.” On the other hand, the counterarguments maintained that the United States 
also had a huge record of crimes. Other critical works juxtaposed Ireland and Haiti, 
the former being oppressed at the hands of imperial Britain, the latter at the hands of 
republican America. Despite the public exposure of U.S. forces’ exploitation of Haiti 
during the occupation of 1915-1934, the United States continuously portrayed itself 
as a selfless actor to uplift a “sister Republic” and celebrated the progress of Haiti at 
the hands of “brave and patriotic members of the U.S. Corps.”  
Relations with European powers were also influential in the metaphors 
attributed to Haiti. In official parlance, Haiti’s portrayal as racially inferior gradually 
waned in the face of souring relations with France in the early 1800s. Even though 
the Monroe Doctrine34 refused to extend protectorship to Haiti, there were numerous 
references as to its indispensability to Caribbean defense and transisthmian security 
in case of  European intrusion. An oft-repeated argument was the need to acquire 
naval posts in Haiti to outmaneuver Europe. Another burning issue was the French 
and German influence on Haitian finances and revolutions. The German threat 
ranked higher in the priority list on the eve of two world wars. Criticisms involved 
that enhanced relations with Haiti would run counter to George Washington’s maxim 
of non-interference and avoiding alliances. Others argued that resuming bilateral 
commerce would end up in recognition of a nation “incapable of self-government.” 
Another counterargument maintained that the European threat was mere pretext for 
expansionist purposes.  
 Order and stability in Haiti was essential for the United States especially in 
the latter’s foundational years. After the proclamation of the Republic on January 1, 
                                                 
34
 The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed on December 2, 1823 by the fifth President of the United 
States James Monroe. The Doctrine stated that European powers should no longer colonize or 
interfere with the affairs of the nations of the Americas. The United States was to stay neutral in wars 
between European powers and its colonies unless such wars occured in the Americas.   
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1804, independent Haiti faced many obstacles. The hundred millions of francs of 
indemnity to France for compensation, near total devastation of infrastructure and 
high death rate as a result of the war, and lack of skilled administrators and craftsmen 
with the departure of the French created a procession of transient presidents and great 
instability. The list below would provide some insight.35  
 
 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines – 1804-1806 – Assasinated 
Henri Christophe – 1807-1820 – Suicide36 
Alexandre Petion – 1807-1818 – Died in office           
Jean-Pierre Boyer – 1818-1843 – Removed from office 
Charles Herard – 1843-1844 – Fled  
Philippe Guerrier – 1844-1845 – Died in office      
Jean-Louis Pierrot – 1845-1846 – Overthrown 
Jean-Baptiste Riche – 1846-1847 – Died in office 
Faustin Soulouque – 1847-1859 – Forced from power 
Fabre Geffrard – 1859-1867 – Forced from power 
Sylvain Salnave – 1867-1869 – Executed 
Nissage Saget – 1870-1874 –Retired 
Michel Domingue – 1874-1876 –Fled to Jamaica 
Boisrond Canal – 1876-1879 – Fled to Jamaica 
Louis Felicite Salomon – 1879-1888 Fled to France  
F. Florvil Hyppolite – 1889-1896 – Died in office37 
Tiresias Simon Sam – 1896-1902 – Fled 
Nord Alexis – 1902-1908 – Fled to Jamaica 
Antoine Simon – 1908-1911 –Fled to Jamaica 
Cincinnatus Leconte – 1911-1913 – Blown up 
Tancrede Auguste – 1912-1913 Poisoned 
Michel Oreste – 1913-1914 – Fled to Jamaica 
Oreste Zamor – 1914 – Murdered 
J. Daviliar Teodore – 1914-1915 – Fled 
J. Vilbrun Guillaume Sam – 1915 – Dismembered 
Philippe Dartiguenave – 1915-1922 –Forced from office 
Louis Borno – 1922-1930 – Forced to resign 
Stenio Vincent – 1930-1941 –Pressured to retire 
Elie Lescot – 1941-1946 – Ousted 
              
 
 
                                                 
35
 John R. Ballard. Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 223-224. 
36During the reign of Dessalines, the island was divided into two by Henri Christophe and Alexandre 
Petion. Upon their tragic deaths one after the other, Jean-Pierre Boyer unified the two governments. 
Boyer also invaded the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo and united the entire island of Hispaniola 
under Haitian rule until 1844, when Santo Domingo obtained its independence. 
37Prior to August 1889, Haiti was divided into two provisional camps; one based in the North ruled by 
Forvil Hyppolite, and one based in the South led by François Legitime. Hyppolite was supported by 
American businessmen, whereas Legitime was given aid by France. In August 1889, Hyppolite, with 
the aid of the United States took control of all of Haiti.  
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In official discourse, Haiti was depicted as needing aid for self-defense and 
sustainable order. This was a common theme for all U.S. administrations. It was “too 
unsettled,” and that the United States needed to feel safe in its backyard. Against this 
background, the United States became the first arbiter of the border dispute between 
Santo Domingo and Haiti. In addition, there was a general unwillingness to end 
military occupation of Haiti (1915-1934) since immediate withdrawal would cause 
bloodshed. The opposition took these pronouncements with a grain of salt. The main 
criticism was related to expansionism under the guise of benevolence. Some mocked 
the most cherished post-World War I Wilsonian principle of self-determination on 
the basis that Haiti could not take the reins of its own destiny. Another discrepancy 
brought into the open was that Haiti, as a charter member of the League of Nations, 
was under military occupation.  
Throughout the subject period, there is not a fixed delineation of Haiti along 
party lines. Democratic-Republican presidents Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) and 
James Monroe (1817-1825) refrained from enhanced relations with Haiti, let alone 
extend recognition. Both depicted Haiti as racially inferior and unqualified for 
membership in the civilized world. However, John Quincy Adams (1825-1829) of 
the same party, with feelings of amity and solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, 
sought to attend the Panama Congress of 1826 in which Haiti would also participate. 
Republican presidents Andrew Johnson (1865-1869) and Ulysses Grant (1869-1877) 
had annexationist plans, but it was Democratic Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) who 
ordered the military occupation of Haiti “for protection of both American and 
Haitian interests.” Finally, it was Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) from the Republican 
camp that would pave the way for U.S. withdrawal. In the Congress, the ruling party 
did not have consensus either. They occasionally allied with the oppositional party in 
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attacking the administration; even on the same grounds at times. For example, during 
the Jeffersonian era, the Democratic-Republican policy of welcoming slaves 
accompanying their French masters was denounced by some members of the ruling 
party as fueling slave insurrection, like the Federalist critique which conveyed fears 
about the future of the Union regarding the constitutional three-fifths clause.38 
Republican Andrew Johnson’s proposals as to the incorporation of Haiti within U.S. 
borders were checked by Republicans and Democrats alike; the common 
denominator being the principle of non-interference in international affairs. There 
were also many officials testifying before the Senate or in the critical press against 
the U.S. policies in Haiti. Several administrations even admitted their mishandling of 
the Haitian affairs; nevertheless, their statements were mainly condescending and 
apologetic.   
Overall, the U.S. official rhetoric was patronizing or, at best, condescending; 
it was also repetitive and normative. One frequent statement was that the United 
States was there to protect American and Haitian interests, and that it had no desire 
to take advantage of the Republic. The successive administrations also thrust their 
definitions of civilization, republic or progress on Haiti, refusing to assess and accept 
Haiti on its own terms. Since official rhetoric drew the lines of civilization and self-
governance along racial lines, Haiti’s future was deemed as conflict-ridden without 
the benevolent guidance of the United States. As a similar case, the withdrawal of 
U.S. military forces from Haiti in 1934 was made contingent upon the sight of “a 
reasonable promise of internal peace and stability,” with the abstract terms of 
“promise,” “peace” and “stability” defined at U.S. will. The official portrait also 
withheld many positive attributions that Haiti deserved. Contributions of Haitians in 
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 In the first article of the Constitution, the “three-fifths clause” regards a slave as 3/5 of a white 
person. The clause would later be repealed by the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868. 
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the American Revolution or Civil War (in the Union ranks) were appreciated only by 
the critical press, while the U.S. Administrations mostly evaded responding to their 
accusations. The oppositional front also made use of the sacred founding principles 
of America (i.e. “city upon a hill,” and “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness”), in 
order to show the discrepancies between rhetoric and practice in American foreign 
policy. Other historical analogies to liken the American example to that of Britain 
were equally abundant like, “taxation without representation.” They helped to 
display that America had become as tyrannical as its motherland, and added to the 
strength of critical arguments. References to international law, like Haiti’s right to 
self-determination, were equally extensive, which further helped to drain the power 
and challenge the plausibility of the official portrait.  
 
1.5.2 The Cold War period (1945-1990) 
In this period, it was the communist threat as a major domestic and 
international phenomenon that determined the rhetorical underpinnings of both the 
official and the oppositional discourse. While racial elements dropped from the 
official agenda, the critics still used them as ammunition with which to condemn 
U.S. restrictive immigration policies especially. The opposition mainly comprised 
the Democratic members of the House of Representatives. As observed in the pre-
Cold War era, there were many ruling party congressmen breaking ranks with the 
Administration. There also appeared new actors on the opposition side, like the civil 
rights activists and the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). The black press, having 
fought actively for the Haitian cause in the pre-Civil War period, passed the torch to 
the CBC, and concentrated mostly on the black civil rights in the United States. 
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The Haitian domestic situation in the early Cold War period resembled that of 
the pre-Cold War period in terms of short-term presidencies and the instability that 
followed. In 1957, there began the Duvalier regime to last until 1986, during which 
the father and son took turns in further drifting the country into chaos. The last years 
of the Cold War era again saw turbulent political rivalries and frequent successions. 
 
 
Dumarsias Estime (1946-1950) – Fled to the U.S. 
Paul Magloire (1950-1956) – Overthrown 
Joseph N. Pierre-Louis (1956-1957) – Forced to resign           
François Sylvain (1957) – Overthrown  
Daniel Fignole (1957) – Overthrown       
François Duvalier (1957-1971) – Died in office 
Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971-1986) – Fled to France 
Henri Namphy (1986-1988) – Overthrown 
Leslie Manigat (1988) – Overthrown 
Henri Namphy (1988) – Overthrown 
Prosper Avril (1988-1990) – Fled to the U.S. 
 
 
 
 Throughout the subject period, Haiti’s willingness to align itself with the 
Western camp was a relief for the United States. This state of affairs had two 
implications: i) Haiti’s rulers were to be tolerated so long as they remained anti-
communist and kept the country’s domestic problems in check, and ii) immigration 
to the United States would be rearranged along the communist factor, which meant 
that those fleeing from “red” oppression were to be prioritized at the expense of 
others running from right-wing dictatorial regimes. Hence, Washington condoned the 
arbitrary rule of Haiti’s despotic presidents, especially the infamous Duvalier dynasty 
on the grounds that there were no alternative to those dictators as they were not only 
anti-communist, but also able to contain the social and economic chaos within the 
country, and preclude a trickling down effect at the regional level. Only very 
occasionally did Washington half-heartedly condemn the breach of human rights of 
Haiti. As Haiti was anti-communist, successive U.S. Administrations interpreted the 
country’s problems through an economic lens. In their view, the only political 
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problem was Communism, hence Haiti suffered only from economic chaos, which 
culminated into social disturbance. Thence began the flow of U.S. aid to this 
“impoverished nation.” The official rhetoric also offered a fatalistic and 
condescending portrayal of events,  believing that Haiti’s plight was insurmountable, 
and could only be reined in through generous economic aid by the United States, and 
by authoritarian rule.  
 In return, the critics replied with questioning America’s being the “city on a 
hill” –a role model for others to emulate. In their view, the United States was 
tolerating dictators for the sake of regional stability, yet, at the expense of the 
indigenous peoples suffering under despotic rule. America’s selective admission of 
immigrants was another target of attack, with the critics, as also observed in the pre-
Cold War era, talking about the high qualities of the Haitians as well as their 
successes and contributions to the United States. It was equally underlined that, 
repression under non-communist rule should be evaluated on par with repression 
under communist regimes. They chastised the ideological prejudices behind the U.S. 
humanitarian responses, believing that the social and economic problems in Haiti 
were not the result of their inherent incapability to live up to the example of its 
Western counterparts, but of systematic oppression at the hands of brutal rulers who 
exploited the country’s resources for their own ends. The critics, especially, the CBC 
attacked the U.S. Government also on racial grounds, claiming that Haiti was 
discriminated against for being a black Republic, and the negative attributes attached 
to it. The civil activists and federal judiciary action also challenged Washington by 
offering evidence regarding the unfair and inhumane conditions that Haitian 
immigrants and asylum seekers endured. 
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1.5.3 The post-Cold War period (1990-2004) 
 In the wake of the Cold War, Haiti was again struggling with succession 
problems that were left almost unattended by the United States. Washington devoted 
all attention to the Gulf Crisis, relegating the Haitian issue to a minor status. Seeking 
order and stability in its backyard, the U.S. simply followed the usual path of 
tolerating the arbitrary rule of whomever offered the best policy to rein in Haiti’s 
thorny issues. When the democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was 
ousted from office, the Republican George H. W. Bush Administration (1989-1993) 
quickly acknowledged the rule of the military junta, while chastising Aristide and its 
followers for destabilizing the country as Aristide sought to resume his rule. 
 
 
Ertha Pascal Truillot (1990-1991) – Forced to resign, jailed.  
Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991) – Fled to the U.S. 
Military junta under General Raoul Cédras (1991-1994) [Joseph Nérette (Provisional President 1991-
1992), and Marc Bazin (Acting President 1992-1993)] 
Emile Jonassaint (Provisional President 1994) – Stepped down  
Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1994-1996) – Completed term      
René Préval (1996-2001) – Completed term 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2001-2004) – Forced to resign 
 
 
 
The Democratic Administration under Bill Clinton (1993-2001) pursued the same 
policy, finally giving in as criticism mounted against his tolerance vis-à-vis the 
democratic process having been overridden at the hands of the military junta. With 
Aristide reinstated by the Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti could not breathe a 
sigh of relief though. This time it was labeled as the scapegoat for some new 
problems that had its roots in the Cold War period like drug trafficking and AIDS. 
The September 11 attacks on the United States also added to the hitherto allegations 
associated with Haiti. Haiti’s turbulent situation was displayed by the official 
rhetoric as ripe for illegal activities. Hence, especially the George W. Bush 
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Administration (2001-2009) sought actively to reverse the Haitian refugee flow 
toward the American shores.  
 The post-Cold War period witnessed the apogee of the U.S. discrimination in 
immigration. Cold War mentality still dominated Washington’s considerations as 
America offered solace and shelter for those running from the former Communist 
countries. The prioritizing of those “politically oppressed” over “economically 
destitute” still haunted U.S. policymaking on Haiti. On the other hand, the Haitians 
were not only intercepted but were also subject to forced return despite the oft-
publicized fact that punishment awaited those returnees at the hands of the military 
junta. The official circles also postulated that Haitians were highly engaged in drug 
trafficking, that they carried the highest risk of carrying and spreading the HIV virus, 
and that, after the September 11 attacks, terrorists could enter the United States 
posing as Haitian immigrants. In return, the critics chided the U.S. Government for 
its inhospitality, barring Haitians on lack of evidence especially regarding their 
relation with AIDS or terrorism. As in the Cold War period, with activists, the CBC, 
and the Democratic Representatives from the U.S. Congress being in the forefront of 
Haitian advocacy, the critical view countered the official rhetoric with first-hand data 
on, for example, the alleged rate of homosexuality in Haiti and the conditions in 
refugee processing and detainment centers. For them, the post-Cold War era did not 
herald a fresh page in history like  President George H. W. Bush had proclaimed in 
his “New World Order” speech, as the United States withheld its guidance and 
benevolence inscribed in the Statue of Liberty. Similarly observed in the Cold War 
period, the critics also commended the Haitians for being “hardworking” and “God-
fearing” men, with many having become noteworthy figures in the United States.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
FROM THE FOUNDATIONAL ERA  
TO THE COLD WAR, 1789-1945 
 
2.1 Prior to the Haitian independence (1789-1804) 
In the years after the war of independence from Britain, it became the utmost 
priority for the United States to sustain survival and order. Internal development was 
elevated above pursuing adventures abroad. George Washington (1789-1797/no 
party) was the first president of this white and Anglo-Saxon oriented country. 
Parenthetically, he was a slave owner. It is within this background that Washington 
approached the St. Domingo revolution with indirect and biased treatment. The 
policy adopted was to assist the French refugees fleeing from the island and help 
France to regain its dominion. In his message to Governor Charles Pinckney, 
Washington distinguished between “our neighbours of St. Domingo,” or “our 
suffering brethren,” namely the French on the island, and the colored slaves.39 
Challenging the official position Abraham Bishop, a fervent supporter of the 
black cause in St. Domingo, wrote a piece named “The Rights of Black Men,” in 
Boston Argus. There he criticized the refugee policy on the basis of one of the 
cherished founding tenets of America.
                                                 
39
 George Washington to Charles Pinckney (Governor of South Carolina), November 8, 1791, in The 
George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799. Retrieved from 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwhome.html 
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Does our allegiance with France oblige us to murder our fellow creatures?. . .The 
blacks are entitled to freedom, for we did not say, all white men are free, but all men 
are free. The blacks bore their condition of slavery, till it became too terrible. The 
blacks took up arms to rid themselves of slavery. Arms were their only resource.40 
 
 
 
One Quaker41 legislator from Pennsylvania challenged the policy by giving reference 
to the American Revolution: “It would be inconsistent on the part of a free nation to 
take measures against a people, who had availed themselves of the only means they 
have to throw off the yoke of the most atrocious slavery.”42  
The dispatch of arms and ammunition for the French nationals in St. 
Domingo stopped on account of France’s declaration of war against England in early 
1793.43 President Washington issued a “Proclamation of Neutrality” (April 1793), 
which implied that necessity for internal development after an independence war 
dictated aloofness from foreign entanglements.  
 
 
Whereas it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, 
Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France on the other; 
and the duty and interest of the United States require, that they should with sincerity 
and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the 
belligerent Powers.44 
 
 
 
“Duty and interest” ranked prior to the concerns about St. Domingo in the Secretary 
of State Thomas Jefferson’s (1789-1793) correspondence with Senator James 
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 Quoted in Tim Matthewson. “Abraham Bishop, ‘The Rights of Black Men,’ and the American 
Reaction to the Haitian Revolution,” The Journal of Negro History 67:2 (Summer 1982), 153. 
Abraham Bishop was a Yale graduate, harboring strong anti-slavery views. He became an influential 
figure in Connecticut politics. 
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 Quakerism sprang in England from the seventeenth-century Puritanism as an unorthodox sect. It 
denied the necessity for a special priesthood and for outward rites. Its main tenet was the doctrine of 
the “inner light.” Quakers believed that inspiration comes from within the individual. They were vocal 
in antislavery and temperance movements. 
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 Quoted in Tim Matthewson. A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations during the 
Early Republic (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 23. 
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 Matthewson. A Proslavery Foreign Policy, 46. In the face of the slave uprising, Great Britain seized 
the initiative and occupied the colony of its ancient enemy between 1793-1798. The French won over 
Britain between 1802-1803. 
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 “Proclamation of Neutrality,” April 22, 1793 in The George Washington Papers at the Library of 
Congress, 1741-1799: Series Two Letterboks. Retrieved from  
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwhome.html 
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Monroe (Democratic-Republican45-VA). Jefferson’s statements were also couched in 
racial terms, depicting the white French as victims at the hands of bloody black 
inhabitants. 
 
 
The situation of the St. Domingo fugitives (aristocrats as they are) calls aloud for 
pity and charity. Never was so deep a tragedy presented to the feelings of man. I 
deny the power of the general goverment to apply money to such a purpose, but I 
deny it with a bleeding heart. It belongs to the State governments . . . I become daily 
more and more concerned that all the West India islands will remain in the hands of 
the people of colour and the total expulsion of the whites sooner or later take place, 
It is high time we should see the bloody scenes. . . 46 
 
 
The American government extended aid to the planters who made their escape to the 
United States: “a sum, not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars, be appropriated to . . . 
the inhabitants of Saint Domingo, resident within the United States, as shall be found 
in want of such support”47 Shortly afterwards, the administration also resumed 
military and financial aid to the French colonial administration, as France deeply 
needed unhampered commerce due to bad harvests, the French-British War and the 
peasant rebellions. America, bound to the French by the 1778 treaties to keep St. 
Domingo under French control in return for the latter’s help in the American 
Revolution, seized the initiative and also gained economically while continuing to 
welcome French refugees.48  
However, it was limited or, preferably no relations with St. Domingo that the 
Southern critics sought after. In the October 9, 1793 issue of the Charleston City 
Gazette and Daily Advertiser, an official cautioned against “the lower order of 
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Frenchmen . . . who would fraternize with our Democratic Clubs and introduce the 
same horrid tragedies among our negroes.”49 Their fears were further exacerbated 
with the French commissioners proclamation of the freedom of all slaves in 1793, 
which was followed by another proclamation next year by the National Convention 
which abolished slavery throughout the empire. These concessions to stave off defeat 
and keep the colony French, caused a massive exodus to the United States of French 
white planters with their slaves.50 A series of letters appearing in the Columbia 
(South Carolina) Herald in the summer of 1794 were illustrative of Southern fears. 
The supposed author of the letters, Alexander Garden, underlined the fact that these 
“French ideas” would prove to be “fatal” for the southern society and called for the 
expulsion from the state “all negroes without exception that have within the last three 
years arrived from the French West India Islands.”51 As the influx of blacks from the 
island would reach a climactic nuisance in 1797, there was the constant fear that all 
blacks, free as well as slave, would turn into internal enemies. As one Philadelphia 
newspaper, Gale’s Independent Gazetteer remarked in early 1797, it was “the Irish 
emigrants and the French Negroes” that caused “the most afflictive and accumulated 
distress” in Philadelphia.52 In 1797 Porcupine’s Gazette, a Philadelphia daily, 
published an article on “French Incendiaries at Charleston” by “Americanus.” The 
piece complained that the thousands of French refugees who had arrived after 1792 
in Charleston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk with their slaves from the island 
of St. Domingo, had treated their American benefactors in an ungrateful manner. The 
charge was that, both slaveholders and slaves were Jacobin incendiaries and spies 
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who set fires in Charleston, Savannah, and elsewhere, seeking to overthrow the 
United States Government and assist French seizure of the Carolinas and Georgia. 
An oft repeated phrase used for the Haitian blacks was “cut-throat Negroes” in many 
of Gazette’s editorials.53 As regards parliamentary critique, two Virginian 
representatives of the anti-administration camp, James Madison and John Nicholas 
raised a constitutional objection against the sending of aid. During the debate in the 
House of Representatives in January 1794, Madison reminded the Federal 
Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expanding, on objects of 
benevolence, the money of their constituents. His concern was that the House did not 
possess an indefinite and absolute authority to dispose this money and it was 
impossible to say to what lengths this practice might go. Hence, rather than an act of 
Congress, he favored to advance a sum for the French refugees in return for the debt 
owed to France for its help in the American War of Independence.54  
These pleas turned into practice as of the late 1790s. Relations with Britain, 
which worsened in the early 1790s within the context of Anglo-French competition 
in the Caribbean trade ended with an Anglo-American rapprochement with the Jay 
Treaty of November 1794. Despite the 1778 treaties with France, most of the United 
States’ trade was with Britain. The main bones of contention had been, seizures of 
American merchant ships trading in the West Indies, impressment of American 
seamen and continuing British occupation of western posts within U.S. borders. The 
treaty signified a break in the French-American relations, which would bring forth 
the Quasi War55 with France between July 1798-September 1800 during the next 
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president John Adams’ tenure. It would take some time for the Congress to ratify the 
treaty, as it entailed some humiliating terms. The British refused to allow trade 
between the United States and the Caribbean, as the treaty went. However, President 
Washington called for ratification on the ground that further conflict with England 
was not in the public interest. Accordingly, the Congress banned all trade with 
France and its dependencies.56 
John Adams (1797-1801/Federalist)57 was pragmatic in the sense that he 
sought to resume commerce with St. Domingo. He also thought that it would be best 
if the island was not under the dominion of any of the great European powers. As the 
British admitted defeat and evacuated the island in 1798, France remained the only 
country to be cautioned against –indeed feared, due to ongoing war between the 
United States and France. Relations with France had soured considerably with the 
XYZ Affair in 1797, which led to the Quasi War of 1798. Upon the French seizure of 
nearly three hundred American ships bound for British ports in the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean, and Caribbean, President John Adams sent a diplomatic delegation to 
Paris in 1797 for negotiations. Three French agents, originally called X, Y, and Z, 
demanded bribes for the delegation to speak to the French foreign minister Charles 
Maurice de Talleyrand, a huge loan to help fund the French wars as a prerequisite for 
negotiations, and an apology for remarks made by Adams on French imperialism. 
Adams’ release of the report to the Congress in April 1798 united the country under 
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anti-French sentiment. The public as well as the Republicans hailed the American 
delegates as they gave “not a sixpence," for tribute.58 
Although the Adams Administration had achieved a general consent to break 
off relations with France, there was still intense criticism about the permission of St. 
Domingo blacks to enter into American borders. American Mercury labeled them as 
“some of those missionaires of hell who have long made the southern States the 
scene of their incendiary efforts.”59 Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser quoted 
the words of Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin, who in vain requested 
authority from the President to prohibit landing of “any French negroes,” as well as 
their masters in adjacent states for fear of insurrection.60  Adams’ initiative was 
fiercely debated in the Congress as well. The Democratic-Republican critique mainly 
revolved around the prospective independence of the island of which renewed trade 
would be its main catalyst. Representative Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina 
depicted the blacks in St. Domingo as “Negroes [who] lacked the capacity for self-
government.” In the same vein, Representative John Nicholas of Virginia underlined 
that the president should not deal with “usurpers.”61 Pennsylvanian Representative 
Albert Gallatin’s address before the House briefly summarized the Democratic-
Republican thesis.  
 
 
[St. Domingue] is known to consist, almost altogether of slaves just emancipated, of 
men who received their first education under the lash of the whip, and who have 
been initiated to liberty only by that series of rapine, pillage, and massacre . . . If 
they were to govern themselves, they might become more trouble to us, in our 
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commerce to the West Indies, than the Algerines were ever in the Mediterranean; 
they might also become dangerous neighbours to the southern states, and an asylum 
for renegades from those parts.62 
 
 
Nevertheless, the Secretary of State Timothy Pickering (1795-1800) 
conveyed the official viewpoint, portraying that France would prove to be more 
troublesome for the country vis-à-vis  the nuisance of blacks within the U.S. borders.  
 
 
Nothing is more clear that, if left to themselves, that the Blacks of St. Domingo will 
be incomparably less dangerous than if they remain the subjects of France. . .France 
with an army of those black troops might conquer all the British isles [in the 
Caribbean] and put in jeopardy our Southern States.63  
 
 
The first proclamation on June 26, 1799 enabled commerce to resume (as of August 
1) only at certain ports, “for the interests of the United States” .  
 
 
Whereas the arrangements which have been made at St. Domingo for the safety of 
commerce of the United States and for the admission of American vessels into 
certain ports of that island do, in my opinion, render it expedient and for the interest 
of the United States to renew a commercial intercourse with such ports.64 
 
 
 
Adams’ Annual Message of 1799 explicated the positive effects of this decision: 
“Since the renewal of this intercourse, our citizens trading to those ports, with their 
property, have been duly respected and privateering from these ports has 
decreased.”65 Accordingly, it was in his Proclamation of September 1800 that Adams 
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discontinued “the restraints and prohibitions imposed by the act aforesaid in respect 
to every part of the said island.”66  
Toward the end of President Adams’ tenure, the southern fears of insurrection 
due to enhanced relations with the black island seemed to come true. The abortive 
Gabriel’s Rebellion of late August 1800 in Virginia, assumed to have been instigated 
by the French blacks from St. Domingo, raised many concerns. The antislavery 
advocates made use of the St. Domingo uprising to advance their cause through a 
connection they made to the Gabriel plot. The first major insurrectionist attempt in 
the early 19th century that was supposed to have been inspired with the St. Domingo 
revolution, was portrayed by them as a major warning that called for immediate 
emancipation in America so as not to meet the same fate with the French. The New 
England Palladium reflected these concerns in the verse below 
 
 
Remember ere too late 
The tale of St. Domingo fate. 
Tho’Gabriel dies, a host remain 
Oppress’d with slavery’s galling chain 
And soon or late the hour will come 
Mark’d with Virginia’s dreadful doom67  
 
 
It was against this background of the Gabriel incident as well as the Paris 
peace talks between France and the United States culminating into the Convention of 
1800 (September 30) that Thomas Jefferson, another slave owner, (1801-
1809/Democratic-Republican) assumed presidency. Jefferson, along with his 
sympathy to the French as a Republican,68 and thinking that France might check the 
growing British naval power in the Caribbean, aligned with the slaveholding 
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southerners and the French. In May 1801, he ordered the cease of hostilities against 
the French and summoned American ships back from St. Domingo and Guadelupe.69 
The southerners had long been discontent with John Adams’ resuming trade with the 
black nation, and the French still clinged to the hope of regaining the insurrectionist 
dominion. Yet, when Jefferson learned that it was the intention of Napoleon 
Bonaparte to suppress the revolution in St. Domingo first, and then head toward the 
United States and establish its power in the Louisiana Territory for schemes of 
empire, he changed his mind and opted for American neutrality.70  
Louisiana Purchase was one of the great successes in the Jeffersonian era, and 
in American history in general. During the latter half of the 1790s, France had begun 
to find ways to take Louisiana back from Spain to use it as a supply base for St. 
Domingo, instead of having to depend on the United States. Originally a French 
colony, the Louisiana Territory had been returned to France by the secret Treaty of 
San Ildefonso (on October 1, 1800, the day after the end of the Quasi War between 
France and the United States) with the French promise to give Spain a kingdom in 
Italy. Upon hearing the clandestine transfer and unfair treatment of American ships 
by the Leclerc expedition of 1802 to St. Domingo,71 Jefferson withdrew all support 
for the French cause to win over the rebellion. When all hope vanished to recapture 
the island or to set up French influence on American soil, Napoleon Bonaparte found 
it more feasible to sell the territory to the United States at bargain price. The sale 
nearly doubled the size of U.S. territory, secured the much demanded port of New 
Orleans and expanded trade for states bordering Mississippi.72 
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As soon as information reached about Bonaparte’s imperial designs, the 
President began to see the St. Domingo blacks in a different light. In his two letters 
to the Governor of Virginia James Monroe in late 1801, Jefferson stated that the St. 
Domingo blacks were not a threat and that they would not “stimulate and conduct 
vindictive or predatory descents on our coasts, and facilitate concert with their 
brethren remaining there.”73 Hence, Jefferson finally chose neutrality in the war 
between France and its dependency. The Jeffersonian era was also a time in which 
the emigration of free blacks in the United States became an issue. Among the 
options for their deportation were St. Domingo and Africa; Jefferson initially opted 
for the St. Domingo project, but he would later change his mind. 
 
 
The West Indies offer a more probable & practicable retreat for them. Inhabited 
already by a people of their own race & color; climates congenial for their natural 
constitution . . .The most promising portion of them is St. Domingo, where the 
blacks are established into a sovereignty de facto, have organized themselves under 
regular laws and government . . .74 
 
 
 
The emigration issue was closely related with the southern view, critical of  
continuing inclusion inside the U.S. borders of French refugee blacks accompanying 
their masters. In late 1802, a Virginia newspaper Alexandria Advertiser and 
Commercial Intelligencer protested that “the infernal French are disgorging the 
whole of their wretched black upon our shores.” Later, the Charleston Courier 
warned that “transports laden with refractory negroes from St. Domingue are to come 
to America and land their contents on the banks of the River St. Marys.”75 The St. 
Domingo analogy was also used by the Democratic-Republicans in Senate debates 
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on the issue of admission of slaves into Louisiana.76 John Breckinridge of Kentucky 
demonstrated his fear that “our slaves in the South will produce another St. 
Domingo.”77 In a similar vein, John Smith of Ohio asked: “Will you increase their 
number, and lay the necessary foundation for the horrors of another St. Domingo? If 
slaves are admitted there, I fear . . .that country . . .will prove a curse.”78 Apart from 
Alexander Hamilton who would hail the Haitian revolutionaries for their making 
possible the American acquisition of Louisiana79, the Federalists shared the same 
opinion with the Republicans. Their fear was that inclusion of slaves into the borders 
would disrupt the Union in the face of the constitution’s three-fifths clause.80 The 
New York Evening Post spoke harshly about the influx of French refugees coming 
into America with their slaves 
 
 
A horde of the most dreadful, desperate and bloody-minded wretches are daily and 
nightly disgorged upon our shores from the French frigates . . .Already may we 
predict, that constant additional watch will be necessary the ensuing winter, to 
preserve our houses from conflagration, our dwellings from burglary, and every 
species of property from beimg plundered. We have here to mention a dangerous 
and shameful species of traffic, which is going on daily between the Long Island 
people and the frigates in the purchase of their negroes for small sums of money. 
Cannot this be stopped? One question must occur to every citizen –for what purpose 
were  these cargoes of negroes brought here?81  
 
 
 
New England Palladium equally denounced the incoming refugees on account of 
their inferiority: “The United States had many ambitious knaves, but only a small 
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number of destitute rabble. All our cities have not so much as London or Paris. Shall 
we import rabble from St. Domingo, Ireland or France?”82   
 
2.2 From Haitian independence to the recognition of Haiti (1804-1862) 
The United States’ withholding of aid to France had a considerable role in St. 
Domingo’s (now resumed its indigenous name, Haiti) independence as of January 1, 
1804. Nevertheless, Jefferson did not show any willingness for trade with or 
recognition of the Republic. In political and public parlance, “Haiti” did not replace 
“St. Domingo” altogether, with the exception of some Federalists’ reference to the 
new name. The President’s earlier thoughts about creating a refuge for former slaves 
in West Africa and St. Domingo had also long been shelved by the mid-1803. 
Jefferson claimed that both regions were too “unsettled” to be suitable places for 
spirited blacks.83 What the President sought after was balance and peace among the 
international powers and protect American commerce. He also had in mind the 
southerners, who would be overly infuriated when some Haitian diplomats would 
travel freely through the southern United States under diplomatic passport. Yet, in 
order to forestall any divisive clash over slavery at the Congress, he refrained from 
portraying the issue in racial terms.84 In his opening message to Congress in 
November 1804, Jefferson pointed at some American citizens who took upon 
themselves “to arm merchant vessels, and to force a commerce into certain ports and 
countries in defiance of the laws of those countries.”85 Conveying the British and 
French concerns regarding privateering as counter to the law of nations, the President 
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called on the Congress to permit prohibitive action. The issue was that the French 
were seizing American merchants on the trade routes to Haiti and the merchants 
responded by arming their ships for resistance.  
 The House first debated the issue of the clearance of armed vessels. However, 
this motion was opposed even by some of the commercial Republicans who 
contended that the armaments saved the merchantmen from calamities in the 
Caribbean trade. Representative William Eustis of Maryland believed that this 
motion would deprive the merchants of the capacity of trading not with St. Domingo 
alone, but with Cuba and many other West India islands and trusted that the 
Congress would not abandon so advantageous and profitable a trade.86 The 
Federalists were unanimous in opposing the bill and their concerns found voice in 
many of their papers. These underlined the independence of Haiti and America’s 
right to trade with this Republic. The Centinel drew parallels between the American 
and Haitian experiences: “Their case is not dissimilar to that of the people of the 
United States in 1778-1800.”87 Likewise, Representative William Ely (Federalist-
MA) spoke in favor of the Haitians: “Have these Haytians no rights? If they were 
once subjects of a Government that can no longer hold them, has that nation any 
right to call on us to starve them out?”88 
 The Senate debate to suspend commercial intercourse between the United 
States and St. Domingo was equally heated. Senator John Quincy Adams (Federalist-
MA) countered on the ground that the purpose was to inhibit a branch of commerce 
which proved to be great importance to the country.89 Concurring with 
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Representative Ely, Senator Samuel White (Federalist-DE) took issue with the 
allegation that since the blacks were the slaves of the French, and that they were in a 
state of revolt, no nation had a right to trade with them. He argued that it was “the 
duty of the government to protect and encourage its citizens in the exercise of this 
advantageous trade.” He furthermore gave evidence that the French National 
Convention had abolished slavery on February 4th, 1794 and declared that all 
inhabitants of the French colonies, of whatever color, were French citizens.90   
 
 
[It is] a fallacious idea that has been taken up, and urged by some, that our 
merchants are conducting this commerce with slaves, the property of freemen, and 
not with freemen themselves, thus ingeniously endeavoring to draw a distinction 
between the situation of St. Domingo and and that of any other colony that has ever 
heretofore attempted to separate itself from the mother country. . .The people of St. 
Domingo are fighting to preserve not their independence as a community, but their 
liberty as individuals. . .91  
 
 
 
White also drew another historical parallel, reminding the audience about the French 
commerce with the American colonies after they had revolted against the authority of 
Great Britain.92 There were even criticisms on the Democratic-Republican camp. 
Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland said he believed this was a British ploy to block 
the nation’s profitable commerce, enumerating the various means the British had 
been employing against American seamen and vessels including their impressment. 
Despising to “legislate at the nod or bidding of any nation,” what he offered was a 
retrospective solution 
 
Thirty years ago, you and your patriotic associates could form a general non-
importation agreement, and despising the luxuries of the mother country, and 
superior to her prowess, you, spirits of freedom, achieved our glorious Revolution. If 
the case requires it, may not we do this again? If we must curtail our commerce by 
our statutes, it is certainly a better policy to retaliate upon an adversary in that way 
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than to abandon to her, as the proposed bill contemplates, a lucrative portion of our 
trade.93  
 
Nevertheless, the bill to end trade with Haiti passed, prohibiting anyone residing in 
the United States from trading with any part of Haiti “not in possession, and under 
the acknowledged Government of France” as a measure to stem French seizure of 
American merchants.94 
 Parenthetically, in March 1807, the “Act to Prohibit Importation of Slaves” 
passed to be effective January 1, 1808. The southerners, especially Louisianans, even 
though they feared servile insurrection, were against the Act on economic grounds 
due to cotton and tobacco fields in the territory demanding manual labor. However, 
this federal ban underwent a change upon the influx of slaves accompanying white 
St. Domingo refugees which had found a shelter in, but later expelled from Cuba.95 
The end result was the congressional approval in late June 1809 of an act remitting 
penalties incurred in introducing slaves owned by persons expelled from Cuba.96 
Here again was another political action condoning the import of slaves for the sake 
of their white masters.   
 James Madison’s tenure (1809-1817/Democratic-Republican) distinguishes 
from its predecessors for the lack of enthusiasm for Haiti in congressional debates or 
the press. Most attention was devoted to the War of 1812 with Great Britain which 
ended with both sides returning to the previous boundaries by the Treaty of Ghent in 
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1815.97 One exception was the authorization of commercial agents to Haiti as of 
1813, which stood for limited recognition. Trade with and recognition of Haiti 
continued to occupy the agenda of James Monroe, another president from the 
Democratic-Republican camp (1817-1825). However, Monroe had a negative view 
of commerce with Haiti. In a report laid before the House by the Secretary of State 
John Quincy Adams (1817-1825), some American merchants “engaged in a lawful 
commerce” with the ports and places on the island had encountered spoliations on 
their commerce (i.e. detaining of American vessels, arrest of officers and crews). 
Quoting the petitioners’ portrayal of a decree enabling Henri Christophe,98 the King 
of northern Haiti to seize American property, the report said 
 
a decree so manifestly wicked and unjust, that even Christophe, while he endeavors 
to shelter himself under his supposed necessity, acknowledges it to be as much 
against sound policy and good faith in him as arbitrary and contrary to the laws of 
all civilized nations.99  
 
 
 
Adams’ observation stated that he found “formal recognition of the kingdom of Haiti 
[as] not being expedient.”100 President Monroe also declined the pleas for recognition 
upon Jean Pierre Boyer’s unification of Haiti and becoming the president. Boyer also 
invited African Americans to Haiti and offered homesteads and free passage.101 
Monroe’s message to the Congress had the final say over the issue of recognition. He 
portrayed the Haitians in racial lines, and as still belonging to the French. 
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[T]he whole island is now united under one government, under a constitution which 
retains the sovereignty in the hands of the people of color, and with the provisions 
which prohibit the employment in the government, of all white persons who have 
emigrated there since 1816, or who may hereafter emigrate there; and which 
prohibit, also, the acquisitions by such persons, of the right of citizenship, or to real 
estate in the island . . .No invasion of the island has been made or attempted by any 
power. It is, however, understood that the relations between the Government of 
France and the island have not been adjusted, that its independence has not been 
recognized by France . . .The establishment of a government of a people of color in 
the island, on the principles above stated, evinces, distinctly, the idea of a separate 
interest, and a distrust of other nations.102  
 
 
 
Monroe’s message also touched upon economic relations with the island. Stating that 
the existing commerce was extensive, but was subject to higher duties than those of 
some other nations, the President called for a most favored nation status to be 
extended to the United States.103 It is against this background that the famous 
Monroe Doctrine of December 1823 did not include any welcoming reference to 
Haiti, leaving the Republic open to French intervention.104 
 
 
With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not 
interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their 
independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great 
consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any 
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner 
their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of 
an unfriendly disposition toward the United States . . .105  
 
 
 
The President’s propositions were an attempt to hinder “future colonization by any 
European Powers.” But, as Haiti’s independence was not yet acknowledged, the 
Monroe principles did not extend United States protection for the new republic. The 
European powers were simply told that they could keep what they already had within 
existing boundaries so long as they did not seek to transfer them to any other 
European power or to add other colonies. This was the only thing that the United 
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States could do as regards its yet feeble capabilities as being a relatively new 
republic itself.106 For Monroe, the principle of self-determination did not apply also 
because, as mentioned in his February message, its independence was not yet 
recognized by France, and that a colored government attested to “the idea of a 
separate interest and a distrust of other nations.”107 
Haiti once more appeared on the scene within the context of the First Pan-
American Conference, scheduled by President Simon Bolivar of Panama in 1826. 
There was heated debate in the Congress upon President John Quincy Adams’ (1825-
1829/Democratic-Republican) intention to send delegates to represent the United 
States. This step meant a departure from his Democratic-Republican predecessor 
Monroe’s policies against establishing formal relations with Haiti. Adams outlined 
the reasons for participation within the context of American generosity and 
benevolence. 
 
 
[The] motive of [our] attendance is neither to contract alliances, nor to engage in any 
undertaking or project importing hostility to any other nation. . .[I]t is believed to be 
of infinite moment, that the principles of a liberal commercial intercourse should be 
exhibited to them, and urged with disinterested and friendly persuasion upon them. . 
[T]he moral influence of the United States may, perhaps, be exerted with beneficial 
consequences at such a meeting –the advancement of religious liberty.108     
 
 
 
These words provoked considerable criticism directly related with Haiti, one 
of the participants to the Panama Congress and whose population mostly practiced 
the Catholic religion. Senator John McPherson Berrien  (Jacksonian109-GA) stated 
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that the United States must not “intermeddle with the principles of their faith,” 
praising the Catholic priests for the “noble part which they have performed in the 
struggle for Independence.”110 This statement was a reminder of the flight of Puritans 
and other religious exiles from Europe, to find a shelter in America. Hugh White, 
another Jacksonian Senator from Tennessee pointed at the country’s own bigotry: 
“Let us be sure that we have wiped out all the motes out of our own eyes before we 
engage in plucking the beams out of those of our neighbors.”111 New Hampshiren 
Senator Levi Woodbury of the same camp ironically denounced the state 
constitution, meaning Washington could send a mission to them next: “by express 
prohibitions in her Constitution, not a single Catholic, much less Jew, Mahometan, or 
Deist, is eligible to either her House of Representatives, her Senate, or her Executive 
chair.”112  
The President’s March 15 Message to the House of Representatives was a 
response to the criticisms. He argued that there would not be any interference in the 
island’s internal concerns, but religious liberty was desired only for the benefit of the 
American citizens residing there. Adams further enumerated the reasons for the U.S. 
nonrecognition of Haiti, and hoped that participation to the Panama Congress would 
yield beneficial results as to the political condition of the island. 
 
There are in the political constitution of Government of that People, circumstances 
which have hitherto forbidden the acknowledgement of them by the Government of 
the United States, as sovereign and independent. Additional reasons or witholding 
that acknowledgement, have recently been seen in their acceptance of a nominal 
sovereignty, by the grant of a foreign Prince; under conditions equivalent to the 
concession by them, of exclusive commercial advantages to one nation, adapted 
altogether to the state of colonial vassalage, and retaining little of independence but 
the name.113  
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Adams also presented a new understanding of George Washington’s maxim of 
“avoiding entangling alliances”.  
 
 
Compare our situation and the circumstances of that time, with those of the present 
day, and what from the very words of Washington, then  would be his counsels to 
his countrymen now? . . .[European Colonies] have now been transformed into eight 
Independent nations, extending to very borders. Seven of them Republics like 
ourselves; with whom we have an immensely growing commercial, and must have, 
and have already important political connexions. With reference to whom, our 
situation is neither distant, nor detached.114    
 
 
 
Nevertheless, his calls were not embraced with equal fervor. Senator Joseph 
Hemphill (Jacksonian-PA) responded 
 
 
It is not in my apprehension, deducible from this, that [George Washington] would 
have recommended entangling alliances with the Republics on our borders, just after 
they had risen to existence. He warned us against alliances with the countries we 
then had intercourse with; and the danger would be as great, if not greater, to form 
alliances with countries adjoining us.115  
 
 
 
The idea of establishing diplomatic relations with Haiti did not find many adherents 
especially among the southerners. Senator John Berrien’s (Jacksonian-GA) 
comments were one of the harshest: 
 
 
The revolted slaves of St. Domingo, who, although years have passed since they 
broke their fetters, have recently afforded the most decisive evidence of their 
incapacity for freedom . . . Our own Cabinet has accepted this invitation to 
“manifest the sensibility of the United States to whatever concerns the prosperity of 
the American hemisphere” but in utter recklessness of the condition of a portion of 
the People of this Union . . .Is the emancipated slave, his hands yet reeking in the 
blood of his murdered master, to be admited into the [Southern] ports, to spread the 
doctrine of insurrection, and to strengthen and invigorate them, by exhibiting in his 
own person an example of successful revolt?116   
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Another attack came from Senator Robert Young Hayne (Jacksonian-SC). Referring 
to the “revolutionary governments” Hayne stated: “You find men of color at the head 
of their armies, in their legislative halls, and in their executive departments. They are 
looking to Hayti, even now, with feelings of the strongest fraternity and . . . 
acknowledge her to be independent.”117 The end result was that the Senate confirmed 
the President’s decision to send delegates to the Congress, and the House voted the 
expenses. Nevetheless, this was a hollow success. The Panama Congress had ended 
by the time the delegates reached their destination.118  
 The black press was not silent during this period and it mostly tried to convey 
the civilized style of living in the Republic –a thing that was almost never brought 
forth in official pronouncements or congressional debates. Many such articles further 
called for U.S. recognition of Haiti, let alone sending delegates to the Panama 
Congress. Freedom’s Journal spoke very highly of Haiti, referring to “the 
establishment of the republic of Hayti after years of sanguinary warfare and its 
subsequent progress in all the arts of civilization.”119 Again, the Haitian revolution 
was juxtaposed against its American and French counterparts, and was portrayed as 
bearing similarity in terms of respect to the principles of equality and liberty. 
 
 
The American revolution which first led the way in asserting the great principles of 
liberty was hailed with enthusiasm . . .The French revolution too had supporters and 
well-wishers everywhere . . .But the Revolution of St. Domingo, which taught the 
world that the African, though trodden down in the dust by the foot of the oppressor; 
yet had not entirely lost the finer sensibilities of his nature, and still possessed the 
proper spirit and feelings of a man –no one wished it well.120 
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Despite the whites’ portrayal of Haiti as savage and backward, many editorials 
depicted Haiti as no different than America or Europe.  
 
 
The present Government of Hayti is decidedly Republican. It consists of a President, 
Senate and House of Deputies. . .The Judiciary is an independent branch of 
Government . . .The cause of Education has always received firm support from the 
Executive of Hayti . . .[T]he rights of citizens and foreigners are respected; and in no 
parts of the globe are crimes less frequent. The police over the island is excellent, 
and so secure do the citizens consider themselves and property, that many never 
close their doors during the night.121   
 
 
 
 During the years between 1825-1860, there were also many memorials and 
petitions brought before the Congress as regards the recognition of Haiti. Beginning 
with the summer of 1838, these petitions grew in number. The 25th Congress (1837-
1839) and 26th Congress (1839-1841) saw heightened debates about sending 
diplomatic representatives and establishing commercial relations with the 
Republic.122 
 In pre-Civil War America, the experiences of Haiti again became a widely 
used tool for the abolitionist cause. Especially many black spokesmen considered the 
Haitian Revolution as superior to the American Revolution. As William Wells 
Brown argued in his 1854 lecture St. Domingo: Its Revolutions and Its Patriots, 
“Toussaint liberated his countrymen; Washington enslaved a portion of his, and 
aided in giving strength and vitality to an institution that will one day rend asunder 
the UNION that he helped to form.”123 James Theodore Holly, a black theologian, 
claimed in 1857, the Haitian revolution was “one of the noblest, grandest and most 
justifiable outbursts against tyrannical oppression,” and it was more “wonderous and 
                                                 
121
 Freedom’s Journal 1:16 (June 29, 1827), 62. 
122
 See Congressional Globe, 25th Congress and 26th Congress. Retrieved from the Library of 
Congress website http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwcglink.html 
123
 William Wells Brown. St. Domingo: Its Revolutions and Its Patriots, 37 quoted in John Ernest. 
Liberation Historiography: African American Writers and the Challenge of History, 1794-1861 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 246.  
 46 
momentous” than the American Revolution.124 In a similar vein, one writer in the 
Anglo-African Magazine stated that it was the portrait of Toussaint that brought 
before his mind “in all its scope and strength the inimitable document, the 
Declaration of Independence.”125 Holly also made use of the Haitian revolution so as 
to refute the allegations to black inferiority 
 
[The] successful establishment of this Negro nationality; the means by which its 
establishment was sought and accomplished; and the masterly vigilance by which 
the same has been maintained for upwards of a half century, presents us with the 
strongest evidence and the most irrefragible proof of the equality of the Negro 
race.126 
 
 
 
In another editorial, the Haitian Revolution was exalted over the American 
experience. 
 
For a time it was fashionable to call them even in our Congress a nation of 
murderers and cutthroats, and for no better reason than that they won their freedom 
by their arms. It is quite time that this interesting people should be better understood. 
Though a city set on an hill, she has been hid . . .127 
 
 
On the issue of emigration to Haiti, the black press had varying views; most 
favored to remain in the United States fearing about what to do in an unknown 
geography and climate. However, there were also pro-emigrationist remarks. Some 
newspapers and magazines even printed welcoming calls from the President of Haiti 
to encourage African-Americans to emigrate. A sample argument seeing the 
emigration in a positive light appeared in Douglass’ Monthly. Elaborating on the 
qualities of Haiti, the article went, 
 
                                                 
124
 Monroe Fordham. “Nineteenth-Century Black Thought in the United States: Some Influences of 
the Santo Domingo Revolution,” Journal of Black Studies 6:2 (December 1975), 120. 
125
 Anglo-African Magazine (March 1859), 87 quoted in Fordham. “Nineteenth-Century Black 
Thought in the United States,” 121. 
126
 Anglo-African Magazine (June 1859), 185 quoted in Fordham. “Nineenth-Century Black Thought 
in the United States,” 122. 
127
 Douglass’ Monthly 3:12 (May 1861). 
 47 
[Hayti] is at peace at home, and within a year or two past has rapidly risen to respect 
in the world . . . The cry from that country is for light, labor, enterprize, order and all 
the arts of an advanced civilization . . .On the other hand, the United States is in 
great trouble. Slavery, vengeance and settled hate, frown and threaten the free 
colored people in the slave states with bondage or expulsion, while evidence are 
abundant of a settled purpose to hold them as a servile and degraded caste in the 
freest of the free States . . . It is easily seen that just in proportion to the inteligence 
and respectability of the colored race in the North, is their power to endanger the 
stability of slavery. Hence, the desire to get rid of us . . . Let us not go to Africa, 
where those who hate and enslave us want to go; but let us go to Hayti, where our 
influence and example can still be of service to those whose tears will find their way 
to us by the waters of the Gulf washing all our shores.128      
 
 
 
President Fabre Geffrard of Haiti was depicted as “patriotic and philanthropic,” vis-
à-vis the “professedly more enlightened and Christianized white Republic of the 
North” since he offered to “this stricken and outcast people a home and a country.”129  
In return, De Bow’s Review became representative of the Southern fears for 
slave emancipation. The editorials made extensive use of Haiti to frighten Americans 
so that they would not uphold the notions of freedom and equality for the colored 
race. As one article went: “The two races cannot mix and mingle in social and 
political equality. Oil and water could as soon unite. The history of the French and 
British West Indies is proof of this.”130 A similar article named “Free Negroes in 
Hayti” aimed at refuting the highly manners in the Republic that the abolitionist 
press so boasted of: “the fruits of freedom in that island, since its independence, in 
1804, are revolutions, massacres, misrule, insecurity, irreligion, ignorance, 
immorality, indolence, and neglect of agriculture.”131 In antebellum America, there 
were even northern papers sympathizing with southern fears. One example was the 
New York Herald, which drew upon “the bloody history of Hayti” to prove that 
abolition would culminate into a “perpetual war of races [that] cannot cease until the 
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black race has been exterminated or driven among us.”132 President James Buchanan 
(1857-1861/Democratic) even considered to acquire Cuba as a solution to prevent 
blacks from taking over the island: “And should a black government, like that of 
Haiti, be established there, it would endanger peace and domestic security of a large 
and influential portion of our people.”133 
 It was in the Abraham Lincoln era (1861-1865/Republican) that emigration 
to, and recognition of Haiti comprised a major part of the policy agenda. Lincoln’s 
faithful enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law not only filled Washington, D.C. jails 
with runaway slaves, but also enraged the anti-slavery figures. The President saw 
that the clamor for abolitionism threatened his success in prosecuting the war that he 
fought to preserve the Union. In an effort to appease both the opposition and his 
party’s abolitionist faction, Lincoln urged that the United States formally recognize 
the black republics of Haiti and Liberia. What he also had in mind was resettlement 
of blacks.134 He could not propose emancipation without at the same time proposing 
colonization. The resettlement schemes might make emancipation more endorsable 
for conservatives.135 In his first Annual Message to Congress, the President 
questioned “why we should persevere longer witholding our recognition of the 
independence and sovereignty of Hayti,” and argued that “important commercial 
advantages might be secured by favorable treaties with them.”136   
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The debates on the bill authorizing the President to appoint diplomatic 
representatives to Haiti (brought before the Congress on February 4, 1862), ran 
concurrently with those of another bill introduced in April. This was about the 
emancipation of blacks initially in the District of Columbia, and their resettlement. 
The latter bill entailed a plan for compensated emancipation and colonization, which 
would finally be signed into law on April 16, 1862. 
 
 
[T]he sum of one hundred thousand . . . is hereby appropriated to be expended under 
the direction of the President of the United States, to aid in the colonization and 
settlement of such free persons of African descent now residing in said District, 
including those to be liberated by this act, as may desire to emigrate to the Republic 
of Haiti or Liberia, or such other country beyond the limits of the United States as 
the President may determine.137 
 
 
However, the bill on diplomatic recognition of the Republic did not pass with the 
same ease. The official view found voice in Senator Charles Sumner’s (R-MA) 
words: “ . . . I have found the [Haytians] so refined and so full of self-respect that I 
am led to believe no one of them charged with a mission from his government will 
seek any society where he will not be entirely welcome.”138 He also read a letter 
from the Commercial Agent at Port au Prince to Secretary of State William H. 
Seward (1861-1869), conveying the disappointment of the Haitians at the coldness 
and neglect on the part of the United States and demanding immediate recognition so 
as to counteract “the schemes of foreign powers.”139  
On the oppositional side, Senator Garrett Davis (Unionist-KY) was against 
acknowledging representatives from the Republic and treating them “upon the same 
terms of equality with similar representatives from other powers.” For Davis, “if a 
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full-blooded Negro were sent in that capacity from [Hayti], by the laws of nations he 
could demand that he be precisely on the same terms of equality with the white 
representative from the powers on the earth composed of white people.”140 Senator 
William Saulsbury (D-DE) was even harsher in attacking the bill. His presumption 
was that, blacks and whites were forever incompatible in manners and style, with the 
latter portrayed as more civilized. 
 
 
How fine it will look, after emancipating the slaves in this District, to welcome here 
at the White House an African, full-blooded, all gilded and belaced, dressed in court 
style, with wig and sword and tights and shoe-buckles and ribbons and many other 
adornments which African vanity will suggest . . . If that is agreeble to the tastes and 
feelings of the people of this country, it is not to mine.141 
 
 
 
This fierce debate ended up in the diplomatic recognition of Haiti, and on June 5, 
1862, President Lincoln signed the bill for the appointment of commissioners to 
oversee colonization projects in Haiti.  
 
2.3 From recognition to occupation (1862-1915) 
 Abolitionists rejoiced upon the recognition; however, they still raised 
opposing voices against any resettlement plan. Their main argument was that blacks 
had a right to remain in the land of their birth. They were also aided by some 
Republican Party leaders as they sought to enlist black political support in a defeated 
South, where most whites would be barred from voting. Others shared the same view 
with Senator Charles Sumner, who spoke this time for the anti-administration camp. 
Sumner argued that black laborers were an indispensable element of the national 
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economy, and plans to expel them “would be fatal to the prosperity of the 
country.”142  
However, Lincoln was insistent on resettling the blacks. In his second Annual 
Message to Congress, the President argued that in the face of applications brought 
before him by free African-Americans for emigration, he saw Liberia and Haiti as 
“yet the only countries to which colonists of African descent from here could go with 
certainty of being received and adopted as citizens.”143 It was not before the project 
of settling a number of blacks in the Vache Island off the coast of Haiti ended up in 
utter failure that President Lincoln abandoned the colonization plans.144 Eventually, 
in November 1864, a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation was signed 
between the United States and Haiti.145 Lincoln’s Annual Message in December 
1864 stated that bilateral relations are “of the most friendly nature,” and that “during 
the past year no differences of any kind have arisen.”146 
 Andrew Johnson (1865-1869/Republican) followed in the steps of his 
predecessor with his willingness to improve relations with Haiti. As he stated, “with 
the exception of those of the island of Hayti,” the people in the West Indies were 
neither independent or capable of self-defence. Conveying that this had been a 
disadvantage for the United States as the European powers had the upper hand by 
using the West India islands for their military or economic designs during war and 
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peace, Johnson advanced the need to acquire naval outposts between the Atlantic 
coast and Europe.147 The President spoke in favor of Haiti for its embrace of 
republican traditions; yet, he also pointed at a number of obstacles, probably 
stemming from “long-indulged habits of colonial supineness and dependence upon 
European monarchical powers.” He denounced the American policy which had failed 
to lend even a moral support to their efforts. He moreover criticized the American 
example. 
 
It is indeed a question of grave consideration whether our recent and present 
example is not calculated to check the growth and expansion of free principles, and 
make those communities distrust, if not dread, a government which at will consigns 
military domination States that are integral parts of our Federal Union, and, while 
ready to resist any attempts by other nations to extend to this hemisphere the 
monarchical institutions of Europe, assumes to establish over a large portion of its 
people a rule more absolute, harsh, and tyrannical than any known to civilized 
powers.148 
 
 
 
Yet, it was also Andrew Johnson who paved the way for the annexation of the 
Dominican Republic149 and Haiti. The same Annual Message had an overbearing 
tone, conveying the desire to incorporate the two republics in order to help solve 
their problems. 
 
It cannot be long before it will be necessary for this Government to lend some 
effective aid to the solution of the political and social problems which are 
continually kept before the world by the two Republic of the island of St. 
Domingo,150 and which are now disclosing themselves more distinctly than 
heretofore in the island of Cuba. The subject is commanded to your consideration 
with all the more earnestness because I am satisfied that the time has arrived when 
even so direct a proposition of an annexation of the two Republics of the island of 
St. Domingo would not only receive the consent of the people interested, but would 
give satisfaction to all foreign nations.151  
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Johnson’s expansionist plans encountered strong congressional hostility from 
Democratic and Republican fronts alike. The House deliberated upon the resolution 
below, which 
 
authorizes the President of the United States to extend to the Governments and 
people of the republics of Hayti and San Domingo152 the protection of the United 
States for the purpose of assisting them to establish permanent republican 
institutions whenever those Governments, or either of them shall apply to the United 
States for its protection, or whenever the President shall be satisfied that the 
Governments and people of those republics desire or voluntarily consent to the 
protection of this government . . .153   
 
 
 
Representatives James Mullins (R-TN) and George W. Woodward (D-PA) argued 
that this resolution clashed with the founding principle of noninterference with 
foreign governments. In the words of Representative Woodward:  
 
 
But the question in my mind is this: if we extend our protection over what claims to 
be an independent, tough a very feeble government, do we not invite agression and 
incur the hazard of a dispute with all the powerful nations of Europe? Is not this the 
very way to form an offensive alliance?154 
 
 
 
Another Representative Samuel Shellabarger (R-OH) shared the same view. 
Reminding the audience of the “most approved, most cherished, and most loved part 
of the Farewell Address of the Father of [this] country which admonished his 
countrymen against the intervention of this nation in the affairs of others,” he added 
 
 
We want republics to be established all over the world. If we take care well of our 
Government we become . . .the lighthouse to the other Governments of the world. In 
that light, given in the honor, the justice, the power and the glory of this 
Government, will be found the moral power which is to furnish the true, the real and 
effective protectorate of the struggling or the feeble or the threatened republics of 
the world. That moral power is to be found in adhering to the old land marks.155  
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William E. Robinson (D-NY) came up with a different proposal: “I desire that 
Ireland shall be protected. Her claims to our protection are higher than those of any 
other country. Her people are brothers of ours and aliens to the Government which 
has usurped control over that country during seven centuries of oppression.”156  
Annexation policy came to a climax during the Ulysses Grant Presidency 
(1869-1877/Republican). Senate debates on the annexation treaty began on March 
24, 1870 –four months after it was signed and just five days before its expiration. 
Eventually, the treaty expired without coming to a vote.157 This did not stop the 
President, who announced to the Senate on May 31, 1870 that the period for the 
ratification of the treaty had been extended. Grant wrote a memorandum titled 
“Reasons Why Santo Domingo Should Be Annexed to the United States.”158 Among 
the reasons enumerated were the fertility of the territory, its being in the transit line 
for half the world’s commerce, the stipulations of the Monroe Doctrine, and the aim 
to pressure the slaveholding trade partners of Cuba and Brazil to abolish this practice 
–slavery had been abolished in Santo Domingo. One last reason as regards Haiti was 
that, Grant proposed to annex Santo Domingo as the republic was “internally weak, 
[though] it struggled bravely to hold off an invasion from Haiti.”159  
The New York Herald published the oppositional theses by Republican 
Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA). Sumner denounced the Dominicans as “a 
turbulent, treacherous race,” and believed that the country’s problems with Haiti 
succintly demonstrated that “the character of the people would render acquisition of 
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their country undesirable.”160 The debate on the issue of appointment of a 
commission to examine into and report upon the condition of the island, reignited the 
fear of anti-annexationists. During the Senate debates, Sumner also pointed at the 
dangers awaiting “the neighboring republic of Hayti, [the only colored Government 
now existing in the world, a republic seeking to follow our great example] . . .” as the 
annexationist policies of the Grant administration might also include this republic.161 
For Sumner, the reasons declared for the annexation of Santo Domingo could well 
apply to Haiti.162 In a similar vein, Senator Allen G. Thurman (D-OH) attacked the 
expansionist spirit of the United States. 
 
 
This scheme contemplates the acquisition first of Dominica;163 secondly, it 
contemplates the acquisition of the remainder of the island, the republic of Hayti, by 
force or by intrigue. It contemplates that, per fas out per nefas, Hayti too is to be 
annexed. That is the meaning of it. Nobody can believe that if the United States gets 
Dominica they will stop there. Nobody entertains any such opinion. “The whole” if 
not “boundless continent,” boundless island, is to be ours if we ever set a foot of 
ownership upon one single of it.164   
 
 
The opposition’s attacks culminated into the March 1871 resolutions that failed to 
please the President. Grant’s schemes regarding the two republics were denounced as 
being incompatible with international law, as well as the founding principles of 
America among which liberty ranked first. 
 
 
Resolved, that since certain naval officers of the United States, commanding large 
warships . . .with powerful armaments, acting under instructions from the Executive 
and without the authority of the Congress, have entered one or more ports of the 
Republic of Hayti, a friendly nation, and under the menace of open and instant war 
have coerced and restrained that republic in its sovereignty and independence under 
international law and [in  defiance of] the principles of our institutions . . .Resolved, 
that while the President, without any previous declaration of war by act of Congress, 
may defend the country against invasion by foreign enemies, he is not justified in 
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exercising he same power in an outlying foreign island which has not yet become 
part of the United States.165  
  
 
 
After the fade of an annexationist wave, President Chester A. Arthur’s tenure 
(1881-1885/Republican) was characterized by “relations of unimpaired amity” with 
the Republic and “increasing trade.”166 There was one complication, but it did no 
harm to bilateral relations. In the face of recurring turmoil in Haiti, Arthur enforced 
neutrality laws “by instituting proceedings against individuals and vessels charged 
with their infringement.”167 His successor Grover Cleveland (1885-
1889/Democratic) was also content to see that the “Republic has made prompt 
provision for adjudicating the losses suffered by foreigners because of hostilities 
there, and the claims of certain citizens of the United States will be in this manner 
determined.”168 Often quoted as a committed isolationist except for cases requiring 
the application of the Monroe Doctrine, Cleveland followed in the steps of his 
Republican predecessor and called for neutrality in the light of “insurrection, 
disorder and bloodshed [in Haiti]” in his last Annual Message of 1888. 
 
 
Our representative has been instructed to abstrain from interference between the 
warring factions, and a vessel of our Navy has been sent to Haytian waters to sustain 
our minister and for the protection of the persons and property of American citizens. 
Due precautions have been taken to enforce our neutrality laws and prevent our 
territory from becoming the base of military supplies for either of the warring 
factions.169 
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Whether the decision of the Cleveland administration to withhold recognition to 
François Légitime’s de facto government after the fall of the dictator Louis Salomon 
was related with Légitime’s being favored by the French or not,170 the rationale for 
avoiding the acknowledgement of republicanism’s reinstitution in Haiti was 
conveyed differently. 
 
 
The tenure of  power has been so unstable amid the war of factions that has ensued 
since expulsion of President Salomon that no government constituted by the will of 
the Haytian people has been recognized as administration responsibly the affairs of 
the country.171 
 
 
 
Benjamin Harrison’s term (1889-1893/Republican) saw better relations with 
Haiti. Harrison stood on the Haitian side when it came to diplomatic relations and 
offered self-criticism. Pointing at the fact that the United States envoys to some 
“sister Republics” were of lower rank, Harrison stated that 
 
 
In view of the importance of our relations with the States of the American system, 
our diplomatic agents in those countries should be of the uniform rank of envoy 
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. Certain missions were so elevated by the 
last Congress with happy effect, and I recommend the completion of the reform just 
begun, with the inclusion also of Hawaii and Hayti, in view of their relations to the 
system of the American system of states.172 
 
 
 
In his next Annual Address, Harrison talked about the conference between October 
1889-April 1890 at which the representatives of every independent state of the 
American continent and of Haiti met. The President deemed this convocation as “a 
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most interesting and influential epoch in the history of the Western Hemisphere.”173 
However, 1889 was also the year in which the United States multiplied its efforts to 
obtain naval stations in the Caribbean. This was the time that the construction of a 
Nicaraguan canal was authorized as a competitor to the French Panama Canal.174 
Accordingly, a base to oversee the region became necessary. The utmost aim was to 
acquire Mole St. Nicholas, a three miles-long, strategic and capacious peninsula, 
through which the control of a transisthmian route would be possible.175  
Some editors were vocal in criticizing the U.S. policy in Haiti as “not only 
interventionist but also immoral.” The editor of a black newspaper Age warned the 
U.S. Minister to Haiti Frederick Douglass, not to be the agent of the expansionist 
Secretary of State James G. Blaine’s (1881/1889-1892) schemes “with the guns of 
three wartubs levelled at the head of Hyppolite.”176 However, Minister Douglass 
allegedly failed in the mission and was denounced by many critics about his 
capabilities. Upon his resignation, Douglass issued a two piece article which 
appeared in The North American Review, answering the allegations against him and 
conveying the inside story of St. Mole negotiations, the true U.S. motives and the 
unprofessional, impractical tactics to get the base. In fact, he had never been 
instructed to enter into negotiations with St. Nicholas and had never heard of the 
mission until Admiral Bancroft Gherardi unexpectedly arrived on the island to 
replace Douglass. He stated that, many people in the establishment linked his failure 
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to his being black, on the basis that “a white man is held in higher esteem by [Haiti] 
than is a black man, and that he can get more out of her than can one of her own 
color.”177  
 
Even if it were true that a white man, could, by reason of his alleged superiority, 
gain something extra from the servility of Haiti, it would be the height of meanness 
for a great nation like the United States to take advantage of such servility on the 
part of a weak nation. The American people are too great to be small . . .178  
 
 
For Douglass, the United States thought of Haiti as too naive or gullible: “Haiti is no 
stranger to Americans or to American prejudice. Our white fellow-countrymen have 
taken little pains to conceal their sentiments.”179 As he contended, the harsh terms of 
instruction handed to the Haitians by the United States and the dispatch of the 
American navy to oversee the negotiations were unbearable. The terms of agreement 
stipulated “not only a comprehensive limitation of the power of Haiti over her own 
territory, but a denial to all others of that which we claimed for ourselves.”180 
Frederick Douglass’ “Lecture on Haiti” at the World’s Fair in January 1893 
had similar tones. In it, he spoke of Haiti’s character, history, importance and its 
relations with the United States in apologetic terms.  
 
 
They have no taste for revolutions. The fault is not with the ignorant many, but with 
the educated and ambitious few . . .I admit that there is much ignorance and much 
superstition in Haiti, [but] we need not travel far from our own country, from 
England, from Scotland, from Ireland, France, Germany or Spain to find 
considerable traces of gross superstition . . . A word about snake worship. This 
practice is not new in the history of religion. It is as old as Egypt and is a part of our 
religious system.181   
 
                                                 
177
 Frederick Douglass. “Haiti and the United States: Inside History of the Negotiations for the Mole 
St. Nicholas,” The North American Review 153:418 (September 1891), 339. 
178
 Douglass. “Haiti and the United States,” 339. 
179
 Douglass. “Haiti and the United States,” 339. 
180
 Frederick Douglass. “Haiti and the United States: Inside History of the Negotiations for the Mole 
St. Nicholas, II” The North American Review 153:419 (October 1891), 453. 
181
 Frederick Douglass. “Lecture on Haiti,” (January 2, 1893), 16, 28-29, 31. Retrieved from the 
Daniel A.P. Murray Collection, 1818-1907 at the Library of Congress. 
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.rbc/lcrbmrp.t2109 
 60 
As for Haiti’s relations with the United States, the former minister spoke in favor of 
the black republic. Challenging the notion that the United States stood for liberty to 
set an example for others, Douglass asserted that, by abolishing slavery it was in fact 
Haiti that others should emulate. So long as the United States regarded Haiti as 
inferior, it was inevitable for this republic to turn its face to other nations that revered 
its existence.  
 
We charge her with being more friendly to France and to other European countries 
than to ourselves. This charge, if true, has a natural explanation, and the fault is 
more with us than Haiti. No man can point to any act of ours to win the respect and 
friendship of this black republic . . .But a deeper reason for coolness between the 
countries is this: Haiti is black, and we have not yet forgiven Haiti for being black or 
forgiven the Almighty for making her black . . .Until she spoke, the slave trade was 
sanctioned by all the Christian nations of the world, and our land of liberty and light 
included.182 
 
 
 
Beginning with Grover Cleveland’s second term (1893-1897/Democratic) 
and continuing into the expansionist William McKinley’s tenure (1897-
1901/Republican) bilateral commerce became a source of complaint although most 
of the issues ended up in settlement. Nevertheless, one tension erupted during the 
McKinley era, in which the United States warned Germany against “annexation 
schemes or undue punishment” in the face of imprisonment of a German citizen by 
Haitian authorities. The State Department remarked that “the United States could not 
tolerate either of the courses before mentioned.”183 Germany would reappear on the 
agenda as an alleged threat on the eve of the United States occupation of Haiti in 
1915. 
The McKinley era had pioneered a more expansionist agenda beginning with 
the 1898 Spanish-American War. In the shadow of German problem, Theodore 
Roosevelt (1901-1909/Republican) and his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine 
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added to the former an offensive tone, developing a “protectorate policy” for the 
“sister Republics” that contradicted the long-cherished commitment to self-
determination. While Monroe had advocated  a “hands off” policy for the European 
powers, the more expansionist Roosevelt Corollary (conveyed in his Annual 
Message to Congress in December 1904) went one step beyond and justified 
intervention to stave off a European threat.184 Other examples of interventionism in 
the U.S. backyard were the Panama Canal and Venezuela debt crisis cases of 1903, 
as well as the crisis in Santo Domingo in 1905. Although Roosevelt and his 
administration often repeated that “under no circumstances do we intend to acquire 
territory in or possession of either Haiti and Santo Domingo . . . even if the two 
republics desired to become a part of the United States,” there were doubts in the 
minds of many.185  
One article in Chicago Tribune suspicious about U.S. motives, argued against 
intervening in Haitian affairs even if the United States was invited to do so:  
 
 
It is still a country where brute force is the only law and and where there is barely a 
trace of what nowadays be called civilization except among the few whites and the 
educated mulattoes of the coast towns . . . In the distant years manifest destiny will 
make the United States the ruler of all the West India islands, but there should be no 
hurry about their acquisition. This country has now all the dependencies it can attend 
to.186 
 
 
 
Although the Secretary of State Elihu Root (1899-1904) reiterated that “no invasion 
or conquest or annexation is intended,” the Cleveland Journal revealed the War 
Department’s plans determined to maintain order in Haiti and even invade the island 
if necessary in the face of a renewed revolution. As the journal conveyed, “this 
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action on the part of the United States government is said to be in the interest of the 
better classes on the island, and to save their property from depreciations and 
confiscation.”187 
 Order and stability became catchwords during William Howard Taft’s tenure 
(1909-1913/Republican) so as to obviate the invocation of the Roosevelt Corollary in 
case of any European move towards the troubled sister republics. In line with this 
view, the United States appeared as an arbiter of boundary disputes between Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic. In his Annual Message of 1911, Taft talked about how 
“the government of the United States, by a friendly interposition of good offices, 
succeeded in prevailing upon the parties to place their reliance upon some form of 
pacific settlement.”188 Next year, the President took one step beyond and became 
more intrusive. As “the revolutionary activities on the Haitian-Dominican frontier 
had become so active as practically to obliterate the [hitherto] line demarcation,” the 
United States indicated a provisional de facto boundary line “without prejudice to the 
rights or obligations of either country [and aimed] to conform to the best interests of 
the disputants.”189 All these actions were in line with the Secretary of State Philander 
Knox (1909-1913) speech at a banquet, which spoke of the need for stability in the 
U.S. backyard. His view, which would inspire the next president Woodrow Wilson, 
rested on the belief that the United States was in danger unless self-government and 
material prosperity were fully instituted around its vicinity.   
 
 
At a time when the obligation which my country has assumed as the agent of the 
interest of all America and of the world in creating a higway for international 
commerce [the Panama Canal] is about to be realized, we are impressed with the 
conviction that the fullest success of our work is, to a notable degree, dependent on 
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the peace and stability of our neighbors and on their enjoying the prosperity and 
material welfare which flow from orderly self-government.190 
  
 
Upon taking office, Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921/Democratic) heralded a 
more interventionist attitude in America’s vicinity. His statement on Latin American 
affairs to the Cabinet in early March 1913 linked American cooperation so long as 
“when supported at every turn by the orderly process of just government based upon 
law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force.”191 Put differently, the lack of democracy 
in other nations became a cause for concern in the Wilsonian era that called for U.S. 
attention. The interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic make more sense in 
the light of his declaration: “We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize 
the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition.”192 
Wilson also derided Haiti and the Dominican Republic for bearing African racial 
traits: “That’s why they differ completely from all the other republics.”193 His first 
Secretary of State William J. Bryan (1913-1915) totally shared the President’s ideas. 
In his address to the governing board of the Pan-American Union, Bryan said that 
“ideals were the most valuable export that the United States had to offer her sister 
republics to the South.”194 However, Wilson began on a slow note. At a press 
conference in late June 1914, when asked about the probability of French and 
German governments to take certain steps regarding the certain indebtedness that 
Haiti owed, the President said these were just rumors.195 In July, President Wilson 
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regarded Haiti as a “conflicting situation,” yet, he concluded that there did not exist 
“any danger of our intervening in the literal sense of the word . . . We are trying to 
exercise as much influence as we can now, to quiet things and accomodate things 
down there.”196 Later in the month at another press conference Wilson remarked, 
“We didn’t feel at liberty to be so far away that if it should appear with regard to 
some lives, for example or interests that ought to be protected.”197  
Within the context of the First World War that began in August 1914, things 
took a new turn in mid-1915 as the United States became highly interested in Haitian 
affairs. The New York Times revealed the findings of a report prepared by ex-
Governor Fort pointing out that  
 
Haiti had been in constant revolution since 1908, no fewer than eight presidents 
having been elected and overthrown in that time. The financial condition of the 
country was found to be deplorable and the Government of President Sam was 
declared to be tottering for the want of funds.198  
 
The article also conveyed that, according to another report by Paul Fuller, Jr., sent to 
Haiti by President Wilson to seek authorization to the American control of customs 
collection in the face of French and German threat to seize the custom houses unless 
debts were repaid, the Haitian government had declined the offer: “Haitian 
Government made counterproposals which are not regarded as likely to lead to a 
settlement of disturbances on the island.”199 On July 27, 1915 American marines 
landed in Haiti to bring back order after the brutal murder of Haitian President Vilbru 
Guillaume Sam, and it was in August 1915 that the United States made a 
proclamation.  
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. . . to assure the Haitian people that the United States has no object in view except 
to insure, to establish, and to help maintain Haitian independence and the 
establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people. Every 
assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. It 
is the intention to retain the United States forces in Haiti only as long as will be 
necessary for this purpose.200  
 
Contrary to Germany, France and Italy, the United States had been withholding 
recognition of the Vilbru Sam government “until some arrangement could be made 
which would stabilize conditions [in Haiti].”201 However, it chose to protect Haiti 
from drifting into further chaos after the murder of a president it had not officially 
sanctified. 
 
2.4 The occupation (1915-1934) 
The occupation of Haiti initiated a fierce debate on the Administration’s 
justifications and their critique. Booker T. Washington,202 a black educator, author  
and leader of the African American community, became a fervent opponent of the 
American occupation of Haiti. Even though Washington had a patronizing, fatalistic 
tone toward the Haitian people, he found fault with the American policies toward the 
Republic.  
 
The way matters are now going, there is likely to be bitterness and war. The United 
States, in the end, will conquer, will control, will have its way, but it is one thing to 
conquer a people through love, through unselfish interest in their welfare, and 
another thing to conquer them through the bullet, through the shotgun. Shooting 
civilization into the Haitians on their own soil will be an amazing spectacle. Sending 
marines as diplomats and Mauser bullets as messengers of destruction breed riot and 
anarchy, and are likely to leave a legacy of age-long hatreds and regrets.203  
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The black magazine The Crisis rebuked American policies on the basis of 
recurrent strife in the so-called “civilized” nations of America and Europe: “The 
anarchy in Hayti is no worse than the anarchy in the United States at the time of our 
Civil War, and not as great as the anarchy today in Europe. The lynching and murder 
in Port au Prince is no worse than, if as bad as, the lynching in Georgia.”204 The 
Elizabeth City, N.C. Independent shared the same view. Haiti represented “the 
earliest effort of the Negro race to establish a Republican form of government” and 
America was in fact indebted to Haiti, as it was Toussaint L’Ouverture “who was big 
enough and brave enough and resourceful enough to drive back Napoleon Bonaparte 
at a time when that imperial personification of force and power was tempted to push 
his conquests into the Western Hemisphere.”205 The Republican National 
Committee’ address pointed at discrepancies of the Democratic Administration: “The 
Administration was ‘too proud to fight’ Mexico but did not hesitate to conquer the 
Black Republic of Hayti and Santo Domingo. There was one policy of international 
justice for Mexico and another for the Negro Republics south of us.”206 The African 
American press championed the Haitian revolutionaries, called cacos or “bandits” by 
the administration, as freedom fighters, following the example of African American 
abolitionists like Gabriel Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner. They also 
ridiculed Wilson for celebrating the rights of small nations in the context of post-
World War I settlement, but denying the same right for Haiti.207 Former President 
Theodore Roosevelt was equally critical of Wilson’s hypocritical stance toward 
certain nations. 
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The first fact is that nations do not stand on any real equality, and that at this 
moment we are not so treating them. A couple of years ago Haiti and Santo 
Domingo were two little independent republics. According to the principles Mr. 
Wilson has publicly laid down they were as much entitled to the right of self-
determination as the United States or France, and all our dealing with them should 
have been frank and above board. But in practice Mr. Wilson conquered them, killed 
large numbers of their people, deprived them of self-determination, and kept the 
action absolutely secret.208  
 
 
President Wilson held the view that certain nations were inferior and hence, 
could not qualify for the application of self-determination principle. Nevertheless, he 
concurrently believed that, “when properly directed there is no people not fitted for 
government.”209 Furthermore, Wilson’s address to the Commercial Club of Omaha 
underscored the need for more assertiveness to have a say over international finance 
and commerce.  
 
 
England had bankers of its own in foreign ports all over the world . . .Germany had 
bankers everywhere, had bankers where we had not dreamed of having trade, to 
serve their own people in financing their own trade. France had banks; the leading 
bank of Haiti, our neighbor is a French bank. The French had thought of their trade 
in Haiti and the right ways to serve it when we had thought of our commercial 
interests there at all. With what we boasted and believed  -what I believe- to be the 
best business genius in the world, we had not even thought of using that genius 
outside of our own markets. We cannot do it any longer. We have got, for a certain 
period at any rate, to finance some of the chief undertakings of the world for 
ourselves and others.210   
 
 
One editorial in The Nation reminded Woodrow Wilson’s Mobile Speech in 
which the President promised not to take any more territory to the south of America: 
“Until we agree to respect the rights of small Caribbean nationalities and treat 
respectfully the citizens of those whom we have annexed or purchased, our moral 
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protests as to Servia and Belgium must lack convincing force.”211 Another article 
asserted that, since the World War was over, the American overseeing of Haiti was 
no longer necessary.  
 
 
It was understood, of course, that the protection of the American navy was necessary 
to keep both Haitians and Dominicans from falling into the clutches of the former 
Kaiser Wilhelm, but now that Mr. Wilson has brought peace to all the world -with 
certain exceptions- that necessity is no longer imperative . . .The world cannot be 
made safe for democracy while the Secretary of the Navy rules, with absolute power 
and without the consent of the governed . . .212  
 
 
 
On the administration’s side, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels (1913-
1921) challenged Senator Warren G. Harding’s (R-OH) statements on American 
occupation. For Harding, thousands of native Haitians had been killed by the 
Marines.  
We are at war, not alone technically with Germany, but actually with the little, 
helpless republics of our own hemisphere. The wars upon our neighbors to the south 
were made and are still being waged through the usurpation by the Executive of 
powers not only never bestowed upon him, but scrupulously withheld by the 
Constitution . . .[M]any of our gallant men have sacrificed their lives at the behest of 
an executive department in order to establish laws drafted by an Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy to secure a vote in the League . . .213 
 
 
 
Daniels defended the “brave and patriotic members of the Marine Corps [who] have 
served the best interest of peaceble Haitians, built roads, preserved order, introduced 
sanitation and served Haitian prosperity and Haitian stability, first destroyed and 
menaced by bodies of bandits.”214 The Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby (1920-
1921) also replied to the attacks on the government’s policies in Haiti. He underlined 
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the stipulations of the Monroe Doctrine, even though the Doctrine had refused to 
extend protectorship to the black Republic 
 
 
[Back in 1915] Haiti’s European creditors were pressing for payment of the foreign 
debts of Haiti and the fear was frequently entertained that murder of the Haitian 
President would prompt an aggressive program on the parts of some European 
Governments which would not only challenge the Monroe Doctrine but arraign the 
United States for a failure to perform duties which it had expressly avowed as a part 
of the Monroe Doctrine. These duties have nowhere found more explicit statement 
than in the addresses and messages of the late President Roosevelt. In an address 
delivered by him in August 1905, he said ‘Inasmuch as by the Monroe Doctrine we 
prevent other nations from interfering on this side of the water, we should ourselves, 
in good faith, help our sister republics upward in peace and order.’215  
 
 
The public statements of Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, who had been charged by 
the Navy Secretary Daniels to investigate the conditions in Haiti spoke similar 
words. He outlined the achievements and asserted that the United States needed to 
stay longer as to reach a fullfledged stability and prosperity in Haiti: “There is no 
censorship of the press in the ordinary sense that of the word in Haiti although false 
and incendiary propaganda against the United States is prohibited.” Knapp also 
justified the taking over of the police forces by the United States on the fact that the 
Haitian army at the time of the occupation was “utterly inefficient, untrained and 
undisciplined.”216 He would again make reference to his findings in early 1921 to 
justify prolonged American occupation of Haiti. For him, Haiti did not qualify for a 
republic, but was an inferior nation ruled by oligarchs.  
 
 
The people of the United States should not allow themselves to be deceived by the 
words ‘Republic of Haiti’ into believing that there exists in Haiti, or ever has, a 
republic in any sense, founded upon the expressed will of an intelligent and educated 
electorate. The so-called Republic of Haiti, left to itself, has been a tyrannical 
oligarchy in which those in power fattened upon the vast masses of the population: 
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while those of the governing class out of power sought every opportunity to get into 
power, by fair means or foul, with the same personal corrupt ends in view.217   
 
 
 
 However, atrocity stories were abundant in the media. Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, New York Tribune, and Brooklyn Eagle frequently used such terms as 
“slavery in Haiti,” “slaughter,” or “shameful abuse of power.”218 A remarkable attack 
appeared in October 1920 in The New York Times which told of 
 
 
how American marines, largely made up of and officered by Southerners, opened 
fire with machine guns from airplanes upon defenseless Haitian villages, killing 
men, women and children in the open market places; how natives were slain for 
“sport” by a hoodlum element among these same Southerners; and how the ancient 
corvee system of enforced labor was revived and ruthlessly executed, increasing, 
through retaliation, the banditry in Haiti . . .219   
 
 
Nineteen-twenty was also the year in which the oppositional press began 
counteracting the portrayal of Haiti in official accounts. They took the initiative of 
investigating the conditions in Haiti, rather than being informed by the 
administration’s records. They also exalted the history and culture of Haiti more 
offensively. In other words, the truths spoke for themselves. That year the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which hitherto had 
focused upon national issues as equality for blacks, incorporated in their program 
blacks in other countries. As the black magazine Phylon conveyed, the NAACP 
decided to send James Weldon Johnson to Haiti to conduct an investigation on the 
atrocities of U.S. marines there. Johnson’s report was widely quoted by the critical 
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media, and the Wilson Administration was faced with demands for explanation.220 
Concisely, the report conveyed that the marines did not intervene to restore peace 
since, in 1914, there were U.S. attempts to persuade Haiti for U.S. control of national 
finances –a proposal fully rejected by the Haitian government. Johnson also exposed 
the relationship between the American business community and the United States 
government, which cooperated to reap the benefits of occupation by controlling the 
Haitian economy at the expense of its nationals. Lastly, Johnson demonstrated the 
brutality of the occupation forces, censorship of the press and ailing infrastructure of 
Haiti despite the official records about the various successes in uplifting the 
inhabitants.221 In reply to Johnson’s charges, the Secretary of State Colby maintained 
that the intentions of the United States had been “benevolent.”222 
One other alternative account demonstrated how Haiti paid for its reluctance 
to be engaged in European imbroglios. The Wilson Administration wanted Haiti to 
declare war against Germany, so that one more ally would help shape the postwar 
settlement in favor of United States. In return, Haiti witnessed the dissolution of its 
parliament at the hands of an alleged champion of democracy. 
 
 
But Washington was far seeing. Before squaring accounts with Germany a Peace 
Conference was going to be held somewhere and votes would be required to put 
certain propositions through. If Haiti declared war against Germany, Haiti would be 
at the Peace Table to vote and that vote would be counted. But the Haitian 
government refused to declare war against Germany. Out of friendship with the 
United States they advised simply that diplomatic relations with Germany be broken 
. . . Because of the refusal to accede to the wishes of the American Government  
[Admiral Caperton] forced the dissolution of the Haitian Parliament [established] a 
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Council of State of twenty-one members whose function shall be to discharge all 
legislative duties.223  
 
 
 
Another editorial in late 1920 in The New Republic criticized the happy picture 
presented by the administration about the affairs in Haiti. Quoting from the Navy 
Secretary Daniels’ annual reports of 1918 and 1919 to the country, the article then 
gave a record of how this “official contentment with our rule in Haiti” was 
challenged by many critics. In his report for 1918, Daniels told that Haiti, “under the 
direction and guidance of naval administration, has, in peace and quiet, and just laws 
well administered, enjoyed development, prosperity, and tranquility. The Marines 
have not only preserved order, but have aided in system of internal improvement.”224 
His next report entailed similar lines 
 
 
Called to restore order and administer the finances of these governments (Haiti and 
Santo Domingo) close to us in geography and interest, it is gratifying to report that 
there has been freedom from all suggestion of selfish aims on the part of the 
occupying civilian and military agencies. The development of the country, the 
education and welfare of the people, improvement in agriculture, the firm and kind 
administration of justice have borne their fruit in the most prosperous era in the 
history of these neighbor governments.225 
 
 
 
For his part, Republican Senator Joseph Medill McCormick of Illinois saw American 
failure in Haiti and urged that, rather than militarily occupy the Republic, the United 
States had to send there such people who were “keenly sympathetic with the purpose 
to develop the country, the government and above all the civilization of the people of 
whom the overwhelming majority have African blood in their veins.”226 
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The low value placed on the Haitians were challenged on many other grounds 
during the Warren G. Harding (1921-1923/Republican) era as well. One editorial 
claimed that  
 
The vaudouism of which much has been made by our imperialist propaganda as 
justification for anything we choose to do anything in Haiti, has been encouraged by 
the American Occupation. Since the days of Toussaint L’Ouverture, the Haitian 
government has legislated against any exhibition of the fantastic and primitive rites 
practiced by a very small fraction among the most ignorant of the Haitian masses, 
and the Haitian civil code, for which American military law has been substituted 
since 1915, expressly forbade it.227 
 
 
 
The Messenger, another black magazine, juxtaposed Haiti and Ireland, drawing 
parallels between the oppression of the Irish by imperial Britain and republican 
America alike.  
 
Santo Domingo and Haiti are the Ireland of America. So long as brutal oppression 
and ruthless exploitation of Haitians and Dominicans continue by American forces 
of occupation, the “land of the free and the home of the brave” sometimes 
erroneously paraphrased as the land of the lynching bee and home of the slave, has 
no right to speak to the notion on the self-determination of smaller nationalities.228 
 
 
 
One critic argued against the propaganda efforts by the American occupation which 
aimed at displaying the Haitian nationalists (“cacos”) and revolutionists as “bandits.” 
In U.S. terms, “caco” was depicted as a mountaineer who would fight for pay in the 
ranks of the revolutionary leader who offered him the highest pay. All cacos were 
regarded as “opponents of the Occupation,” whereas “revolution” meant “any 
organized movement against the Occupation or its policies.”229 In another article in  
The Messenger, Haiti was claimed to be “not more savage than Texas;” contrary to 
the allegations of being “backward,” the Haitians “neither lynch nor burn human 
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beings.”230 A similar argument would be repeated by the Republican Senator 
William Edgar Borah of Idaho in 1922 as: “When you examine the record of 
robberies and murders in great cities, the lynchings and burnings in this country, and 
compare them with the lawlessness in Haiti, you will find little excuse for our going 
to Haiti.”231 Alternative histories of American occupation continued well into 1921 
and 1922. These brought into open the brutality, torture, rape and arson attributed to 
the American marines, by giving witness names and mortality statistics. Some of 
them even included orders in private correspondence and secret dispatches.232 A 
comprehensive account was the memoir on the wretched political, economic and 
financial conditions in Haiti by the delegates of the Union Patriotique d’Haiti, which 
was presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 9, 1921, and was 
publicized on May 25. Its conclusion mocked America as the so-called cradle of 
liberty and democracy, while celebrating the founding principles, capabilities and 
manners of the Haitian nation.  
 
 
The Haitian Republic was the second nation of the New World –second only to the 
United States– to conquer its national independence . . . For 111 years the little 
Haitian nation has managed its own affairs; for 111 years it had made the necessary 
effort for its material, intellectual, and moral development as well as any other 
nation –better than any other nation, because it has been from the start absolutely 
alone in its difficult task . . . [One day], without any possible explanation or 
justification on the grounds of violation of any American rights or interest, 
American forces landed on our national territory and actually abolished the 
sovereignty and independence of the Haitian Republic . . . [The Occupation] is the 
most terrible regime of military autocracy which has ever been carried on in the 
name of the great American democracy.233 
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In a defensive reply, the former Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s (1915-
1920) letter read before a Select Committee of Inquiry234 put forth that, the reason for 
intervention was “the imminent threat of Haiti’s falling into German hands.” For 
him, “the Germans were financing revolutions, dominating local politics and were 
about to take over exclusive control of Haitian customs and the Mole-Saint-
Nicolas.”235 One of the conclusions of the Committee was the need for an imposition 
of a system of vocational education in the republic, which also drew much criticism. 
According to the committee report, a new agency to supervise the manual/technical 
education was founded under the name of Service Technique de l’Agriculture et de 
l’Enseignement Professionnel, which became operational in early 1926.236 Zonia 
Barber and E.G. Balch of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
pointed at another negative impact of the occupation on Haitian life. 
 
 
Haitians, so far as we talk with them, dread American influence on their education 
system, fearing that if it is “Anglo-Saxonized” it will be turned away from the 
French cultural tradition and given a materialist and purely utilitarian trend. Their 
sense of distress is acute. It is as if their soul itself were in danger of being tampered 
by alien hands.237 
 
 
 
At the annual conference at Langwood, Pennsylvania, June 2-4, 1922, The 
Progressive Friends238 expressed their discontent of the “seizure and military control 
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of the Dominican Republic and Haiti,” and considered the intervention as “not only 
un-American and in violation of existing treaties and international law,” but also 
inconsistent with President Harding’s ante-election pledges.239 The opposition also 
criticized America’s hypocrisy as the government began signs of granting freedom to 
Santo Domingo but not Haiti. For them, the rationale behind this had racial and 
cultural undertones. 
 
 
Santo Domingo, although most of her citizens are of Negro descent, ranks as a 
“white country” because most Dominicans are ashamed of Africa and are 
encouraging white migration . . . Santo Domingo, speaking Spanish, also calls on the 
sympathy of Spanish and Portuguese South America, where our banking interests 
are seeking broader fields.240  
 
 
 
The final report of the United States Senate hearings before the Select 
Committee on Haiti and Domingo was condescending. Although natives and 
foreigners alike were given the opportunity to express their views during the 
hearings, and despite the fact that the report admitted the deficiencies on the part of 
the occupation forces, the final prescription favored the Americans. It was stated that 
Haitian moral, social, political and economic development depended upon continued 
American policy. 
 
The obvious duty of patriotic Haitians is to uphold their own government in 
effectively cooperating with that of the United States under the treaty, and so hasten 
the day when Haiti may stand alone. The alternative to the course herein suggested 
is the immediate withdrawal of American support and the abandonment of the 
Haitian people to chronic revolution, anarchy, barbarism, and ruin.241   
 
 
 
In late 1923, an appeal was made in The Nation by the Haitian diplomat 
Dantes Bellagarde. Reminding that Haiti was a charter member of the League of 
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Nations, Bellagarde’s claim revolved around the prolonged military occupation as 
being an unjustifiable violation of  international law: “a humiliation for the Haitian 
nation, an attack upon its territorial integrity, and a limitation of the full exercise of 
its sovereignty.”242 A 1924 article in Atlantic Monthly displayed criticism by France, 
Britain and Spain against the occupation, portraying the military intervention as a 
blot in American history since it encouraged other actors to act arbitrarily in their 
backyard. 
 
In no country has the military occupation of Santo Domingo and Haiti has been 
more discussed than in Japan, where the government has formed now its own 
Monroe Doctrine of the Orient, by which it justified its recent Twenty-One demands 
on China, and its imperialism in Korea.243 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the John Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929/Republican) era did not 
offer anything different from other administrations’ policies. In 1923, the Secretary 
of State Charles Evans Hughes (1921-1925) referred to the United States as a 
benefactor, with no other intention than guaranteeing sustainable order in Haiti, 
whose nationals were yet unable to govern themselves.  
 
 
Conditions in Haiti have not yet permitted the withdrawal of American forces, as 
there is general agreement that such a withdrawal would be the occasion for 
revolution and bloodshed . . .[The Government of the United States] does not seek to 
acquire or to control the territory of Haiti and it will welcome the day when it can 
leave Haiti with the reasonable assurance that the Haitians will be able to maintain 
an independent government competent to keep order and discharge its international 
obligations.244 
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Coolidge’s remarks in early 1925 reflected a similar understanding. He portrayed the 
United States as behaving selfless and volunteering to bear the burden of occupation 
at the pleas of Haitians. 
 
 
Of course, we want to withdraw. We had some plans to withdraw. We have there a 
few marines –sent there for the purpose of maintaining peace and order and 
protecting American interests, and incidentally, perhaps more than incidental for 
protecting also the Haitians. But the Government of Haiti sent a very strong request 
that we continue the occupation, and that we have done.245  
 
 
 
Upon criticisms about the United States withdrawal from Santo Domingo but not 
Haiti, Hughes almost repeated his words 
 
 
We have no desire to take advantage of this regrettable condition [of internal 
dissensions and revolutions instead of fair elections] in neighboring countries, either 
to acquire territory or to assume political control . . . In Haiti, we are only waiting to 
see a reasonable promise of internal peace and stability to effect our withdrawal. 
And meanwhile we are doing our utmost to promote the interest of the people of 
Haiti without selfish considerations.246 
 
 
  
In 1926, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom organized 
a committee to look into the conditions of Haiti and offer alternatives to the 
American policy of routinely sending in the marines. According to their conclusions, 
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what the United States was doing in Haiti was a gross aberration that contradicted the 
basic founding tenets of America. 
 
 
We are teaching them to accept military control as the supreme law, and to 
acquiesce in the arbitrary use of superior power. They are not permitted to elect 
representatives nor to convene a National Assembly. Haitians themselves complain 
that a generation is growing up without any political experience or habit of political 
responsibility or initiative, and that the government was never so militarized.247 
 
 
Another editorial, mocking the so-called American “experts” to uplift Haiti, drew 
parallels with the “American haze in Haiti” and the “British mess in Mesopotamia”: 
“The present policy is using starvation as a threat and money as a bait in order to 
force all Haitian departments under American control. When the Haitian law 
professors are sufficiently hungry, they too will put their schools under an 
‘expert’.”248 Senator William H. King (D-UT) repeatedly attacked the occupation’s 
self-portrayal as “the savior,” and called for withdrawal from “that unhappy 
country.” In his eyes, “Haiti is in the position of a conquered country and the Haitian 
people regarded themselves as the victim of an oppressive foreign invader.”249 One 
other article pointed at an inconsistency: the United States, interfering in the 
domestic affairs of Haiti since 1915, was refraining from doing as such in the case of 
oppositional press members in Haiti being sent to prison. 
 
 
What happens to a newspaper man, arbitrarily cast into prison? He stays there, 
without examination by a magistrate, without the judgement of a court. And if an 
American philanthropic society, knowing of the case, makes an appeal to the State 
Department at Washington, the invariable response is: “It is the native government 
which has acted, and we are powerless to interfere in the domestic affairs of Haiti.” 
250
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Another discrepancy was reflected in the occupational forces’ behavior during the 
voting of constitutional amendments in early 1928. The so-called inferior Haitians, 
who were allegedly unable to take part in elections, were brought to the voting 
platform by the U.S. forces themselves. 
 
 
American and Haitian officials state that elections in Haiti are impossible because of 
the illiteracy of the people. Yet, in January, 1928, the people solemnly voted upon a 
set of constitutional amendments which were “adopted” by [an] overwhelming 
majority. The United States assisted in this election by placing trucks at the 
disposition of the Borno Government to take voters to the polls. If the United States 
insists on “fair” elections in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America, is it 
unreasonable to ask why in the one country, where it is in the position to secure such 
elections, it should be a party to a jocose fraud?251  
 
 
 
Within the context of economic exploitation of Haiti by the occupation, one editorial 
attacked the American policy by a retrospective argument: “Once Americans were 
sensitive about taxation without representation. Now they force this upon a 
neighboring republic, at the dictate of affected American financial interests.”252 
 Coolidge’s replies to these allegations had a defensive tone. The President 
reiterated that the United States had no veiled intentions, and that it aspired to elevate 
Haiti to the level of civilization. 
 
 
Though we have at this time some of our forces in Haiti, Nicaragua and China, they 
are in none of these places for the purpose of making war, but for the purpose of 
insuring peaceful conditions under which the rights of our nationals and their 
property may receive that protection to which they are entitled under the terms of 
international law. Our further purpose in Haiti and Nicaragua is to assist the peoples 
and governments of those two countries in establishing stability, in maintaining 
orderly and peaceful institutions in harmony with civilized society.253 
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Nevertheless, he never refrained to talk about the benefits the U.S. would derive by 
the extension of air-mail routes “from Key West, Fla., over Cuba, Haiti, and Santo 
Domingo to San Juan, P.R., where it will connect with another route to Trinidad.” 
For Coolidge, an additional route from Key West to the Canal Zone “will give us a 
circle around the Caribbean under our own control.”254 
A progressive and reformer, Herbert C. Hoover’s (1929-1933/Republican) 
policies were more concessionary than those of the former Republican President. 
They aimed at improving the conditions and image of the United States both at home 
and abroad. His view toward Latin America was summarized as the attitude of the 
“good neighbor,” which meant the repudiation of the Roosevelt Corollary. This term 
was later adopted by Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945/Democratic) as well.255 It 
was within this context that the United States abrogated its rule in Cuba, Nicaragua 
and Haiti. In his first Annual Message to the Congress, the President stated: “We still 
have marines on foreign soil –in Nicaragua, Haiti, and China. In the larger sense, we 
do not wish to be represented abroad in such manner.”256 Calling for the Congress 
the approval of a Commission to Haiti to review and the study of American 
withdrawal, Hoover nevertheless spoke highly of the occupation forces: “Our 
representatives in Haiti have shown great ability and devotion, and have 
accomplished signal results in improvement of the material condition of that 
people.”257 In his instructions to the Forbes Commission set up by Congress approval 
Hoover spoke in a patronizing manner. According to the President, any haste in 
withdrawal would probably cause a blowback. 
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The primary question which is to be investigated is when and how we are to 
withdraw from Haiti . . .There are some people who wish for us to scuttle overnight. 
I am informed that every group in Haiti considers that such action would result in 
disaster to the Haitian people.258 
 
 
Nevertheless, Hoover’s refusal to appoint an African American to the Forbes 
Commission drew much criticism. An editorial by Robert Abbott of the Chicago 
Defender denounced the “lily white” commission, writing that “there is no one on the 
commission with whom Haitians can claim kinship.”259 Additionally, in a late 1929 
congressional debate, several congressmen denounced the condescending attitude of 
the Administration, and desired that Haiti should be treated on an equal footing with 
America. They pointed at the fact that the number of Haitian presidents assassinated 
was almost the same as the number of American presidents assassinated and that, at 
the time of the United States’ recognition of Haiti, the numbers were three presidents 
for both countries.260 In the Congress, there were also repeated attacks against the 
occupation, with the critics resembling it to that of Great Britain in India and Japan 
in Korea.261 Representative George Huddleston (D-AL) also underlined that “an 
imperialism abroad cannot remain a democracy at home.”262 Speech by another 
Representative, Robert Crosser (R-OH), conveyed the congress member’s fear about 
the possible repercussions of highhandedness in Haiti on the United States itself 
 
 
I sympathize with the Haitian people, but I regard our disregard of the right of self-
government by the Haitians as more harmful to our own institutions than to the 
Haitians, because we disregard the great principles announced in the Declaration of 
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Independence. When we cease to practice justice, the moral fiber of the people will 
begin to decay.263  
 
 
 
The report of the Forbes Commission in 1930264 reflected a version of the 
Senate Hearings Report of 1922. Even though certain weaknesses of the occupation 
system was admitted, overall, it was the positive accomplishments that filled the 
papers such as the “noteworthy” financial improvements. However, it signified a 
turning point in U.S.-Haitian relations and gradual withdrawal began according to its 
recommendations.265 Walter Thurston, Chief of the Division of Latin American 
Affairs of the Department of State portrayed the nation’s Caribbean policy in the 
context of the “Monroe Doctrine and the Isthmian policy, which has to do with the 
protection of the Panama Canal” and added that he saw nothing in American policies 
on Caribbean countries “that need alarm or embarrass any good American citizen.” 
With reference to Haiti, Thurston asserted that “to withdraw fully at this time and 
leave them exposed to their own inadequacies of one sort or another” would be an 
ingracious move.266 
As the process of withdrawal gained pace, criticisms abounded. An article by 
Walter White in The Crisis, exposed a comment by one of the American officials on 
the issue of not teaching physics and higher mathematics to the Haitians -essential 
knowledge in modern warfare: “We may have to come down here again sometime 
and if these Haitians know too much about the use of modern guns it might cost us 
too much.”267 In line with the findings of the Commission, the new policy of 
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“Haitianization,” that is, the process of replacement of Americans with Haitian 
nationals in public works, sanitation and education began in October 1931. However, 
the Journal and Guide treated Haitianization as “rampant imperialism” deeming it as 
a means to “extend iron-fisted diplomacy over Haiti.”268  
Hoover’s December 1931 message to the Congress seemed to confirm this 
observation. The terms of withdrawal were designed not for the sake of the Haitians 
altogether. Regarding the Haitians as still incapable to stand on their own, the 
withdrawal framework mostly aimed at protecting the U.S. forces before they finally 
left the Republic.  
 
 
To minimize the possibility of epidemics, and in order that the health of the 
American troops and officials still stationed in Haiti might adequately be protected, 
the accord provided that an American scientific mission, consisting of three 
American naval officers and six hospital corpsmen, should be charged with the 
control of sanitation in the cities of Port au Prince and Cape Haitien.269 
 
 
 
 The election of 1932 also witnessed sarcastic comments about the presidential 
candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt and his role in the drawing up of the Haitian 
Constitution. Quoting Roosevelt’s own words that had appeared in the August 19, 
1920 issue of The New York Times, namely that “I wrote Haiti’s constitution myself, 
and if I do say it, I think it was a pretty good constitution,” Cleveland Gazette said 
that “the enforcement of Roosevelt’s Haitian constitution has occasioned the 
bloodiest chapter in all the history of Haiti.”270  
However, it was Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945/Democratic) who won the 
election, and his Inaugural Address incorporated the borrowed term of “good 
neighbor” from the Hoover administration. Roosevelt went one step beyond 
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Hoover’s neighbor policy though, by finally realizing the withdrawal of American 
troops from Haiti. Criticism inside and outside the United States, as well as 
frustration with the incessant political and socio-economic upheaval in Haiti had 
rendered further American presence there obsolete. In a public statement in early 
November 1933, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1933-1944) quoted from the 
President’s message that promised to “dedicate this nation to the policy of good 
neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in 
and with a world of neighbors.” Hull’s address affirmed that it was this 
understanding to be adopted in the upcoming Pan American Conference at 
Montevideo.271 In line with this thinking, Roosevelt requested that the Congress 
authorize the granting of unneeded U.S. marines’ buildings and equipment to Haiti. 
 
 
Next October, our Marine and Naval forces will be withdrawn from Haiti. During a 
period of almost twenty years in Haiti, they have rendered valuable assistance in 
training the Haitian Constabulary. This Constabulary known as the Garde, has been 
using certain equipment and material loaned to them by our Marine and Naval 
forces. Also, there are various buildings, barracks, garages and workshops which our 
Marine and Naval forces have constructed. It would seem to me a fitting climax to 
the close of the period of special relationship which has existed between Haiti and 
the United States if our Government were to make a gift of these buildings and a 
portion of this material and equipment to the Haitian Government.272    
 
 
 
In a Fireside Chat, Roosevelt referred to Haiti as one of the “sister republics.”273 And 
finally, the marines departed on August 15.  
 
2.5 Until the Cold War (1934-1945) 
Haiti was relegated to relatively minor status with occasional moments of 
alert during the Second World War and the following Cold War period. In late 1935, 
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the President’s Address to a Committee from the National Students Federation at the 
White House repeated his goodwill toward America’s neighbors. He also spoke in 
apologetic terms. 
 
 
[T]here has always been a suspicion on the part of Latin Americans that the United 
States had some ulterior motive –and there was ground for some suspicion. In the 
past we have done all sorts of things. After all, they are a people of great pride. We 
should have respected that pride. Yet we sent troops to Nicaragua, to Cuba, to Haiti 
and to Santo Domingo. In fact, that continued until two years ago, giving them the 
idea that we had in the back of our minds the thought to expand and take in their 
territory.274 
 
 
 
Yet, it was also in the same address that Roosevelt distinguished between the United 
States and Europe, favoring the former as usual: “In establishing trade relations we 
are establishing peaceful relations with Canada and other American republics and 
perhaps, some day, European Nations will see what we have done and will try to 
copy us.”275 His statements evoked the “city upon a hill” discourse, which regarded 
the United States as an exemplary nation for others to emulate. The State 
Department’s foreign policy statement for the Democratic Platform also repeated that 
the actions of the present administration had erased suspicion and hostility in the 
Western Hemisphere towards the United States. Hailing the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations, the statement held that 
the Administration “will carry on the policy of the ‘good neighbor’, encouraging 
increased trade and stimulating all means of intercourse with our American 
neighbors to our mutual advantage.”276 The President’s Address at Chautauqua, N.Y. 
reiterated the withdrawal of marines from Haiti, underlining that “throughout the 
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Americas the spirit of the good neighbor is a practical and living fact. The twenty-
one American Republics are not only living together in friendship and in peace; they 
are united in the determination so to remain.”277 
Within the context of the Second World War, a critical article in late 1939 
pointed at the lack of interest in Haiti by the press. As it exposed, “that an American 
fiscal representative has dictatorial control over its finances are facts that are scarcely 
known . . .[T]he insidious civil invasions have done their work without their beating 
of tomtoms. Haiti has become the land of the forgotten.”278 It was in mid-April 1942 
that an official agreement was made public in The New York Times for strengthening 
the military, naval and economic position of Haiti against fascist invasion. 
Supplemental to the Lend-Lease agreement between the United States and Haiti of 
September 16, 1941, it stated that America would give “active assistance in 
developing and manning Haitian defenses” and would “buy Haiti’s cotton, extend 
credits for exchange purposes and assist in increasing sisal production.” Lastly, the 
statement talked about experts to be sent to the Republic to improve health and 
sanitation.279 It was not before the prospect of Haiti-Cuba rapprochement appeared in 
the Cold War setting that Haiti would again occupy the attention of U.S. 
administrations. 
 
2.6 Analysis 
 This account of argumentative challenge between official and oppositional 
rhetoric regarding U.S.-Haitian relations brings into light many details that can never 
be reached only through an analysis of the official view. The anti-establishment lens 
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presents almost a completely different account of Haiti’s situation, furnishing the 
audience with behind the scenes data right from the country itself. The position of the 
black press is especially insightful on this issue, arguing fervently about the rights of 
Haiti and against the distorted account of Haiti’s portrayal by the U.S. officials as 
bloody barbars requiring caution and guidance. Within this web of meaning-making 
efforts, various techniques are used to interpret and describe the past and present. 
Recounting history from the perspective of predicates, comparisons and metaphors 
created by the people offers a fresh venue for a better understanding of the character 
and quality of the burning issues of history, as well as the actors associated with 
them. Parenthetically, rhetorical elements do not often show stability in terms of the 
actors’ occupation (i.e. government or Congress member, ordinary citizen), party 
affiliation or race. This is one of the contributions of this study, showing the variety 
in perspective and rhetoric even within the establishment or the opposition. Finally, 
the research case also contributes another example to the preexisting studies showing 
the interrelatedness of internal and external constraints in policy, and of domestic and 
foreign policies.   
The U.S. official rhetoric from the foundational era to the pre-Cold War 
period rests upon rigid presuppositions, yet changing metaphors as regards Haiti. The 
change in metaphorical quality can be attributed both to internal and external 
developments in and around the United States, and according to how these were 
interpreted as dangers and threats to the country by the administration and the 
opposition. The first and foremost predicate rested on racial prejudices, and stated 
that the black republic was naturally and irrevocably savage, inferior, hence 
incapable of reaching to the level of civilization. This identification would be a 
recurring theme for most of the U.S. administrations. Haiti gradually became a 
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source of anxiety for the United States since a weak actor in its backyard would incur 
threats upon the U.S itself. Nevertheless, “avoiding entangling alliances” of the first 
President George Washington (1789-1797/no party) remained the basic tenet for a 
considerable period of time as the United States itself was a newly founded republic 
in need of internal development. Worsening relations with France and prospects of 
profitable trade with Haiti paved the way towards denoting Haiti in more favorable 
terms, yet the presupposition of a destitute Haiti which was better to be avoided 
remained.  
Positioning itself above Haiti, the official rhetoric often couched the United 
States in overbearing metaphors that justified late recognition of Haiti. The 
announcement by the U.S. of its being the watchman over the Western Hemisphere 
did nothing to elevate the status of Haiti any further, as the famous Monroe Doctrine 
of 1823 (James Monroe, 1817-1825/Democratic-Republic) left Haiti outside its 
protection due to non-recognition of this black republic. Another Democratic- 
Republican President John Quincy Adams’ (1825-1829) stance toward Haiti was a 
positive, yet, condescending one. His decision for sending American delegates to the 
Panama Congress in which Haiti would also participate was based on a 
presupposition of American generosity and benevolence. The metaphors associated 
with the United States proposed a new interpretation of avoiding alliances, 
describing this country as the role model for liberal commercial economic system 
and religious liberty for others in an increasingly interdependent world.  
Against the background of fervent abolitionist campaigns, Republican 
Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865) foresaw domestic approval as well as commercial 
advantages in establishing formal bilateral relations with Haiti, and further qualified 
this country refined and friendly for American blacks to resettle if they desired. Also 
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a Republican, Andrew Johnson (1865-1869) even identifed Haiti as the only 
independent republic in the West Indies capable of self-defence, yet he also noted its 
dependence on European monarchies. Therefore, Johnson “selflessly” advocated 
annexation of Haiti “for the best interests” of the United States, European powers 
and the Haiti itself. Another Republican president Ulysses Grant’s (1869-1877) 
annexation policy involving Santo Domingo was based upon this country’s being 
open to intervention by restless Haiti. Behind these territorial expansion schemes 
stood the desire for enhanced American control over the region. Within this context, 
Haiti was viewed as an important venue regarding the U.S.-initiated Nicaraguan 
Canal as a competitor to the French Panama Canal. Mole St. Nicholas was also seen 
as a strategic place to oversee the region. Theodore Roosevelt’s (1901-
1909/Republican) militant and interventionist interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine 
in his Roosevelt Corollary, and finally Woodrow Wilson’s (1913-1921/Democratic) 
policy of occupation marked a turning point in Haitian history. Upon taking office, 
Wilson sought to see “the orderly process of just government” around U.S. borders, 
and stated that Haiti lacked the capability to achieve such political order as it bore 
African racial traits. The occupation’s (1915-1934) main official justification was 
phrased as the need “to insure, establish, and to help Haitian independence and the 
establishment of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people,” since certain 
nations were naturally inferior.280 It was also for this presupposed inferiority that 
Wilson believed Haiti could not qualify for the self-determination principle.    
French and especially German influence over political and economic 
conditions of Haiti was another reason for occupation put forward by the Wilson 
Administration against the background of World War I. Moreover, the so-called 
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“brutal” or “bloody” Haitian “bandits” were often portrayed as slaughtering the U.S. 
Marines busy with uplifting the pitiful Haitian people. In many official accounts and 
reports, the United States were described as building roads, introducing sanitation 
and serving Haitian prosperity and stability. Criticisms as to the abuse of power by 
the occupational forces, or the lack of improvement in Haiti finally led to hearings 
and surveys on the situation in Haiti as of 1922. Nevertheless, even though the 
Administration admitted some deficiencies in handling the Haitian development, it 
was stated that many substantial steps had been taken and that immediate withdrawal 
from Haiti would culminate in “chronic revolution, anarchy, barbarism and ruin.” It 
was only at the hands of progressive and reformist Herbert Hoover (1929-
1933/Republican) that Haiti saw the initial signs of regaining its independence, 
although with remarks about American achievements there: “Our representatives in 
Haiti have shown great ability and devotion, and have accomplished signal results in 
improvement of the material condition of that people.”281 Eventually, Franklin 
Roosevelt (1933-1945/Democratic) built upon his Republican predecessor’s “good 
neighbor” policy and authorized the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Haiti albeit with 
remarks on their “valuable assistance to the Haitian government and people.” He also 
juxtaposed the United States and Europe, underlining that Europe should emulate 
their way of establishing peaceful relations with other American republics. Against 
the background of the Second World War, Haiti was accorded relatively very little 
interest vis-à-vis Germany, Italy or Japan. However, the United States again offered 
its helping hand by agreeing to strengthen military, naval and economic position of 
Haiti with concerns about prospective fascist infiltration into this republic. 
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Looking at the United States-Haitian relations from a critical perspective 
makes visible many gaps, as well as veiled and distorted truths. The abovementioned 
account of the United States handling of Haitian affairs misses a variety of essential 
details. Alternative viewpoints display how others perceive and interpret domestic 
and foreign events. They also bring into open the degree of credibility and legitimacy 
attributed to the U.S. administrations. Inside information provided by critics in the 
form of witness interviews, field reports or even confessions by former or current 
officials contribute to a better understanding and analysis of historical events. 
Critical views challenged the official portrait by various means. Some 
appeared in the form of accusing the United States for betraying the basic founding 
tenets of Americanism such as “all men are created equal” which appears in the 
Declaration of Independence. Aiding the French refugees, but ignoring a black 
nation’s cries for independence was regarded as breaching the Declaration. Some 
critics also juxtaposed the Haitian plight to that of American colonies in the War of 
Independence from Britain. In a similar vein, ending commerce with Haiti during its 
war with France also raised many critical voices. It was stated that France had not 
stopped trading with the American colonies during their war against Great Britain. 
Jacksonians’ critique in the Congress, of Democratic-Republican John Quincy 
Adams’ (1825-1829) decision to attend the inter-American Panama Congress for 
reasons of playing role model again reminded the Administration of America’s own 
faults. In many accounts especially of the pre-Civil War period, Toussaint was 
celebrated as the true warrior against tyrrany, and the Haitian Revolution was 
deemed more “wondrous and momentous” than the American Revolution. “City set 
on a hill, though she has been hid” was one of the frequent predicates used to denote 
Haiti’s exemplary nature vis-à-vis the slaveholding America, with its self-made 
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declaration of being the role model for others to imitate. Andrew Johnson (1865-
1869/Republican) or Ulysses Grant’s (1869-1877/Republican) annexation policies 
were equally denounced on the basis of the first President George Washington’s 
maxim of avoding foreign entanglements. Against the backdrop of U.S. occupation 
of Haiti (1915-1934), republican America’s oppression and exploitation of Haitians 
were likened to imperial Britain’s unjust treatment of the Irish. It was further stated 
that America once suffered from “taxation without representation” at the hands of 
British; now they were doing the same to the Haitians.     
Those Haitians that were welcomed into the U.S. borders in the company of 
their French masters evoked mixed responses from the pro-slavery, aristocratic 
southerners. These people detested the influx of blacks for fears of insurrection 
among their own slaves, labeling them as “missionaries of hell,” “refractory 
Negroes,” or “dreadful, desperate and bloody-minded wretches” to set the South on 
fire. Yet at the same time, it was these southerners who protested the 1808 Act to 
Prohibit Importation of Slaves as they sought laborers to toil in the cotton and 
tobacco fields.  Apart from their need for menial workers, the southerners firmly 
stood against sending American delegates to the Panama Congress in which Haiti 
would also participate. Seeing this as one step toward diplomatic recognition of 
Haiti, Jacksonian Senators from Georgia and South Carolina gave examples from 
continuing chaos and revolutions in Haiti, where bloody changes of government 
attested to incapacity for freedom. Positioning the exemplary United States above 
barbarian Haiti, the southerners in public or in the parliament believed that America 
should be choosy about whom to show its generosity, and take into consideration the 
sake and sensitivity of “a portion of the People of this Union.” The southerners also 
attacked the abolitionist press before and during the Civil War with reports of 
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massacres, misrule, immorality and indolence in Haiti, pointing at the fact that when 
freed, the American slaves would indulge in similar behavior.  
It was not only southerners, but also many others that called for aloofness on 
the Haitian plight. “The Irish emigrants and French Negroes” were regarded as 
equals in causing distress in Philadelphia, Baltimore and Norfolk. Even the white 
French masters were portrayed as secondary class of French. Democratic-
Republicans  challenged John Adams’ (1797-1801/Federalist) decision to resume 
commerce with Haitians, claiming the Haitian blacks were initiated into liberty 
through “rapine, pillage, and massacre,” and that their self-governance would cause 
trouble for America’s commerce. Within the context of plans for emancipation in the 
Civil War era, Haiti was often given as an example that “the two races cannot mix 
and mingle” as the history of the French and British West Indies proved. In the 
World War I context, the Wilson Administration was chastised for protesting Servia 
and Belgium while invading Haiti. Some articles maintained that, with the First 
World War’s end, there remained no necessity for overseeing Haiti as German threat 
waned. The critical press also revealed the bakcstage of U.S. occupation by 
portraying abuse of power by the American forces. They displayed natives’ being 
slain for sport” or, revival of enforced labor. It was also reiterated that prolonged 
military occupation was counter to the fact that Haiti was a Charter member of the 
League of Nations. Democratic Representatives pressed Republican President 
Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) by maintaining that “an imperialism abroad cannot 
remain democracy at home.”  
Analyzing the black press contributes a lot while questioning the official 
view. It was only through articles, editorials or reports in black magazines and 
newspapers as well as some black activists that the civilized style of living in Haiti 
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and the Haitians’ dedication to set up a democratic type of governance was brought 
before the public. The Haitian revolution was likened to the American or French 
counterparts in terms of respect to the principles of equality and liberty. Contrary to 
the general picture of the Haitians as savage and backward, black rhetoric celebrated 
the republican characteristics of governance with due concern about the rights of 
citizens and foreigners, as well as about education. In the pre-Civil War era, the 
Haitian and American examples were often compared as regards the situation of 
blacks. It was frequently stated that when Toussaint liberated his colored people, 
Washington enslaved his, and that he further paved the way toward slavery’s solid 
institution inside the United States. As time proceeded, the opposition in general and 
the black press in particular attached more importance to uncovering truths or 
engaging in field research in Haiti themselves in order to fight more effectively 
against the distorted picture of Haiti. Frederick Douglass, a colored American and 
the former U.S. Minister to Haiti, contributed to the debate by unveiling the U.S. 
highhandedness during negotiations for the strategic Mole St. Nicholas. He further 
challenged the United States’ role model aspirations by disclosing the harsh terms 
imposed on Haitians, and the presence of the American Navy to oversee the 
negotiations. During the U.S. occupation of Haiti, there were numerous references to 
the anarchy in the United States from the Civil War onwards and in Europe. Hence, 
they refute one of the allegations for occupation that Haiti had drowned into anarchy 
and chaos. NAACP-conducted research by James Weldon Johnson finally paved the 
way to gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops. Johnson made public how Haiti was 
forced to declare war against Germany, the relations between American business 
community and the U.S. government who collaborated in draining Haiti’s resorces at 
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the expense of its inhabitants, and atrocity stories by U.S. marines engaged in theft, 
murder and rape.  
Like the southerners, the black press and the administration in the United 
States were somehow divided on a number of issues. As regards the resettlement 
project, advocates of emigration underlined the qualities of Haiti in the light of its 
mild climate and advanced lifestyle in terms of order, enterprise and arts. On the 
other hand, the opponents of the idea put forth that leaving the United States for 
pursuit of a better life meant admitting defeat and spoiling all hitherto efforts to 
create a just order in the United States. Or, even Booker T. Washington, one of the 
ardent supporters of the black cause almost condoned the U.S. occupation of Haiti, 
believing that the United States would conquer, control and have its way sooner or 
later. Yet, he said this process should entail love and honest interest in others’ 
welfare, not bullets. In a similar vein, the administrations’ policies were sometimes 
criticized by the fellow congressmen from the president’s party. During Thomas 
Jefferson’s tenure (1801-1809/Democratic-Republican), continuing inclusion of the 
Haitian slaves inside the U.S. borders was protested by several Democratic-
Republican Senators alike for the fear that “slaves in the South will produce another 
St. Domingo.” Or, Jefferson’s attempt to cut trade ties with the newly independent 
Haiti so as not to infuriate Britain and France was criticized by his party fellows for 
this would mean abandoning a profitable trade at the bidding of other nations. 
Republican presidents Andrew Johnson and Ulysses Grant’s mid-nineteenth century 
annexationist policies regarding Haiti were also denounced by some Republican 
congressmen since “extending protection over what claims to be an independent, yet 
feeble government” not only would clash with one of the most cherished founding 
principles of noninterference with foreign governme
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from the European nations. U.S. occupation of Haiti, began during the Democratic 
Wilson Administration but continued under the Republican Warren Harding 
Administration (1921-1923) was criticized by the same party members. Republican 
Senators underlined that lawlessness and lynchings in America’s many great cities 
should be examined and ameliorated before occupying Haiti for the same reason.  
Concisely, the juxtaposition of official and oppositional rhetoric of U.S.-
Haitian relations gives us a nearly full picture of the domestic and foreign concerns 
of the time and respective responses of the involved actors. Haiti’s character and 
qualities like its dedication to liberty and equality as well as the abuses and atrocities 
at the backstage would not have been brought into the open without the alternative 
accounts by the critics, especially the black press. The basic tenets of Americanism 
declared by the Founding Fathers of the United States were rendered hollow at the 
hands of the opposition. Witness reports also added to the strength of the alternative 
rhetoric, making public the contradictory, distorted and overbearing nature of official 
portrait. 
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CHAPTER III 
  
 THE COLD WAR PERIOD, 1945-1990   
 
 
3.1 The early Cold War period 
 Relations with Haiti in the early Cold War period were far from deserving 
close surveillance and emergency measures. Haiti’s preference for the Western camp 
obviated the need for attentive watchfulness. Special attention was devoted to the 
Soviet Union and its satellites in Central and Eastern Europe during the Harry S. 
Truman (1945-1953/Democratic) era. In a State Department report of April 1951, 
Haiti was regarded as cooperating with the United States in the Organization of 
American States (OAS)282 as well as in the United Nations on issues of human rights 
and anti-colonialism. Haiti’s referral of disputes with the Dominican Republic to the 
OAS peace machinery was also considered as a positive step through Haiti’s 
becoming a fullfledged liberal democracy. Its accession to General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT)283 in January 1950 through the U.S. efforts were thought 
to prepare Haiti for extended foreign investment in the country. Finally, it was hoped 
that the modest U.S. contribution to the small Haitian air force and coast guard 
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would help Haiti’s effective overseeing and defense of the Windward Passage 
separating Haiti and Cuba as being the channel for most shipping between the 
Panama Canal and eastern U.S. ports.284 Against this background, the United States 
chose not to break relations despite the recurring pattern of Haiti’s frequent changes 
in government. President Elie Lescot,285 who had taken Haiti to the Second World 
War on the side of the Allies, was overthrown by a military coup in January 1946. 
Franck Lavaud assumed power for the first time as Chairman of the Military 
Executive Committee. His second term began with another coup, which deposed 
President Dumarsais Estimé286. Upon Dumarsais Estimé’s flight to the United States 
in May 1950, the U.S. agreed to recognize Lavaud’s junta government as it was the 
policy to recognize a new government “if it clearly has control of the country, and if 
it agrees to undertake all the country’s international obligations, including 
treaties.”287 In other words, the United States recognized the new administration as it 
did not seem to disrupt bilateral relations or the international order. Lavaud would 
rule Haiti until early December 1950, when President Paul Eugene Magloire288 
assumed the presidency. 
 There were critics against the Truman Administration. These called for 
enhanced involvement in Haitian affairs on account of the looming threat of 
communism. One article in The Nation revealed the complicated domestic situation 
in Haiti that clashed with the sunny picture drawn by the United States. It pointed out 
how the nascent socialist movement in Haiti wanted to end corruption in the Haitian 
government as well as granting monopolies to foreign-owned, especially American 
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corporations while reviving Haitian economic, social and cultural riches. It also 
touched upon the asymmetrical commercial relations between Haiti and the United 
States, accusing the latter for not allowing the Haitian people enjoy the riches 
provided by coffee, sugar, bananas and cotton thanks to the monopolies of Standard 
Fruit, the Haitian-American Sugar Company and other firms.289 Dr. Joseph F. 
Thorning, associate editor of The Americas also joined in by chiding the “singularly 
inept and sadly ineffective nature of the State Department’s Division of International 
Information and Cultural Affairs.” Having returned form an observation tour through 
Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, Thorning said the United 
States should engage more thoroughly with Haiti at a time when “Red Fascism” hung 
over the world and undermined the Good Neighbor Policy in the Western 
Hemisphere. For him, the United States should put more imagination in winning the 
masses and overcoming totalitarian propagandists.290  
As regards the black press in the early Cold War period, it was almost 
inconspicuous compared to the pre-Cold War era. This trend would continue 
throughout the Cold War. Magazines like The Black Scholar, The Crisis, Ebony, and 
Freedomways allocated almost no space for Haitian affairs other than some minor 
references in other articles.291 The focus between the 1950s and 1970s rested mostly 
on civil rights activism at home, especially in terms of black voting and labor rights. 
Within this context, it was Africa in the form of Pan-Africanism, rather than Haiti or 
elsewhere, that attracted the most attention.292 The handful of works on Haiti 
throughout the Cold War also had a very different focus. While in the 1940s many 
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black periodicals had filled their pages with stories about the exploitation of Haiti by 
the U.S. Government and Wall Street, by 1950, there were articles suggesting that 
black Americans might also join in this process.293 Haiti was often depicted as “the 
paradise of the greater Antilles,” favorable “for happy vacationers”: “Negroes who 
have long held regal dreams of living like a native prince can have these dreams 
come true in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.”294 It was also conveyed that the Haitian 
President Estimé sought to attract “American Negro business people [to] come to 
Haiti to establish business.”295 It would be only after 1970 that African-American 
members of the Congress would actively counter the U.S. official rhetoric and policy 
regarding relations with Haiti.  
The Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961/Republican) Administration did not 
differ from its predecessor in continuing friendly relations with Haiti despite the 
Republic’s incessant political turmoil. The President extended greetings and best 
wishes to the Haitian government on the 150th anniversary of the country’s 
independence, and talked highly about its devotion to freedom as well as Haitian 
support to the American War of Independence at the battles in Savannah and 
Yorktown.296 As the Department of State commented in 1954, the government of 
General Paul Magloire (1950-1956) in Haiti was characterized as follows: “Haiti has 
been reasonably democratic, has opposed communism, has encouraged foreign 
investment, and has been very friendly toward the United States.”297 Even though the 
overthrow of Magloire and the circulation in Haitian government seven times in less 
than a year disturbed the United States, no considerable change in relations or 
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rhetoric would take place.298 One exception was President Eisenhower’s speech to 
the Congress for withdrawal of the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation 
between the United States and Haiti, signed on March 3, 1955 and submitted to the 
Senate on June 22 the same year. The reason was stated as a desire “to give further 
consideration” to the subject treaty.299   
During this period, many articles from the black press ironically celebrated 
the American presence in Haiti, without which the country would not have 
experienced stability and order. They also wanted more U.S. involvement in Haiti: 
“The nation felt no security until it was occupied by the United States Marines in 
1915. The occupation was a bitter thing for Haitians, but it provided them with 
stability until 1934, when the Marines withdrew.” The beginnings of a new economy 
in Haiti through agricultural, social and political reforms were also attributed to the 
Marines.300 The fall of Magloire was equally associated with “bad advice from his 
henchmen and adverse economic circumstances,” and it was demanded that the U.S. 
should not refrain from helping Haiti.301 However, there was some criticism against 
the United States, saying that it should withdraw recognition of the Magloire 
government on account of its “exceptional measures” on the pretext of alleged 
disorder in Haiti. Democratic Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) 
contended that Magloire also gave signals for suspending the Senate and Presidential 
elections due January and April 1958 respectively.302    
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The seizure of power by François Duvalier303 (October 1957-April 1971) 
through fraudulent elections did not make any difference in the policy of condoning 
Haiti’s internal turbulence. “The situation there is essentially chronic,” remarked 
Eisenhower’s Secretary of State Christian Herter (1959-1961) in the light of 
economic decline and breach of human rights in Haiti.304 Nevertheless, only minor 
measures were taken against Duvalier such as two-thirds reduction of the American 
aid program in Haiti. The reason was stated as being “not in reprisal against Haiti’s 
governing junta for the reported fatal beating of a United States citizen Shibley 
Talamas by the Haitian police,” but as the failure of the junta to provide the required 
counterpart funds for assistance mission.305 At the same time though, the U.S. 
dispatched a mission to train Haiti’s army for “further demonstration of the close 
bonds of friendship,” and State Department officials maintained that despite the 
shortcomings of his regime, Duvalier “had given more stability to the impoverished 
nation than had any of his numerous predecessors in recent years.”306 However, the 
Special National Intelligence Estimate of March 1959 directly rejected any 
establishment of U.S. military facilities at Duvalier’s request as this would help 
bolster his unpopular regime, and raise criticism against the United States both in 
Haiti and the Latin America in general.307  
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Haiti did not became a major source of nuisance for the United States on the 
issue of impending communist spread over the Western Hemisphere. The 
Eisenhower Administration had conceded that the Communist Premier Fidel 
Castro308 of Cuba was trying to foment rebellion in Haiti not for the sake of ideology, 
but for using Haiti as a base of guerrilla operations against Castro’s enemies, namely 
the dictator of the Dominican Republic Rafael L. Trujillo Molina, and his brother 
President Hector B. Trujillo Molina.309 Similarly, the Special National Intelligence 
Estimate of June 1959 pointed at the traces of communist actions in Haiti, yet saw 
them as weak and opted for Duvalier’s continued rule in the country. The rationale 
was stated as follows. 
       
There is, however, no clear alternative to the Duvalier regime . . . There are very few 
communists in Haiti and no organized communist party, but the nucleus of a  
communist movement exists among the intelligentsia. A significant number of 
known and suspected communists are employed by the government which provides 
the principal source of employment for intellectuals . . . When [Duvalier] goes, it is 
probable that there will be a period of political chaos comparable to that following 
the exit of dictator Magloire in late 1956.310 
 
 
 
 
The United States’ main policy became one of not infuriating or incapacitating Haiti 
so as to guarantee Haiti in the Western camp. Eisenhower’s message to the Congress 
in mid-February 1960 requested a total of $268 million for a number of mutual 
security measures including undergirding the Haitian economy.311 In April the same 
year, the $4,300,000 economic aid project that was suspended in March resumed 
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again although on certain conditions. The Artibonite Valley project, the target of the 
subject sum was the largest aid program hitherto launched by the United States.312 
Within a few months, Haiti was also furnished with military equipment besides 
regular training service provided by the U.S. forces. The official view believed “a 
competent and well-trained Haitian Army [was] becoming of increased importance 
because of the troubled situation in the Caribbean,” meaning the threat of a possible 
invasion by communist Cuba or Haiti’s arch-enemy, the Dominican Republic. It was 
further stated that the equipment hitherto used by the Haitian army had been given to 
them on the eve of the U.S. invasion of 1915, and that they dated back as far as the 
Spanish-American War.313 Yet, upon Duvalier’s expulsion from the country of 
Archbishop François Poirier for his alleged help of $7,000 to communist students to 
overthrow the regime, the United States did not move a finger.314  
 
3.2 Relations in the shadow of communism 
The U.S. view on Haiti gradually involved the emanating communist threat in 
the backyard of the United States. John F. Kennedy Administration (1961-
1963/Democratic) took office with the project of Alliance for Progress in order to 
eliminate any chance for this gloomy prospect to realize. The initiative aimed at 
promoting democracy and stability thorough economic development in the Western 
Hemisphere. It rested on the principle of “good” countries deserving to receive 
aid.315 Accordingly, Haiti could not qualify for aid with its catastrophic political and 
social conditions. Yet, ironically the Kennedy Government would continuously 
                                                 
312
 “U.S. to Reinstate Big Haiti Project,” The New York Times, April 10, 1960. 
313
 “U.S. to Send Arms to Haiti’s Forces,” The New York Times September 4, 1960. 2. 
314
  Paul P. Kennedy. “Haiti expels Catholic Prelate: Says he gave $7,000 to Reds,” The New York 
Times November 25, 1960. 1, 19. 
315
 The Alliance for Progress was initiated by John F. Kennedy in 1961 for the purpose of establishing 
economic cooperation between North and South America. The intention was to stave off communist 
influence and to keep the region in the Western camp. 
 106 
extend aid to this brutal dictatorship which, not very long ago, had declared martial 
law, curbed the opposition and closed the university in Port-au-Prince.316 The main 
reason behind this action was the possibility of ideological infiltration in Haiti, just 
45 miles from the eastern tip of communist Cuba. Kennedy’s Task Force on 
Immediate Latin American Problems viewed Haiti as being in an explosive situation 
since it was infiltrated by pro-Communists.317 The Under Secretary of State Chester 
Bowles also condoned the state of affairs in Haiti for fear of  “Communists or other 
anti-U.S. factions getting control of the state.”318 François Duvalier’s running for a 
second term through rigged elections despite the fact that there were over two years 
before his first term’s expiration did not cause due discontent on the part of the 
Kennedy Administration. Despite the U.S. Ambassador Robert Newbegin’s  
deliberate absence during the inauguration ceremony, the Ambassador resumed 
office only after a week with the instructions “to be cool but correct.” In the 
Administration’s words, “it would be unwise to try to upset the Duvalier regime until 
a political alternative was found,” and additionally, withdrawal of the annual $6 
million aid was avoided so as not trigger the collapse of the Haitian government.319  
 The U.S. programs in Haiti, in fact, were not effective. Soon many critics 
raised their voices over the arrested development of the Artibonite project, the 
unmoving literacy programs and Haiti’s incapability to raise itself out of poverty and 
catch up with the rest in the Western Hemisphere. Articles found fault with the 
United States for its neglect of the projects after pouring money into them, rather 
than mandating the Haitians fiscal accountability or management programs. 
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Maladministration and inefficiency coupled with the fact that the Duvalier 
Government was the true beneficiary of American aid.320 From the pro-establishment 
camp, Deputy Director for Operations of the International Cooperation 
Administration Dennis A. Fitzgerald fought against allocation of military aid to the 
Haitians for the Fiscal Year 1962. For him, it was dubious that Haiti could make 
proper use of military equipment for the sake of the public, since the sum was most 
likely to be directed to Duvalier and his forces to solidify his own power.321 A 
similar viewpoint was conveyed by Senator Stephen M. Young (D-OH). 
 
 
Are there any good reasons for our policy in Haiti? There is no military advantage as 
we have no bases in Haiti. Politically there is no advantage, we are supporting a 
dictator who is blackmailing us with threats to turn his people over to communists. 
There are no sizable private American investments which demand our protection . . . 
If U.S. aid to Haiti were ended, the Duvalier regime would surely fall. Duvalier 
realizes this. We should insist that he hold free elections supervised by the 
Organization of America States before we grant any more aid.322  
 
 
 
    
Officials maintained that a related concern necessitating aid was the possible 
swing to the extreme left from within the Duvalier government itself rather than from 
without.323 Yet, criticism about economic aid to a dictatorship and the 
Administration’s own reports about the futility of feeding Haiti helped cancellation 
of most aid to Haiti in July 1962 except for a sum for malaria eradication.324 A joint 
memorandum of August 8 by the State Department and CIA reported that no chance 
existed for the Duvalier regime to survive devoid of American economic and military 
                                                 
320
 Max Frankel. “U.S. Dilemma on Haiti,” The New York Times May 29, 1961. 6. 
321
 Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Operations of the International Cooperation 
Administration Fitzgerald to the General Counsel of that Agency, Rubin. Department of State. August 
21, 1961. FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII. 179. 
322
 Congressional Record, Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, May 24, 1962. 9167-9168. 
323
 Tad Szulc. “U.S. Shuns fete for Haiti’s Chief,” The New York Times May 23, 1962. 12.  
324
 Since 1946, the United States endowed Haiti with a total of $100 million in loans and grants. U.S. 
economic aid program amounted to $13,5 million by 1962. The cut was reported as $6 million. 
 108 
aid.325 Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to endow Haiti with other financial benefits 
such as a $2.8 million jet airport in Port-au-Prince. The official reason pronounced 
was that Haiti needed it anyway, and that by the time the construction ended, the 
Duvalier government may not be in office.326 As they indicated: “[T]he advantage of 
limited aid to Haiti outweighed the disadvantages of being vulnerable to charges by 
the Haitian people and other Latin Americans that the United States is supporting a 
dictator.”327 In January 1963, President Kennedy finally ordered a policy review 
regarding Haiti for a solid and succesful posture against this country. Insisting that 
replacement of Duvalier was a prerequisite for U.S. interests in Haiti, Kennedy 
sought assurances before any plan which could not guarantee that the new regime 
would be better than the existing one. He also maintained that the plan should be 
conducted either by the Haitians or by a third country.328 In late April 1963, a war 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic loomed on the horizon on the former’s 
intrusion into the Dominican Embassy and seeking to get the Haitian refugees back. 
The State Department issued a statement of detachment rather than active 
involvement, observing that 
 
 
the overall situation remains explosive and inflammatory statements by government 
officials, apparently directed at opposition elements, are a strong contributing factor. 
In this situation, the Embassy’s warning to United States citizens to stay off the 
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street continues in effect. The Department also continues to believe that the United 
States nationals should avoid unnecessary travel to Haiti.329  
 
 
 
In a couple of days an evacuation order followed, through which dependents of the 
U.S.  personnel slowly made their way to the United States. The State Department 
announced that this action should not mean “that the chances of strife between Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic, her neighbor on the island has increased,” yet the 
“deteriorating situation” between the two Caribbean nations was uttered as the reason 
for the evacuation policy. In the words of the Under Secretary of State George W. 
Ball, “Haiti appeared to be falling apart” in a kind of “progressive disintegration.” 
Nevertheless, rather than a UN action, the State Department believed that the OAS 
should handle the crisis.330 In mid-May 1963, the Administration officials still 
believed that if anything should happen to Duvalier, confusion and chaos would 
follow. Hence, they chose to suspend diplomatic relations upon the commencement 
of Duvalier’s second term on May 15, yet, administrative contact remained though at 
the lowest level: “The United States has still not decided how to treat the Haitian 
Government, which it considers unconstitutional, and that is why it has discontinued 
formal contact with that government for the time being.”331 Nevertheless, the United 
States resumed “normal diplomatic business” with Haiti as early as June 3, insisting 
that the lifting of diplomatic sanctions did not imply any change in the U.S. view that 
the Duvalier regime was unconstitutional. It was also concluded that the Haitian 
government was “firmly in power,” despite the “reasonable belief” of the 
Administration that the dictator Duvalier would actually leave his post. In the light of 
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this reality, it was stated that “resumption of full-scale relations appeared to be in the 
best interests of the United States.”332  
 Critics from both Democratic and Republican parties raised their voices on 
many accounts. Representative Armistead I. Selden (D-AL) argued that the Kennedy 
Government had failed to create a stable order in Haiti, which would pave the way 
toward Haiti’s fall into the orbit of communist sphere.  
 
 
U.S. Government . . . has been slow to react to the growing political crisis in Haiti . . 
. There is evidence -ominious evidence- that forces are at work to convert Haiti into 
the second communist base in the Caribbean. Certainly the conditions in that 
unsettled country are ripe for communist purposes. And let there be no doubt that 
Fidel Castro and the Kremlin’s agents are ready, willing and capable of moving into 
any power vacuum left open by indecision and inaction on the part of the free 
nations of the hemisphere.333   
 
 
 
Republican Representative John R. Pillon from New York reiterated the issue of a 
prospective communist infiltration in Haiti, and chastised the slowness and 
ineffectiveness of the State Department to stabilize Haiti.  
 
[T]he communists in Cuba, in the United States and in Latin America are building a 
hostile image of Duvalier as a bloody-voodoo dictator. This propaganda is intended 
to create a world opinion for the liquidation of Duvalier. A political vacuum would 
thus be created, and only the communists are prepared to fill this political vacuum. 
This was the exact pattern used to destroy Batista and to create Castro’s communist 
Cuba. The State Department and our government are fiddling and finagling while 
the international Soviet-Communist forces are calculatingly coverting Haiti into a 
second Soviet satellite at our back door.334 
  
 
 
  
In his speech, Pillon even went as far as advocating occupation of Haiti “for the 
purpose of  protecting the vital security interests of both this nation and this 
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hemisphere.”335 Floridan Representative William Cato Cramer of the same camp 
called for deeper involvement of the U.S. in Haiti. He called for firm leadership of 
the United States in the Organization of the American States, conveying that 
communists in Cuba were getting tooled and armed. He put forth evidence regarding 
lack of surveillance and intelligence on the U.S. part to detect arms drops or 
infiltration in Haiti. Cramer also pointed at “Haitian sugarcane cutters from Cuba 
who had been trained in Cuban subversive schools.”336 As for press criticism, an 
article in The Nation touched upon how Haiti became such a messy place.  
 
 
In the main, U.S. seems to have benefited the governments, rather than the people of 
Haiti. The assorted old weapons received as “foreign aid” are for the convenience of 
the government, and it uses them in maintaining itself in power. Perhaps military aid 
is the only kind Haitian governments ever requested. Whatever the reason, the 
Haitian people seem not to have shared in the largess distributed in so many quarters 
of the globe by the United States since World War II. Haitian per capita income, 
education, health, and other statistics have not changed very much in three 
decades.337 
     
 
    
Representative Paul Grant Rogers (D-FL) revealed the continuing of economic aid 
by the Kennedy Administration despite the official statements to the contrary.  He 
called for more effective measures by the U.S. Government that would not only 
ensure Haiti’s seat in the Western camp, but also contribute to sustainable 
development in Haiti not at the expense of, but for the sake of the Haitian people 
themselves. 
 
 
[T]he American people have had the impression that U.S. aid to Haiti has been 
suspended. I am informed that this is not so. Under the U.S. food-for-peace program, 
Haiti last year received some $1.3 million in U.S. surplus foodstuffs subsidized by 
the U.S. taxpayer . . .And at present Haiti is free to market over 40,000 tons of sugar 
in the United States, and at present prevailing price of sugar in New York last 
Friday, which was $152 per ton, Haiti could expect an income of $6,166,488 this 
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year if its U.S. sales continued. This aid should be cut as well. Positive actions, such 
as these, would do much to strengthen our position in the Caribbean and the rest of 
the hemisphere as well.338 
 
 
3.3 Anti-communist Haiti  
The policy of non-interference in Haiti’s internal policies was immediately 
adopted by the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration (1963-1969/Democratic), as the 
United States at the time was preoccupied with the Vietnam debacle outside, and 
with civil rights issue and “Great Society” inside.339 In November 1963, the State 
Department prepared an Action Plan for Haiti, underlining the need to continue 
“present cool posture toward Duvalier while denying his government economic or 
financial assistance other than of a purely humanitarian nature,” together with the 
recommendation that the United States avoid involvement with exile groups or plans 
to invade Haiti and/or assassinate Duvalier.340 Another intelligence analysis by the 
State Department under the heading “Opportunities for Communist Exploitation in 
Latin America,” did not see Haiti as a threatening actor where Duvalier sustained 
order through superstition, terror and execution of opponents.341 The historical 
attitude toward Haiti as well as the ever increasing corruption associated with the 
Duvalier regime led the Johnson Administration to follow the same policy of partial 
engagement with the intent of not rocking the boat. Against this background, 
resuming direct aid was not feasible. Hence, on the issue of a water-supply project 
for which the United States had refused to endorse a loan so as not to further 
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strengthen Duvalier’s rule, Johnson chose to give blessing to the Inter-American 
Bank’s involvement in the project. The State Department underlined that “the United 
States continued to be faithful to the Democratic principles of the Alliance for 
Progress,” despite its tacit approval in March of a $2,360,000 loan for the 
development of Haitian potable-water facilities.342 It was further acknowledged that 
“to continue to hold back all economic and technical help was seen as imposing a 
senseless penalty on more than four million Haitians who have confronted the 
Western Hemisphere with a pathetic problem of poverty, illiteracy and disease.”343  
Despite the aid, the United States never endorsed or permitted Duvalier’s 
acquisition of modern arms, especially through formal authorization by the U.S. 
Upon hearing about the Haitian government’s purchase of 30 T-28 trainer aircrafts 
from Texas, the Johnson Administration blocked licenses for these aircrafts on 
account of the fact that no exports of arms to Haiti have been authorized in the last 
two years, and that Haiti was not participating in a regular assistance program.344 The 
Johnson Administration continuously reiterated that the United States Haitian policy 
was one of reluctant acceptance of the unchanging affairs there. The Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann addressed the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee session in 1965 in these words. 
 
 
We have tried nearly everything to get aid to the people, to help them get educated. 
If you put in an education program, then the teachers have tried to kick back to the 
government. If you try to build a dam, the trucks are taken away from hauling dirt 
and put to hauling people to political rallies. We have simply given up, Mr. 
Chairman, in trying to do anything . . . There is some communist infiltration, and we 
are afraid if we are pushed out without ears or eyes, that before we get back in we 
may have a communist in the presidential chair. I think the only way we deal with 
that kind of situation is by collective action, and we have neer been able to get 
collective action. We have tried it since 1945 periodically. By collective action, I 
mean the use of military force.345     
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The Democratic camp raised criticism on aid to Haiti. As Senator Paul 
Douglas of Illinois argued, there was no urgent communist threat, but surely a steady 
anti-Americanism in Haiti which spoiled the efforts to upgrade that country. 
 
 
We have given $100.8 million in aid to Haiti since 1945; Americans have advised, 
cajoled, pled and deplored, ineffectually threatened –and we are farther from 
attaining very modest objectives in Haiti than we were in 1958. Still worse, we have 
in François Duvalier, a thoroughly undependable, implaceably unfriendly, bitterly, 
antiwhite neighbor who fosters internal communism as a means of blackmailing the 
United States . . . Haiti is a one-party state. There have been no overt communist 
manifestations (only anti-American ones) since Duvalier attained power. The 
Communist Party (outlawed) is small, but growing steadily.346 
 
 
 
Another Democratic criticism posed a contrast to this observation as it underlined the 
looming communist threat, and the incapacity of the Johnson Administration in 
preventing this. Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana invited attention to an article by 
Jeremiah O’Leary published in Washington Sunday Star in mid-December 1967. The 
article spoke of the two Haitian Marxist parties and the Radio Moscow’s recently-
initiated daily broadcast in Haiti. 
 
 
The ingredients exist for another Vietnam. The violence, bloodshed and further 
deterioration of the economy and citizens’ hopes, are prospects serious enough in 
themselves. A menacing and opportunist communist Cuba scarcely 50 miles across 
the Windward Passage makes the situation all that much more ominous.347 
  
Nothing important happened in U.S.-Haitian relations in the forthcoming 
years of President Johnson’s tenure. The same conclusion is valid for Richard Nixon 
(1969-1974/Republican) and Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977/Republican) 
Administrations. Latin America and the Caribbean were not the priority regions for 
Richard Nixon as compared to the Vietnam case. For him, Third World countries 
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were a major issue of concern only when there was an imminent threat regarding 
Soviet interest on these places. As long as they remained anti-communist, they would 
rule themselves as they willed.348 The United States refused to take action when 
François Duvalier’s son Jean-Claude Duvalier assumed power in April 1971, at the 
age of 19. The State Department said the United States would recognize the new 
president of Haiti; since the change in leadership was “an ordinary one,” the question 
of breaking normal diplomatic relations did not arise. Yet, the United States 
increased naval surveillance near Haiti “out of prudence,” in an effort “to learn what 
was happening” since the death of the former president.349 Meanwhile, during the 
Nixon Administration Haitian military and economic embargo came to an end, with 
the country included in the list of countries eligible for military aid. It was argued 
that the Haitian arms equipment was obsolete and that many P-51 airplanes dating 
back to post-World War II period had been lost “in a series of clashes.” Economic 
aid was also resumed, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) 
reopening its office and giving a sum of $3 million for road construction, and with an 
annual grant of $500,000 for road maintenance.350  
 Nixon Administration’s Haitian policy met considerable disapproval. The 
opposition, in the name of Democratic Representative William S. Moorhead from 
Pennsylvania, countered against endowing Haiti with military aid, resembling the 
brutal Tonton Macoutes to the contemporary version of Haitian gestapo. On the visit 
of the Haitian Minister of Defense and Interior Luckner Cambronne to the United 
States, Moorhead addressed the Senate as follows 
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I am afraid that our government -the Easter bunny to so many military dictators- is 
going to drop some military goods in Cambronne’s basket . . . [T]he Nixon 
Administration is giving “favorable consideration” to granting Haiti approximately 
$1.5 million worth of credits to purchase military goods in the United States . . . 
Today, with Cambronne the real power behind a figurehead president, Haiti’s 
government can become equally repressive as it was under the infamous “Papa 
Doc.” Cambronne has replaced “Papa Doc’s” feared personal army, the Tonton 
Macoute, with his own army, the Leopards, reportedly the 1972 version of the 
Haitian gestapo. Haiti’s people are among the poorest in the world, and yet President 
Nixon is considering the approval of military aid credits that cannot do anything but 
make them poorer.351 
 
 
 
For his part, Representative William Lehman (D-FL) focused on the plight of 
Haitians fleeing from the repressive baby-Duvalier regime, and the United States’ 
denial to treat them justly. For Lehman, there could be no plausible distinction 
between repression under communist and under right-wing dictatorial regimes. 
 
 
Miami, on the southern tip of Florida, has been the touchstone for liberty during the 
last few months for persons fleeing the brutal regime of Duvalier in Haiti. There 
have been no freedom flights in Haiti. They have come to Miami at the risk of their 
lives in small boats. Yet, if they finally reach Miami safely, the United States 
government is less than cordial to them. For some reason, the Immigration and 
Naturalization service has determined that these Haitians do not meet the guidelines 
for political refugees. I reject this reasoning. The persecution of peoples under 
communist regimes is no different in quality than persecution by non-communist 
dictatorial governments.352  
 
 
 
  
 Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977/Republican) did not attach much importance to 
Haiti. However, there was a subtle belief that Cuba was intent on extending its 
sphere of influence through winning the hearts and minds of the Caribbean countries. 
The Administration officials thought that Castro might play upon the color 
differences as a black revolutionary cause against the United States; yet, they did not 
pin much hope on a Cuban military assistance to Haiti to fuel the country toward a 
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revolution.353 Hence, the United States continued to furnish Haiti with arms for signs 
of friendship and cooperation, while at the same time denouncing it as among the 
countries that constantly breach human rights. According to the State Department, 
there were some reasons for not suspending military sales to certain countries which 
engaged in human rights violations. As for Haiti, it was stated that: “Elimination of 
the modest United States security assistance program would have no impact on 
Haitian human rights practices.” It was dubious that this view abided by the foreign 
aid law, which stipulated withholding military aid to governments following a 
consistent pattern of human rights abuse except for “extraordinary circumstances.”354     
 The Ford Administration’s policies in Haiti were subject to considerable 
criticism. Related with this was the U.S. Government’s Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC), which insured bank loans given to American citizens to start 
businesses in underdeveloped nations. OPIC’s first and thus far only direct 
authorization of $415,000 for the construction of the luxurious hotel Habitation 
Leclerc fueled criticism. The Leclerc operators explained that the hotel aimed at 
reviving tourism which would lead to employment for many, while encouraging 
tourists’ spending money on local arts. Senator Frank Church (D-ID) replied that it 
was outrageous for a government agency to provide loans for a hotel that “cater[ed] 
exclusively to the rich,” hence created further schisms between the rich and the poor. 
Church also observed that the Haitian employees did only menial jobs, the hotel 
really lacked guests other than some young wealthy Haitians in the discotheque at 
weekends, and that the food was inedible.355 More serious than that, condoning of 
Haiti’s anti-democratic profit-making policies also raised concerns. The Washington 
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Post brought into light several U.S. investors’ loss in a proposed Haiti free port 
complex since they had refused to bribe the Haitian officials. The article quoted 
criticism by Senator William Proxmire (D-WI). For him, the case “raise[d] the most 
serious questions about the policy and actions of the U.S. government regarding 
bribes and payoffs,” when federal agencies decided to ignore such problems.356 
Baltimore Sun also paid attention to the incident, and allocated some remarks from 
Proxmire who denounced the State Department for failing “to protect the interests of 
the American citizens” in this case.357 One Democratic Representative, Lee H. 
Hamilton from Indiana, directed attention to another The Washington Post column 
contrasting the lifestyle of AID employees “with conditions of extreme poverty that 
exist in that small country,” and stated that “some questions remain concerning 
whether or not our aid program is well organized for trying to relieve the severe 
problems of poverty and unemployment in the rural areas of the country.”358 U.S. 
generosity on military terms towards Haiti provoked similar criticism.  
The increase in U.S. munitions sales to countries prompted Senator Hubert H. 
Humphrey (D-MN) to liken American arms industry to “a kind of arms supermarket 
into which any consumer can walk and pick up whatever he wants.” Humphrey also 
asked as follows: “What kind of security do you get out of giving something to Haiti, 
or to Paraguay?”359 Haiti’s takeover of American property owned by the Translinear 
Corporation of Texas was again revived in September when Representative J. J. 
Pickle (D-TX) told how the issue fell on deaf ears by the Ford Administration wheras 
the affair was totally against a number of U.S. trade and foreign assistance 
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agreements. To prove his case, Pickle mentioned Senator Lloyd Bentsen’s (D-TX) 
letter to the President to invoke against Haiti the Hickenlooper Amendment of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, the Gonzales Amendment to the Sugar 
Act of 1968, and the provisions of the 1974 Trade Act denying the benefits of the 
generalized system of preferences to countries which expropriate without 
compensation.360  
  
3.4 Refugee Crisis - I 
Bilateral relations after the Johnson era witnessed another handicap as the 
Haitian refugee issue transformed from chronic to acute during the Jimmy E. Carter 
Administration (1977-1981/Democratic). Haitians suffering from the brutal Duvalier 
regime had begun to flee from the country as early as the 1960s. Nevertheless, as the 
dictatorial quality of the Haitian Government multiplied, the number of refugees rose 
as well. In 1980, within the context of thousands of incoming refugees from 
Southeast Asia, Cuba and Haiti, President Carter showed initial sympathy. However,  
some restrictions soon followed, based on the reason of flight –those running from 
communist countries faced a more favorable treatment. Accordingly, many Haitians 
were deported back to their homeland in cooperation with the Duvalier regime.361  
The United States’ first restrictive immigration law was the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882. This and other exclusionary laws until the Cold War reflected 
racial, national and religious discrimination towards, for example, the Irish and the 
Chinese. With the issuing of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, foreign 
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policy considerations became the utmost principle for refugee status.362 In 1957, the 
U.S. definition of refugee was an alien who had fled a communist or communist-
dominated country or an area of the Middle East.363 It was in 1968 that the United 
States signed and ratified the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of the 
Refugees. Hence, it accepted to forego any ideological bases associated with 
refugees. Even though the Protocol formally superseded the discriminatory U.S. 
refugee law, in practice, the executive branch testified in mid-1970s that nothing was 
done for the sake of implementing the new principles and adopting an impartial 
perspective as regards the “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion” of those running to the shores of the U.S.364 During 
the Ford Administration the State Department continuously associated refugee status 
with those running from communist repression. People from other countries were 
believed to flee out of personal disputes with the country’s officials or because of 
bad economic conditions. The categorization also implied that the communist 
governments were “unfriendly,” whereas the rest including rightist authoritarian 
countries were considered as “friendly.” Hence, withholding of deportation from 
temporary processing centers became available almost only for those members of 
dissident political groups, active political figures, or those who were extremely 
critical of their home government. As the State Department maintained 
 
 
There is no question that, when we grant asylum to a refugee from a [friendly] 
government  . . . that government feels that its reputation is slighted, its honor 
impugned. This can only lead to resentment against the United States and both 
governments lose out.365  
                                                 
362
 Alex Stepick. “Haitian Boat People: A Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S. Immigration,” 
Law and Contemporary Problems 45:2 (Spring 1982), 162. Definitions of “refugee” and “asylum” are 
in order. Refugees are those individuals outside the country seeking admission, whereas asylum refers 
to the status extended to those within the country, seeking refugee status.   
363
 Malissia Lenox. “Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United States’ Haitian 
Immigration Policy,” Stanford Law Review 45:3 (February, 1993), 710. 
364
 Stepick. “Haitian Boat People,” 170 and Lenox. “Refugees, Racism, and Reparations,” 710. 
365
 Stepick. “Haitian Boat People,” 172-173.  
 121 
Analysis of asylum data belonging to years 1975 and 1976 show that, 95% of those 
that were treated by the U.S. as deserving asylum were citizens from communist 
countries.  
It was only at the Congress’ initiative culminating into the Refugee Act of 
1980 that a transformation of the U.S. refugee and asylum policy became possible for 
the better. Accordingly, the UN Protocol was activated and the new policy was based 
on humanitarian principles. However, lack of precise wording about those aliens 
fleeing a “well founded fear of persecution” soon became a useful tool for the U.S. 
Administrations to twist the phrase so as to meet their own ends, interpreting it as 
that only the ones escaping from communist regimes had a feasible reason to fear.366 
There was one other explanation for increased vigilance over Haitians’ refugee 
claims. The previous emigrants of 1960s running from the despotic Duvalier regime 
were composed of a heterogeneous group of urban middle and lower class members 
which the Immigration and Naturalization Service367 (INS) authorities did not bother 
to meddle with. However, the newcoming influx beginning in early 1970s were of 
poor, rural and black in origin, coming to the United States on rickety boats. Hence 
there were also racial undertones in the rigid practice of refugee policies. Despite the 
fact that the two Duvaliers had ruined the economic fabric of the country and 
deprived many with diminished income and GNP, people fleeing from Haiti 
underlined that they were fleeing political persecution.368 The U.S. initially 
responded to their plight with lenient admission; however, when the issue gradually 
turned into a chaos under the “Baby Doc” regime, the United States began to make a 
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shift in policy and adopted a preferential treatment of refugees sailing ashore 
American borders. The official view as regards Haitian refugees was presented in the 
testimony in 1975 before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations by 
William Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in 
these words. 
 
 
The great majority of Haitians who are illegally in the United States say, when first 
apprehended, that they have come to the United States to seek employment. In very 
few instances are they able to demonstrate that they have been or will be persecuted 
by their government. Frequently, they claim that they will be punished on return to 
Haiti simply because they left their country without permission . . . 369   
 
 
President Carter took office with a view of condemning past discrimination 
and offering “equal treatment and temporary legal status” rather than refugee status 
for both Cubans and Haitians under the categorization of Cuban-Haitian Entrant in 
June 1980. The Program was designed in the face of a mass asylum crisis in mid-
1980, and only for those migrants who had arrived before October 10, 1980. This 
initiative found its root in the Mariel Boatlift between April-October, 1980 in which 
Cubans suffering economic hardships left for the United States.370 President Carter’s 
address to the League of Women Writers in May 1980 portrayed Haitian deportees as 
if they had been receiving more preferential treatment than those from communist 
Cuba. 
 
It’s important for me, for instance, to treat the Cuban refugees with the same degree 
of compassion and understanding and with the same commitment to the law as we 
do the refugees from Haiti and from other countries. We are the most generous 
nation on Earth in receiving refugees, and I feel very deeply that this commitment 
should be maintained. Ours is a country of refugees. Many of those in this room 
have either parents or grandparents who were refugees who came here for a new life 
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of freedom, a chance to worship as they pleased, or a chance to combine their own 
talents to build a growing and dynamic country.371  
 
 
 
Carter spoke of refugees as “the flood of people” from Cuba and Haiti “seeking 
freedom and a better life.”372 He reiterated the benevolence of the United States at 
every occasion, underlining that the U.S. elevated everywhere the cause of political 
freedom. 
 
[We] treat those seeking asylum and those who are refugees from Cuba, from Haiti, 
and from other countries equally, on a case-by-case basis as is required by the 
American law . . . We have a sober, responsible recognition that American power is 
especially important in a turbulent world where others depend upon us for their 
safety and for their freedom.373  
 
 
 
In October 1980, Carter made remarks on the signing of the Refugee Education 
Assistance Act into law. This Act would enable financial help from the Federal 
authorities to reimburse the expenses of Florida and some other states related with 
the influx of Cuban and Haitian people arriving in these places. Carter celebrated 
these places for their accomodating “this large number who are seeking freedom and 
new life in this country.” In his words, this Act would be of service to the “difficult 
task of helping these newcomers enter the mainstream as productive members of 
[the] society.”374 Yet, in a remark, Carter distinguished between Haiti and the other 
incoming people, portraying it as suffering from economic burdens rather than 
political.  
 
                                                 
371
 “Remarks and a Question and Answer Session at the League’s Biennial National Convention,” 
May 5, 1980 in The Public Papers of Jimmy Carter: 1980-1981. Book 1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1981-1982). 834. 
372
 “Remarks at the Swearing in of Edmund S. Muskie as Secretary of State,” May 8, 1980 in The 
Public Papers of Jimmy Carter: 1980-1981. Book 1. 861. 
373
 “Address before the World Affairs Council Philadelphia,” May 9, 1980 in The Public Papers of 
Jimmy Carter: 1980-1981. Book 1. 874. 
374
 “Remarks on signing the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 into Law before a Joint 
Session of the Florida State Legislature”, October 10, 1980 in The Public Papers of Jimmy Carter: 
1980-1981. Book 3. 2153. 
 124 
[L]iterally millions and millions of people are trying to escape totalitarian 
governments and find freedom. This is going on in Cambodia, where the 
Vietnamese have invaded. It’s going on in Afghanistan where the Soviet Union has 
invaded. It’s going on in Ethiopia, where people are trying to seek a life of freedom, 
and in other countries around the world. Some people are escaping extreme poverty, 
like in the case in Haiti, and of course, in Cuba, the Castro regime had imposed on 
its people a loss of freedom and also poverty at the same time.375   
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the Administration continued in other instances to acknowledge 
political oppression in Haiti. Upon arrests by Haitian authorities of critical journalists 
and political figures including Joseph L’Enfantin, a founding member of the Haitian 
Human Rights League, the State Department expressed “grave concern”: “We would 
view an attempt by Haitian authorities to silence the free expression of political 
opinion as inconsistent with the Government’s previous expression of the intention to 
move toward a more liberal system.”376 However, Haiti ranked low compared to 
other emigrants in the acknowledgement by INS of their refugee status. Beginning 
with the first attempt of Haitians in September 1963 to request political asylum after 
being taken into custody by the INS, almost all following claims were denied. 
Criticisms regarding the Haitian  policy of the Carter Administration revolved 
around continuing communication and cooperation with dictatorial Haiti, as well as 
the U.S. Haitian refugee policy. Representative Edward I. Koch (D-NY) argued that 
Baby Doc engaged in only cosmetic development of Haiti hoping to entice tourism 
and foreign investment. Signifying that Haiti was an “intensely repressive society,” 
Koch said Haiti continued to receive economic and military assistance from the 
United States. He also quoted from Nat Henthoff’s article in the Village Voice as 
follows: “Baby Doc, by the way, like his grand old dad, is also president for life. And 
one of his most devoted supporters is Heyward Isham, the American Ambassador in 
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Port-au-Prince. Does Jimmy Carter know? Does Jimmy Carter care? Ask him.”377 
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC)378 members also contributed to the debate, 
criticizing the sanctioning of the authoritarian regime in Haiti as well as the U.S.’ 
unprofessional refugee program. CBC member Senator Edward W. Brooke’s (R-
MA) analysis of the current affairs in Haiti continued somehow mixed  comments; 
criticism regarding Haiti’s domestic turmoil that refuted the official reports’ rosy 
metaphors to describe the domestic situation in Haiti, together with a hint of applaud 
for U.S. involvement in there. 
 
 
There are still recurring instances of government disregard for basic procedural 
safeguards for individuals guaranteed by the Haitian constitution. Too little attention 
has been given to the need to reduce opportunities for corruption. Press freedoms are 
still minimal . . . My own conclusion is that, in general, our assistance efforts are 
contributing to the betterment of the Haitian people and are supportive of 
liberalizing trends in Haiti . . . Nonetheless, the government in Haiti remains 
basically authoritarian. Opposition political activity is not permitted.379 
 
 
 
Senator Brooke’s report also included the State Department’s Human Rights Report 
for Fiscal Year 1978, which provided a more optimistic picture about the Haitian 
human rights issue. This official certification enabling cooperation and aid towards 
Haiti faced many objections. 
 
 
Since 1971, there has been an improvement of the political atmosphere; this slow 
trend continues, with occasional setbacks. President Jean-Claude Duvalier has 
declared policies of domestic detente and national reconciliation; and political 
repression has ceased . . . The Department of State is of the opinion that the current 
U.S. security program for Haiti should be continued. Elimination of the modest U.S. 
security assistance program would have no impact on Government of Haiti’s human 
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rights practices. To the contrary, it would lessen our ability to influence the Haitian 
government on a range of U.S. interests in Haiti, including promotion of human 
rights.380  
 
 
 
Representative Tom Harkin (D-IO) presented a critique of the Carter 
Administration’s proposed security assistance program for fiscal year 1979, and of 
the State Department’s Human Rights report. As Harkin contended, this initiative 
included assistance to “governments which continue to violate the human rights of 
their citizens.”  
 
U.S. military and financial contributions to repressive regimes historically have 
tended to strengthen military sectors and discourage democratic opposition forces . . 
. The State Department report on Haiti represents a blatantly self-serving attempt to 
obscure the continuation of human rights violations by the Duvalier regime. Among 
the few clear statements in the report are “organized political opposition is not 
permitted” and “Haiti is a one-party authoritarian state and the President has tenure 
for life.” Much of the remainder of the report consists of generalized statements of 
improvement based either on flagrant misrepresentation or outright omission of facts 
that have been presented to the State Department by our office and by others. 
Perhaps the most telling omission is the report’s total failure to note the fact that 
more than 2,700 Haitians have fled their country since 1972 seeking political asylum 
in the United States from the political repression and economic misery which are the 
hallmarks of the current government . . . In seeking to prove that justice is more 
available now than before, the State Department says that criminal trials held (for 
the first time in years) in 1976 and 1977 resulted in a number of acquittals. 
Ironically enough, these acquittals were of public officials accused of exactly the 
corruption which the report describes as “endemic.”381  
 
 
 
The Carter Administration also had critics within itself. Richard Celeste of the Peace 
Corps382 denounced the discriminatory refugee policies of the United States, 
supposedly the role model for asylum. 
 
 
[R]egardless of diplomatic and domestic pressures, I believe we must be at least as 
generous to these refugees as we are to Southeast Asians, Cubans, Eastern 
Europeans, and Russians . . . We can, should, set an example of what should be done 
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by a country of first asylum. This, I believe, is the least we can do for those Haitians 
who flee to our shores.383 
   
 
 
The House Subcommittee on Immigration hearing on Haitian refugees in 1980 
marked the apogee of critique as regards U.S. immigration policies. Upon asking the 
State Department’s human rights officer in Haiti about whether political freedom 
existed in Haiti, it was the freedom of religion, the only “gleam of light” that the 
officer could tell.384 The Administration’s argument that the Haitians were economic 
refugees were also discredited by the fact that, as the Cuban refugees of the Mariel 
Boatlift arriving Florida explained, they had come to the United States for scarcity of 
food in Cuba, or they had thought they could earn more in the U.S. Despite their 
testimonies, the Cubans were quickly processed and released, with asylum applicant 
grantees as well as cash benefits by the Carter Administration.385 Many articles 
denounced this disparity in behavior regarding the Cuban and Haitian cases. In an 
editorial article, Andrew Brimmer wrote in The Washington Post as follows. 
 
 
I have been deeply concerned by what appears to be a serious disparity in treatment 
between Cuban refugees -who have been welcomed to the United States with “open 
arms,” and Haitian refugees -to whom the door may be slammed shut unless there is 
timely action by President Carter.386 
 
 
 
Another editorial in The New York Times countered against such unjust 
classifications as it not only had racial undertones, but also a shallow understanding 
of what constituted “political oppression.” 
 
 
There are difficulties with this distinction. First, it is subject to grievous 
misunderstanding: most of the Cubans are white, most of the Haitians are black. 
Second, many of the Cubans seem to be driven not only by political motives but also 
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by a desire for economic opportunity. Many of the Haitians, meanwhile, are in fact 
subject to persecution. There is no doubt of their desire for jobs; Haiti is one of the 
genuinely poor countries of the world. But national poverty provides no protection 
against being beaten for opposing the regime. When they run governments, families 
can be as repressive as fascists.387  
 
 
 
Several lawsuits were filed on behalf of the Haitians, among which perhaps the 
famous case was the Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti. Here Judge James 
Lawrence King acknowledged the link between economic and political factors in 
Haiti.  
 
Haitian economics is a function of the political system. Much of Haiti’s poverty is a 
result of Duvalier’s efforts to maintain power. Indeed it could be said that Duvalier 
has made his country weak so that he could be strong. To broadly classify all of the 
class of plaintiffs as “economic refugees,” as has been repeatedly done, is therefore 
somewhat callous. Their situation is a political condition.388  
 
 
 
On the refugee issue, the Congressional Black Caucus became a fierce 
advocate of the Haitian people. Shirley A. Chisholm, Democratic Representative of 
New York, and also the Chairperson of CBC Task Force on Haitian Refugees, called 
for adherence to the “Nation’s fundamental tradition of equal protection for all 
persons under law by granting work authorization and genuine due process to 
Haitians seeking political asylum in [America].” In her speech, Chisholm refuted the 
official argument that the Haitian people were economic refugees by several 
examples including the official pronouncements.  
 
 
To deny political asylum to refugees merely because they are from an economically 
poor country unfairly punishes them for conditions over which they have no control 
in their homeland. This position further suggests that poor people have no political 
rights . . . Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in his 1977 Law Day address at the 
University of Georgia stated that “the fulfillment of such vital needs as food shelter, 
health care, and education was a recognized human right. We recognize that the 
fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a nation’s economic 
development. But we also know that this right can be violated by a government’s 
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action or inaction, for example, through corrupt official processes which divert 
resources to an elite at the expense of the needy or, through callous indifference to 
the plight of the poor.”389 
 
 
Another CBC member, Representative George T. Leland (D-TX) quoted the 
inscription on the The Statue of Liberty for disparaging the U.S. Government. 
 
 
Give me your tired, your poor/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free/The 
wretched refuse of your teeming shore/Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to 
me . . . The Haitians whom we have turned away from our shores are receiving 
precisely the opposite message –the land of liberty does not want this particular 
huddled mass yearning to breathe free, these homeless, tempest-tossed refugees 
fleeing repression in search of liberty.390  
 
 
 
Hispanic members of the U.S. Congress were equally critical of the official policy of 
discrimination based on color or poverty. Henry B. Gonzales, another Democratic 
Representative from Texas added that Haiti’s discrimination may stem from its being 
predominantly a colored nation, and a colored immigration vis-à-vis Cuba’s 
demograpic aspect and immigration experience.391 For his part, Representative 
Anthony Lee Coelho (D-CA) questioned the true motives for immigration from the 
Soviet camp. 
 
Certainly all of the people who fled from Cuba did not do so because of opression of 
the government. Many fled because they wanted a more prosperous life in the 
United States. Did the Soviet danseur flee because of a desire for political 
expression or artistic expression and/or economic reward? Are all the Vietnamese 
fleeing because of political oppression or primarily for economic reasons because 
their urban lifestyle had been transformed to a rural one.392  
 
   
 
Shirley Chisholm continuously articulated the international obligations of the United 
States in terms of human rights, contending that the Carter Administration had been 
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violating not only international law, but also basic American principles. She talked of 
lawsuits and complaints against the Administration’s discriminationatory refugee 
policies. 
 
The procedures employed by the United States in handling the claims of these 
Haitian refugees violate regional and international commitments which the United 
States has undertaken. The United States of America is subject to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Right by virtue of the fact that the United States 
is a member of the Organization of American States. As a member of the OAS, the 
United States is obliged to guarantee those rights which are enumerated in the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted at the Ninth 
International Conference of American States in 1948. The United States is also a 
signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights, which entered into force 
on July 18, 1978 . . . Pursuant to Article XXVII of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, the United States is bound not only to act in accordance 
with its domestic laws in granting asylum to those seeking it, but must also act in 
accordance with international agreements.393  
 
 
 
 
CBC member, Representative Walter E. Fauntroy, (D-D.C.) touched upon two points 
in his criticism; one being the segregation within the State Department, and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service personnel: “[As of 1974], blacks comprised 
only 2.5 percent of the foreign service corps . . . More important than skin color has 
been the insensitivity and cavalier attitudes that are all too often found among 
Government officials who deal with countries such as Haiti.” Another accusation 
was related with the Administration’s discriminating in favor of the Indochinese 
refugees, whose admission quota and refugee assistance were doubled. However, the 
black Haitian refugees had not ever met with such attention.394 This case was also 
subject to a number of critical articles. One of them was Bruce Keldan’s article in 
Philadelphia Inquirer: “They are the other boat people, the people whose plight is 
every bit as pitiful as that of Indochina’s boat people . . . But, unlike the boat people 
of Indochina, they have attracted little public notice; no humanitarian outcry has 
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gone up on their behalf.”395 Comparison of Vietnamese and Haitian refugees was 
another issue. One Saturday Review article claimed that these two refugee people 
endured the same plight, yet had evoked different responses from the U.S. 
Government: “Like the Vietnamese ‘boat people,’ the poorer illegal Haitians cram 
themselves onto the open decks of broken-down fishing boats for the 800-mile 
voyage to Florida.”396 In a similar vein, Representative Cardiss Collins of CBC (D-
IL) regarded right-wing persecution on par with communist persecution. 
 
 
Why does this nation distinguish between the oppression of the Eastern European 
nations and the oppression of the right-wing regimes? Why can we suddenly find a 
means to admit thousands of Vietnamese refugees, but keep passing the buck 
between legislative and executive branches on the Haitian refugees.397 
 
 
 
Representative James Oberstar (D-MN) contended that the United States had “a far 
greater obligation to the Haitian refugees” than it did to the Cubans due to time-
honored American presence there. 
 
 
It is a moral obligation to a country and a people who have virtually been our 
satellite for 65 years, since the outset of the U.S. occupation of Haiti in 1915.  
Haiti’s currency, the gourde, is tied to the dollar; the U.S. is the principal market for 
their exports, sugar and coffee . . . Yet, our foreign aid program there has largely 
been a failure, principally because of the insufficiency of our commitment to solid, 
sustained economic growth in that neediest of all the countries of the hemisphere.398 
 
 
 
Oberstar also criticized the official refugee policy by a Haitian phrase: “An old 
Haitian Creole proverb says: ‘It makes no sense to wash your hands and then dry 
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them in the dirt.’ Paraphrased, it applies to the refugee case: “It makes no sense to 
crusade for human rights and ignore the need on your very doorstep.”399 Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) blamed the Administration for the “chaos and 
confusion in the Cuban and Haitian refugee crises.” Naming both cases as 
“worsening human tragedies,” Kennedy called for “urgent diplomatic action to end 
the chaos,” threatening the lives of thousand of refugees, as well as the integrity of 
U.S. immigration laws.400 Last, but not least, Shirley Chisholm touched upon the 
measures taken by the House Appropriations Committee, which involved a reduction 
of $2 million economic assistance to Haiti while eliminating all military aid on 
account of “the Government’s tragic disregard for the well-being of its people” and 
the “brutality and corruption in Haiti.” The Committee report argued that 
“maintenance of direct U.S. Government assistance programs with a developing 
country carries with it an implicit approval of the recipient country’s approach 
toward development.”401  
 
3.5. Refugee Crisis - II 
The last president of the Cold War period, Ronald Reagan (1981-
1989/Republican), was busy with U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. Against this 
background, President Reagan followed in the steps of his predecessors by according 
Haiti minor status. The United States almost chose to dismiss the refugee problem 
altogether by adopting the policy of intercepting ships from Haiti, rather than 
offering a helping hand. Couched in veiled words, Reagan’s Executive Order alluded 
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to Haiti in his proclamation that the Coast Guard should turn around “ships on the 
high seas that are suspected of carrying illegal immigrants.” The reason was stated as 
“the entry of undocumented aliens arriving at the borders of the United States from 
the high seas is detrimental to the interests of the United States.” As the White House 
officials further elaborated, no refugees fleeing political persecution in their 
homeland would be refused, and that the Coast Guard was ordered to communicate 
with the Haitians on the reasons of their escape to the U.S.402 The Administration 
also made some legislation proposals aimed at a more active and healthy appeal 
process since, with reference to the Haitians, the system was being “abused by 
applicants with frivolous claims.”403 On the other hand, the United States ironically 
called for southeast Asian nations not to turn Vietnamese and Cambodian exiles back 
to their repressive communist countries. In order not to sound hypocritical, the 
Reagan Administration claimed that the Haitian and these two cases were not 
comparable since Haitians could “return to their homeland without fear of 
reprisal.”404  
The official policy was to couch Haiti in such terms that justified their escape 
as stemming from economic reasons. The U.S. Government’s position was reflected 
in the INS General Counsel Maurice Inman’s words saying that “one hundred 
percent” of Haitian refugees fled for economic reasons: “They want material wealth, 
whatever that may be to them –a house, a car, a pig.”405 In his message to the 
Congress, Reagan coined the Caribbean Basin countries’ crisis as being economic in 
nature, and maintained that  
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The crisis facing most of the Basin countries is real and acute. Deteriorating trade 
opportunities, worldwide recession, mounting debt burdens, growing unemployment 
and deepseated structural problems are having a catastrophic impact throughout the 
region. This economic disaster is consuming our neighbors’ money reserves and 
credit, forcing thousands of people to emigrate, and shaking even the most 
established democracies. This is not a crisis we can afford to ignore. The people of 
the Caribbean Basin are our neighbors. Their well-being and security are in our vital 
interest. Events occuring in the Caribbean Basin can affect our lives in profound and 
dramatic ways. The migrants in our midst are a vivid reminder of the closeness of 
this problem to all of us.406    
 
 
By the end of its tenure, the Reagan Administration had surpassed his predecessors 
in discriminating against Haitian emigrants. Between 1981 and 1990, 22,940 
Haitians were intercepted at sea with only 11 qualifying to apply for asylum.407 The 
statistics between 1987 and 1991 show that nearly 90% percent of those granted 
refugee status were those from communist regions in Asia and Europe. Between 
1983 and 1989, only 39 out of 2000 of asylum applications by Haitians were 
succesful vis-à-vis the approval rate from USSR being 72.6, Romania 70.3 and Iran 
61.5 percent.408  
President Reagan repeatedly associated the acute problems in Haiti with 
economic backwardness, hence gave advice accordingly: “Illegal immigration is 
spurred by stagnant economic activity and a credit-starved private sector in a country 
already desperately poor.”409 He talked of the Caribbean as a possible prey to 
communism, hence condescendingly offered economic guidance and aid by the 
United States to stave off such prospect: “A faraway totalitarian power has set its 
sights on our friends and neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean. If we 
don’t meet our responsibilities there, we’ll pay dearly for it.” Conveying that the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative aimed at “bring[ing] the power of private enterprise -
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America’s most potent weapon- to help build Central America and the Caribbean,” 
he recounted the AID program’s contributions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
in eradicating the swine fever disease.410 The Reagan Administration also regarded 
Haiti as qualified for trade-liberalizing measures provided for in the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). A project to revitalize and rebuild weak 
economies, selection of Haiti as one of CBERA beneficiaries stemmed from the fact 
that the country had demonstrated that their laws, practices and policies conformed 
with the CBERA criteria.411 In 1984 Ronald Reagan certified to the Congress that 
despite “serious human rights abuses,” Haiti would receive more aid from the United 
States. The justification criteria were enumerated as Haiti’s being cooperative in 
halting illegal emigrants and implementing American aid programs. The State 
Department explained that Haiti was “the poorest country in the Western 
hemisphere,” hence needing aid though it still had to proceed in terms press freedom, 
political association and multi-party elections.412 The President reiterated next year 
that Haiti was one of the least-developed beneficiary countries.413  
Duvalier’s imposition of martial law in resistance to the riots in January 1986 
against his regime led the State Depatment to announce delay of new aid 
commitments to Haiti. Denying “a conscious decision to push Duvalier out,” it was 
maintained by the Department that shipments of food and other humanitarian aid 
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would continue. The Administration said they saw no communist involvement as 
regards the protests against the Haitian regime.414 President Reagan himself referred 
to the country as not “very much of a model of democracy.”415 On the question of 
whether the United States would resume economic aid to Haiti that was stopped on 
account of breach of human rights Reagan said they were in a process of reviewing 
the situation, yet, he spoke in hopeful terms regarding Haiti’s future. 
 
 
Well, this group now -this council that has stepped in has made it that they- what 
they want to do is make possible now to have a government. In other words, they 
don’t view themselves as the government. They’re an interim force, and they want 
to now establish democracy and a government that represents the will of the people. 
And, we’re perfectly willing and ready to help in any way we can bring that 
about.416  
 
 
 
In a news conference, Reagan reiterated his frank efforts to reestablish democracy in 
Haiti, and denied the U.S. role of participation in Duvalier’s departure other than 
providing an airplane to fly him to France.417 Upon the end of the Duvalier regime in 
early 1986, the United States endowed Haiti with over $26 million in economic aid. 
In Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s (July 1982-January 1989) words, the 
decision was made in view of improvements in Haiti, primarily in human rights as 
well as the Haitian government’s prompt and cooperative response for repatriation of 
illegal migrants. Shultz also underlined the new Education Minister’s commitment to 
educational reforms and the new Health Minister’s willingness for implementation of 
disease control programs. Shultz noted that all political prisoners were also released 
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from detention on Government orders.418 One month later, the President stated that 
Haiti had demonstrated “the desire of the people worldwide for democratic rule.”419 
In a message to the Congress in March 1986, Reagan repeated the United States’ 
“responsibilities and security interests” beyond the U.S. borders which required 
“strong, confident, and consistent American leadership,” and conveyed how the U.S. 
had met these responsibilities in Haiti “in difficult circumstances” during the past 
several weeks. As he said, the Haitian people had “the first chance in three decades 
to direct their own affairs.”420 In a National Security Decision Directive issued by the 
White House, the Reagan Administration gave the news of extended U.S. aid in 
Haiti’s pursuit of a stable socio-economic and political order.  
 
 
The flight of Jean-Claude Duvalier from Haiti has created an opportunity to break 
the pattern of Haitian history -which has alternated between periods of political 
instability and periods of dictatorial rule- and to set Haiti on a path toward a true 
democracy . . . Our near-term goals in Haiti must be to support and to stabilize the 
National Council of Government, to stabilize the Haitian economy now suffering 
from critical financial and material shortfalls, to ensure that security forces are able 
to maintain order and avert threats to the goverment, and to achieve the transition to 
to a genuine and respected democracy. Our longer-term goals must be to achieve 
installation of a democratically elected government and the implementation of legal 
and policy reforms in Haiti and the stimulation of foreign private investment to 
promote economic development on the basis of free enterprise principles. Achieving 
these goals would reduce pressures for illegal immigration from Haiti.421    
 
 
 
Accordingly, the United States quickly increased and diversified the amount and type 
of aid extended to the Haitians. Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs specified Haiti’s most pressing needs as food and jobs, yet also 
touched upon military support. 
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But if you want to maintain order in the country, then the military is going to have to 
modernize and professionalize, which it wishes to. Obviously a new democratic 
Haiti will need a professional force to maintain order . . . I think the Army wants 
training. This is something we can offer and that I think will be very useful for the 
armed forces here.422     
 
 
 
In June, an emergency grant of $20 million was given to Haiti for the purpose of 
financing fuel to run Haiti’s electric power stations and other urgent foreign imports. 
On this occasion, the Reagan Administration also repeated its consideration of a 
security aid to Haiti. As the State Department argued, no force had effectively 
replaced the infamous secret police of the Duvalier regime, and that Haiti had “so 
few police that it would be equivalent to having six police for the entire District of 
Columbia.” As Secretary Shultz argued, the United States had a commitment to help 
the new Haitian Government as it did for the Philippines upon the departure of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos.423 Nevertheless, a late 1987 statement showed that the path to 
Haiti’s transformation had its thorns. However, President Reagan was hopeful about 
the prospect of Haiti’s elections to take place in February 1988.  
 
 
Following the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier, the provisional government of Haiti, 
the Provisional Electoral Council and -most importantly- the Haitian people have 
moved towards the goal of true democracy. The path has not been easy or smooth. 
We, along with other friends of Haiti, have been concerned by the all too frequent 
violence which has marked the process, especially that which was directed at 
electoral authorities and candidates. Despite these disturbing events, we are 
heartened by the evident determination of the Haitian public not to be denied their 
voice in choosing those who will lead their country in a new, freer era.424  
 
 
However, the Reagan Administration cut off military and other nonhumanitarian aid 
to Haiti upon violence that led to cancellation of presidential elections. In order to 
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bring the military-dominated government of Lieutenant General Henri Namphy425 
into line with the American view of liberal-democratic Haiti, such aid categorizations 
would not be resumed until the electoral process was resumed. Elliott Abrams 
defended the U.S. position by maintaining that “the cancellation of elections was 
always regarded as a possibility,” and that “what happened yesterday would not have 
been avoided by a different U.S. policy.” Shultz also made it clear that U.S. 
intervention in support of presidential elections was “not being contemplated” as it 
would bring with it “the risk of adding fuel to the problems in Haiti.” He strongly 
argued that the blame rested with the Haitian Government, whose dissolution of the 
civilian commission responsible for carrying out the elections and for annuling all 
electoral election culminated in chaos in the country.426 However, as the election day 
drew nearer, the Reagan Administration viewed it “flawed.” The State Department 
said the military-dominated national governing council should “prevent violence 
against all Haitian citizens on voting day, something it did not do on November 29,” 
referring to the violence by soldiers and right-wing Duvalier supporters which had 
led to cancellation of elections.427 Haiti again faced a threat to its democratically 
elected type of governance when Leslie F. Manigat,428 the civilian President of Haiti 
was ousted by General Namphy on June 20. The United States evaluated the coup as 
a “serious blow to hopes for democracy.” When Lieutenant General Namphy was 
himself overthrown by officers from the palace guard on September 17, the 
American officials said this may have been a response to the “feckless leadership” of 
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the Namphy Government. Upon Lieutenant General Prosper Avril’s429 assuming 
power as the new President of Haiti, Elliott Abrams commented as follows: “You 
have one military group replacing one another. There is no reason to believe that 
such a move is either harmful or beneficial to Haiti.”430 Within two months, the 
Reagan Administration agreed to release some $25 million to Haiti since they were 
“encouraged by what the Avril Government [was] doing.” Underlining that President 
Avril had pledged to lead Haiti to democracy, the United States believed he needed 
encouragement and assistance if “his government, the fourth Haiti has had this year,” 
was to survive to accomplish this goal. In the official’ view, “with the army at his 
command” President Avril had more potential to bring about change. The U.S. 
Administration recounted the steps Avril had taken to reduce the use of Haiti as a 
drug base for smuggling into the United States. Plus, the President was portrayed as 
“unlike his predecessors as chief of state,” Avril had consulted military and civilian 
circles on the issue of how to realize elections.431      
Reagan Administration’s policies towards Haiti faced frequent disapprovals 
on various fronts. As early as February 1981, the Administration was blamed for not 
taking the reins on the issue of refugee accomodation. As Senator Walter D. 
Huddleston (D-KY) contended: “Mr. Castro has more control over who will come to 
this country and how many and when, than does the Congress of the U.S. or does the 
President of the U.S. unless we have a change in policy.”432 Representative Richard 
L. Ottinger (D-NY) also touched upon the Administration’s flawed policy of 
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intercepting and turning around ships in agreement with the Haitian government as 
strengthening the hands of the communists.  
 
 
Those Haitians who have succeeded in arriving in the United States to the promise 
of freedom and liberty are being sent to detention centers throughout the country, 
including some in cold northern climates . . . Clearly, the Administration’s program 
casts doubts on our Nation’s historical humanitarian commitment to those fleeing 
the tyranny and oppression . . . This threatens our long-term interests in the 
Caribbean by handing the cause of freedom to the Communists.433  
 
 
 
 
Detention centers became focus of attention by many attorneys and civil rights 
activists. In the words of Ira Kurzban, an attorney for the Haitian Refugee Center Inc. 
of Miami and the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the faraway 
detention centers proved to be similar to those in Siberia. He accused the Reagan 
Government of treating the refugees “in a completely alien environment, separate 
from lawyers, with the idea of getting them voluntarily to return to Haiti, 
circumventing the legal process.” As for Dorothy Samuels, executive director of the 
New York Civil Liberties Union, the U.S. Army previously described Fort Drum in 
upstate New York as “having climactic conditions unsurpassed in the continental 
United States for cold weather training.”434 Shirley Chisholm spoke for the CBC 
regarding the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 1979 and 1980. These analyses portrayed Haiti as having “no institutional 
changes favoring political liberalization,” and suffering from “authoritarian rule 
characterized by many periods of political instability and serious rights abuses.” In 
light of these admissions by the U.S. Administration, Chisholm chided the official 
refugee policy on humanitarian grounds. 
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On the 34th aniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, it is indeed ironic that the United States is currently engaged in violations of 
Article 13, which guarantees the right of a person to emigrate from their homeland. 
The interdiction of Haitian vessels on the high seas by our U.S. Coast Guard is in 
direct violation of Article 13. Interdiction certainly violates the principle of 
nonrefoulement in the UN protocol relating to refugees.435   
 
 
 
Representative Fauntroy also reiterated his attacks toward the Reagan 
Administration’s Haitian refugee policy as being racist, seen from its “alarming tilt to 
the racist government of South Africa, [and] its support for tax exemptions for racist 
institutions in the United States.” Fauntroy also criticized the Reagan 
Administration’s announcement in July 1981 of the new policy of “indefinite 
imprisonment of Haitians until they receive exclusion hearings,” and quoted from 
Newsweek, in which a recent article resembled the detention centers to 
“concentration camps,” impeding “fair hearings of asylum claims.”436 Mayor 
Maurice Ferre of Miami also spoke in favor of Haitians by contrasting their 
experience with those of luckier Cubans and Mexicans.  
 
 
We absorbed 125,000 Cubans in two months and many of these were criminals . . . 
Our criminal record for the Haitians is zip. They are a peaceful people . . . There are 
1,000 illegal Mexicans that enter the United States each hour. The Mexicans are just 
as poor as the Haitians, but we don’t put them into jail. We are talking about human 
beings and putting them in a camp for eight months without explanation.437   
 
 
 
Representative Peter W. Rodino (D-NJ) likewise called for “reasonable and human 
detention policies which will apply equally to all persons, regardless of their race or 
national origin.”438  
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 Senators Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) 
condemned the continuation of U.S. Government’s partial refugee policy despite 
disapproval by judiciary action. Senator Kennedy reminded the Congress that the 
Federal Court had twice found the illegal imprisonment of the Haitian boat people as 
violating the U.S. Constitution for being selective and discriminatory.439 Senator 
Moynihan quoted from the Freedom House report, which testified the existence of 
political repression in Haiti.  
 
 
Haiti is a dictatorship . . . Attempts at independence in journalism were severely 
repressed in 1980 . . . A government-sponsored militia has suppressed opposition; 
political murders, imprisonment without trial, exile and torture have characterized 
the system intermittently. An acceptable rule of law has been in abeyance during a 
prolonged “state of siege”; property has been seized indiscriminantly by security 
forces.440   
 
 
 
Wade Henderson, legislative counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union in 
Washington put forth a similar view: “What you really have is a situation in which 
the U.S. supports the regimes in [some] countries and would find it terribly 
inconsistent to say that on the one hand their human conditions were improving 
while at the same time granting asylum to persons who have fled.” Timothy Barker, 
directing attorney for the National Center for Immigrants’ Rights in Los Angeles 
counted Haiti among such countries along with El Salvador and South Africa. As he 
cited from Government statistics, from October 1981 to December 1982, 68 percent 
of the Afghani and Iranian refugees were granted asylum vis-à-vis 8 percent for 
Haitians and 5 percent for Salvadorans.441 State Department’s human rights report of 
Haiti dating May 14, 1984 brought heightened criticism as well. CBC members and 
Representatives Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA) and Major R. Owens (D-NY) belied 
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such statements as “the Duvalier regime was making progress toward greater reforms 
for Haitians.” As Representative Owens argued, as early as May 10, “the Haitian 
government decreed an immediate halt to all political activity.”442 His analysis of the 
Haitian regime went as follows. 
 
 
Like the child’s game of giant steps, Haiti takes one step forward and one giant step 
backward. The small steps forward are the proclamations which recognize the basic 
rights and the giant steps backward are the summary arrests of those who dare to 
believe and act as if they could exercise those rights. In the past, those who were 
politically active were most likely to be subjected to arrest, incommunicado 
detention, and physical abuse. In the last year, those who have been active in 
community development and work with the poor have always been subjected to 
arrest and abuse.443  
 
 
Representative Michael D. Barnes (D-MD) and Senator David F. Durenberger (R-
MN) attracted attention to the purge of three bishops from the Haitian Catholic 
Church in late July 1985. Radio stations associated with Catholicism and other 
denominations were also threatened or closed. Radio Soleil and Radio Ave Maria, as 
well as the Protestant Radio Lumiere ceased broadcasting.444 One of the members of 
CBC, Representative Edolphus Towns (D-NY) touched upon the amount of some 
$450 million “spirited out of the country by the Duvalier family and government 
ministers,” while the Haitian children fed upon “stones to fill their aching stomachs.” 
He furthermore mocked the U.S. Administration for its faulty misinformation as 
follows. 
 
[The Reagan Administration] already has egg on its face from Friday’s faux pas, 
when White House spokesperson Larry Speakes announced aboard Air Force One 
that Duvalier had been overthrown and fled the country. The error was compounded 
when officials circulated the names of Duvalier’s replacements . . . Yet, baby Doc 
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appeared on the television at the National Palace in Port-au-Prince, saying that he 
was still in power and “fo pase ke makak” (“as firm as a monkey’s tail”).445    
 
 
 
By February 1986, the Duvalier regime had ended for good, and everywhere in the 
United States were calls to help Haiti recover from the chaos. The situation in Haiti 
had shown signs of renewed turbulence on account of the caretaker junta appointed 
by Duvalier just before his departure. Representative Owens pressed for U.S. 
initiative in the free elections to take place in Haiti at once: “The argument that they 
are an illiterate people, that they have never had democracy, is not a legitimate 
argument. We have solved all these problems before in places as large as India and 
Africa.”446 Ironically, the U.S. Government paid no heed to these pleas and 
supported instead the re-militarization of the Haitian government. Representative 
Byron L. Dorgan (D-ND) summarized the position of the Reagan Administration as 
adding fuel to a restless spark. 
 
It looks like the White House wants to pump in military aid to Haiti’s new military 
council, just as we did so many years for the Marcos bunch in the Philippines . . . 
Haiti has not ranked high among our military aid recipients. But, last month, the 
Administration approved some $383,000 worth of riot control gear. Now it seems 
poised to provide unconditional security training for a new police force to fill in the 
vacuum left by the demise of ex-dictator Duvalier’s hated militia, the Tonton 
Macoute.447  
 
 
Dante Fascell, Democratic Representative from Florida argued that Haiti was 
indispensable for American security interests for a number of reasons, and had to be 
treated accordingly.  
 
Haiti occupies a position of great strategic importance to the United States and its 
other friends in the Caribbean region. Together with Cuba, Haiti forms the narrow 
Windward Passage, a vital choke point for legitimate maritime commerce, illicit 
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drug trafficking and migration in the region. Thus, the development of stability, 
peace, prosperity, and democracy in Haiti is of importance to both the people of 
Haiti and the United States itself.448  
 
 
 
For his part, Representative Tony P. Hall (D-OH) likened the poverty and despair in 
Haiti to that in Ethiopia and Sudan, calling for deeper involvement by the U.S. 
Administration with Haitians’ plight. Rather than military aid, Hall advised 
humanitarian aid to help directly the Haitian people: “Why cannot our enhanced aid 
to Haiti be a massive immunization-against-disease campaign for the children? Why 
could we not sponsor a crash effort to the several million people in the country who 
now lack that?”449 Representative Gerry E. Studds (D-MA) focused on the same 
issue about the boomerang effect of the military aid to the transitional National 
Governing Council of Haiti: “When Secretary Schultz stopped off in Haiti for a few 
hours in August, taking the opportunity to call for $6 million in new military aid for 
the [National Governing Council], Haitians gathered en masse for their first anti-
American protests in over 20 years.”450 One critical article in The New York Times 
followed suit.  
 
An Administration that not long ago was inordinately pleased with itself for having 
saved the 100,000 inhabitants of Grenada from unspecified terrors, today ignores the 
anarchy threatening five million Haitians. Our policy is to keep sending a flood of 
military aid and a trickle of economic to an interim government that few Haitians 
like or trust. President Reagan, so pious and voluble on Afghanistan’s woes, is silent 
on Haiti. If only there were a threat of a communist takeover to remind us our 
vaunted devotion to democracy and human rights! But the Soviet Union has troubles 
of its own; one doubts that it would accept Haiti as a gift. Yet, there Haiti stands, a 
few hundred miles off the Florida coast, a mute but eloquent reproach to our vain 
glory.451  
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It was only when the National Governing Council cancelled the elections in a wave 
of terror that the United States cut all military and nonhumanitarian aid to Haiti. 
Amidst political instability, there was another problem for Haiti looming on the 
horizon, namely that of drug trafficking. Upon the inauguration of Haiti’s new 
president Leslie Manigat,452 Representative Owens blamed the Reagan Government 
with cynicism on account of rigged presidential elections. 
 
 
Can Leslie Manigat say with all honesty that it was a fair election when he knows as 
well as the rest of us that every citizen who voted had to show his ballot to a 
member of the army . . . People were allowed to vote more than once. Children well 
under the legal voting age were allowed to vote as polling officials looked the other 
way.453  
 
 
As for the drug threat, Owens portrayed Haiti as “under the domination of the second 
largest power or second strongest power in the Western Hemisphere, the South 
American drug mob.” Underlining that this threat would penetrate the borders of the 
United States and influence families and children, Owens pointed at Colonel Jean-
Claude Paul as the “real power behind the Haitian regime,” and the main person 
responsible for the drug issue.454 Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) concurred with 
the findings, asserting that Haiti was on par with Panama in being a drug menace, 
and that these countries had close communications.455  
President Leslie Manigat’s overthrow by a coup under Henri Namphy456 bred 
equal criticism. CBC member, Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) argued that 
the United States should partake in the blame as it was the U.S. that condoned the 
rigged elections that not also brought Manigat to power but also showed Namphy 
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that the U.S. would do nothing if he resorted to the same unfair tactics. Rangel 
quoted from Paul Kantz’s article to maintain his position on the issue. 
 
 
The White House’s immediate reaction to the coup was a perfunctory expression of 
surprise and disapproval. This was followed quickly and inevitably by assurances 
that diplomatic relations with Port-au-Prince would neither be broken, nor economic 
sanctions be used to isolate the illegitimate regime. Instead, the Administration says 
it will push for democracy in Haiti through “quiet diplomacy.” This policy has failed 
miserably in the past because achieving democracy is not the principal goal for 
Foggy Bottom. Seen from Washington, the primary mission of any Haitian 
government is to prevent anything resembling a political left from emerging as a 
political force, whatever the cost, which is a cause in which General Namphy has 
been a durable soldier.457 
 
 
 
In the wake of the Cold War period, Haiti fared no better. General Prosper Avril’s 
rule, as well as the Reagan Administration which released economic aid funds to his 
government were fiercely condemned. When the United States and Europe finally 
took a deep breath with the Cold War’s end, Haiti was still struggling to find a way 
out. The country would be beset by additional post-Cold War problems like terrorism 
or drug trafficking that Haiti had already been afflicted with. 
 
3.6 Analysis 
 During the Cold War period, United States’ domestic and foreign policies 
were shaped along one main determinant factor –communism. This external problem 
also left its mark on the United States-Haitian relations. U.S. economic, military, or 
refugee assistance to Haiti were determined in line with this criterion. Haiti’s fighting 
along with the Western camp in World War II, and its stance on the Western side 
directed the United States’ attention to other problematic regions like Korea, the 
Middle East, Central America and Vietnam. Overall, the United States refrained 
from meddling with Haitian affairs -despite human rights abuses and recurrent 
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domestic strife- on condition that the country stayed anti-communist. With the 
exception of the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963/Democratic), no U.S. 
Government saw any major trace of communism in Haiti. Hence, as dictatorial 
leaders occupied the Haitian government one after the other, the position of the 
United States was to recognize them if they had control of the country and abided by 
international obligations. Namely, dictatorships in Haiti were often condoned, 
provided that they did not disrupt the international order by behaving against the U.S. 
interests or shifting ideological camps. During the Eisenhower Administration (1953-
1961/Republican), the government of General Paul Magloire was celebrated in 1954 
for being “reasonably” democratic, for its opposition to communism and its friendly 
behavior towards the United States. The François Duvalier regime that began after 
fraudulent elections in 1957 was similarly acknowledged and continuously backed 
by the United States since, despite the shortcomings of his despotic rule, “he had 
given more stability to the impoverished nation than any of his numerous 
predecessors.” President Eisenhower’s concern was not one of communist Cuba’s 
infiltration into or invasion of Haiti; it was related rather with the possibility of 
communist Cuban Premier Castro’s using Haiti as a base to attack their common 
enemy, the Dominican Republic. This was the justification offered by the official 
front to boost Duvalier’s corrupt regime with military aid: “a competent and well-
trained army is becoming of great importance because of the troubled situation in the 
Caribbean.”  
It was only during the Kennedy Administration that the prospect of Haiti’s 
falling into the Soviet sphere became a major concern in view of the Cuban Missile 
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Crisis.458 During this period, it was the U.S. security interests abroad that dictated the 
metaphors associated with Haiti. Accordingly, Haiti was not only certified for 
admission to the Alliance for Progress initiative despite its bad human rights record, 
but Duvalier’s second term presidency through rigged elections was also condoned. 
The country was depicted as being in an “explosive situation,” with “communists or 
other anti-U.S. factions getting control of the state.” The United States occasionally 
cut off aid to Haiti in response to the corrupt regime of Duvalier, who resorted to 
blackmails to get further U.S. military and economic aid; yet, this always meant to be 
a partially practiced, short-term deterrence tactic to calm down the critics. Soon after 
the cancellation of most aid to Haiti in summer 1962, the Kennedy Administration 
ironically authorized the construction of an almost $3 million dollar jet airport, using 
such vague statements as “Haiti needed it anyway” or by the time it finished “the 
Duvalier Government may not be in office.” Haiti fell off the Lyndon Johnson 
Administration’s (1963-1969/Democratic) agenda, for other foreign and domestic 
problems. During Johnson’s tenure, the United States had to concentrate not only on 
Vietnam’s falling into the Soviet sphere at the time, but also on domestic demands 
for civil rights and economic development. The official rhetoric did not enumerate 
Haiti among possible preys for “communist exploitation in Latin America,” for 
Duvalier was portrayed as maintaining order through superstition, terror and 
execution of opponents. The Johnson Government sought ways to continue to furnish 
Haiti with, though partial, aid so as “not to rock the boat.” Hence, indirect aid toward 
Haiti for its water project was justified as stemming from a humanitarian concern for 
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the Haitians who suffered from “a pathetic problem of poverty, illiteracy and 
disease.” The Richard Nixon era (1969-1974/Republican) did not attach much 
importance to Haiti either with regard to communist spread over there. A repeated 
presupposition was that Haiti was anti-communist. It was against this background 
that the United States interpreted Duvalier junior’s inheritance of the presidency in 
1971 as only an “ordinary” change in leadership. Military and economic embargo 
also ended on the same grounds put forth during the Eisenhower Administration; that 
the Haitian military equipment was obsolete and that many planes had been lost in a 
series of clashes.   
 Regardless of party affiliation and date of presidential tenure, one of the 
frequently-repeated official justifications for the support given to the Papa and Baby 
Doc Duvaliers was that there was no other alternative, and that if they left, confusion 
and chaos would follow. The Eisenhower Administration believed that, with the 
departure of Duvalier, there would be “a period of political chaos comparable to that 
following the exit of dictator Magloire in late 1956” –note that, very shortly before, 
the same Administration had viewed the Magloire Government as reasonably 
democratic. The Kennedy Administration shared a similar view on the prospect of 
Duvalier’s leaving his post, arguing that “it would be unwise to try to upset the 
Duvalier regime until a political alternative was found.” The Carter Presidency 
(1977-1981/Democratic) maintained a similar posture when resuming military and 
economic aid to Haiti –the reason was stated as elimination of the “modest” U.S. 
“security assistance” program would not make a difference on human rights issues in 
Haiti.   
The refugee rhetoric of the United States was equally shaped according to the 
communist threat abroad. Relations with Haiti on the issue of refugees rested on 
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arbitrary definitions of the terms “refugee” and “persecution.” Metaphors associated 
with the Haitians coming ashore the U.S. also had overbearing and racial undertones. 
Haitians fleeing the country for reasons of deprivation and repression were evaluated 
by the consecutive U.S. goverments through an economic, not political perspective. 
In 1957, the official definition of a refugee rested on whether the aliens fled a 
“communist or communist-dominated country or an area of the Middle East.” Even 
though adoption of the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of the Refugees led 
to the elimination of ideological bias in the evaluation of refugees, this principle 
never went into practice. The Nixon and Ford Administrations conceived of political 
repression as emanating only from communist countries, whereas flight from other 
right-wing authoritarian regimes was associated with pursuit of economic hardships, 
better jobs or with personal disputes. One other rationalization of this behavior was 
the classification of communist countries as “unfriendly,” vis-à-vis other regimes 
which were “friendly.” Hence, the United States governments refrained from 
disrupting relations with those friendly countries by granting their people refugee and 
asylum status.  
President Carter came to office with a commitment to end duplicity in U.S. 
refugee policy. This was the intent behind the Refugee Act of 1980, a final initiative 
to redress the discrimination and injustice practiced by the U.S. governments. 
However, the vague phrase of “well founded fear of persecution” in the Act, 
rendered impossible any welcoming approach toward those black Haitians. Hence, 
the former policy in the 1960s of lenient admission into the U.S. borders transformed 
into one of deportation and interception as the status of Haitian refugees changed 
from mostly urban and middle class into poor, rural and black in the 1980s. Carter’s 
speeches oscillated between acknowledging and rejecting the political nature of the 
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Haitians’ plight. In some cases he spoke of “the flood of people” from Cuba and 
Haiti “seeking freedom and a better life”; yet, he also made occasional remarks about 
Haiti’s being an exceptional case since the Haitians were “escaping extreme poverty” 
vis-à-vis the Cubans on whom the Castro regime had imposed “a loss of freedom and 
also poverty at the same time.”  The only stable element in Carter’s refugee rhetoric 
was its condescending nature, which boasted of the United States’ benevolence of 
being a refugee country itself. President Carter often reiterated that America was “the 
most generous nation on earth receiving refugees.” The Administration circulated 
this portrayal of affairs despite the admission statistics which witnessed no change 
regarding the Haitians. State Department’s human rights reports repeatedly wrote 
about political stability in Haiti despite “occasional setbacks.” In their words, the 
political atmosphere had improved since 1971. In the Report of 1978, Jean-Claude 
Duvalier was described as having promised “domestic detente and national 
reconciliation.” During the Ronald Reagan Administration (1981-1989/Republican), 
the hitherto biased refugee policy turned for the worse as the Haitians were 
interdicted at sea and forced to return to their homelands. Claiming that Haitians 
could return “without fear of reprisal,” the Reagan Presidency regarded their 
demands for  refugee status as “frivolous claims,” and saw that “the entry of 
undocumented aliens” were “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” 
According to the official view, as high as “one hundred percent” of Haitian refugees 
fled for economic purposes such as “a house, a car, a pig.” The economic 
underpinnings for the Haitians’ fleeing ashore the United States was not the only 
theme borrowed from earlier administrations. The Reagan Administration also 
adopted a condescending posture concerning the Haitian refugees, and took relevant 
measures to upgrade the Haitian economy to curb the refugee flow and to prevent 
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Haiti from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. In Reagan’s words, “illegal 
immigration [was] spurred by stagnant economic activity,” and if they did not meet 
their responsibilities in Central America and the Caribbean, the United States would 
pay dearly for it since “a faraway totalitarian power [had] set its sights” on 
America’s “friends and neighbors.” The Administration further justified the 
economic nature of Haitians’ plight as the country’s being “the poorest country in the 
Western Hemisphere.” Hence, aid was extended to Haiti though with veiled 
acknowledgement of human rights abuses there: Haiti was described as not “very 
much a model of democracy.” The end of the Duvalier regime in 1986, did not divert 
the United States from pursuing the usual course towards Haiti. The successors to the 
Haitian Government were welcomed by the U.S. with initial optimism and extension 
of economic and military aid. The United States saw each new president as being  
dedicated to lead Haiti to democracy, and committed to pursue reforms. Each time 
the Reagan Administration had to admit that the recurring change in leadership 
through coups meant a “serious blow to hopes for democracy.”   
 Criticism against the official portrayal of relations with Haiti was raised 
mostly by the House of Representatives from the Democratic camp, regardless of the 
party in power. Even though there were mixed opinions among the Congress 
members and in the oppositional press concerning the existence, or degree of 
communist threat, they showed concurrence as regards the U.S. Government’s 
flawed policies towards Haiti. When the initial U.S. policy was to count Haiti in the 
Western camp, some early Cold War articles warned against a nascent socialist 
movement in Haiti which would undermine monopolies by American corporations, 
or talked about “Red Fascism” to ruin the Good Neighbor Policy in the Western 
Hemisphere. The Democratic camp, albeit agreeing with the Kennedy 
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Administration on the prospect of communism in Haiti, criticized its inefficiency to 
prevent such a conclusion. In the words of one Democratic Representative, the 
Kennedy Government failed in creating a stable political and economic order in Haiti 
–a situation ripe for communist forces to make use for their benefit. In the 
oppositional camp, many Republican members of congress also called for close 
attention by the United States, believing that the State Department and the Kennedy 
Government were “fiddling” as communist forces were “calculatingly converting 
Haiti into a second Soviet satellite” at the United States’ “back door.” Democratic 
Lyndon Johnson was also countered by his party Senators, who foresaw another 
Vietnam debacle in the face of Haiti’s getting influenced by “a menacing and 
opportunist communist Cuba.” However, here the Democrats did not behave in a 
uniform manner as was observed during the Democratic Kennedy Administration. 
One Democratic Senator believed there was “no overt communist manifestations 
(only anti-American ones),” arguing that the small, already outlawed Communist 
Party had no chance in Haiti. The Republican Reagan Administration was equally 
denounced by the Democrats for its controversial policy of intercepting and turning 
around Haitian refugee boats while trying to prevent Haiti to shift ideological camps 
at the same time. Several Representatives evoked the “Nation’s historical 
humanitarian commitment to those fleeing the tyranny and oppression,” the neglect 
of which would hand “the cause of freedom to the communists.”     
Criticisms mainly revolved around the United States’ cooperating with, and 
furnishing a dictatorial regime in vain. Many thought that it was the Duvalier family 
and their coterie being the true beneficiaries of economic and military aid, and 
chastised the U.S. Government for not holding these people responsible for 
maladministration and inefficiency as regards development projects in Haiti. As for 
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parliamentary criticism, Congress members did not withhold their disapproval 
towards the U.S. Administrations even in cases when they were of the same party. As 
one article argued, “Haitian per capita income, education, health, and other statistics” 
remained almost the same for three decades despite aid by the United States. There 
were even critics from the establishment. One criticism regarding Democratic 
President Kennedy’s paving the way for a power vacuum in which communists 
would fill was mentioned above. The Kennedy Government met disapproval also by 
its Senators who believed that the corrupt Duvalier rule would come to an end with 
the cut of aid flow to Haiti. When the Administration had yielded to criticisms from 
various fronts and announced a considerable cut in aid except for the malaria-
eradication program, one Democratic Representative revealed that Haiti still 
benefited a lot from U.S. food-for-peace program. The Gerald Ford Government 
(1974-1977/Republican) was challenged by Democratic Representatives and 
Senators alike. Among the factors for disapproval were the AID personnels’ 
luxurious lifestyle in contrast to the “conditions of extreme poverty in that small 
country,” or the American arms industry being “a kind of arms supermarket” which 
pleased any consumer. The absence of a response by the United States upon Haiti’s 
expropriation without compensation of a Texan corporation was another disparaging 
theme put forth by the Democratic camp. The argument was that the United States 
had failed to support its citizens’ rights while rewarding the Haitians despite their 
breach of the Foreign Assistance Act and for the sake of stability and order in the 
Caribbean. Democrats were vocal also during the Carter Administration to pressure 
for economic and military cuts toward the “repressive” Baby Duvalier regime who 
was engaged only in “cosmetic developments to entice tourism and foreign 
investment.” They questioned the State Department human rights report of 1979, 
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maintaining that acquittals after criminal trials, “held for the first time in years” by 
the Duvalier regime, were granted to some corrupt public officials themselves. Even 
some Tonton Macoutes members revealed that everyone who left Haiti was jailed 
upon return. The unchanging findings in consecutive human rights reports during the 
Reagan Administration were challenged by several human and civil rights 
organizations like the Freedom House or the American Civil Liberties Union. They 
concurred that Haiti was a dictatorship, contrary to the Administration’s portrait 
which described Duvalier as “making progress toward greater reforms.” 
Criticisms also abounded on the plight of Haitians being denied refugee 
status. The Democratic camp questioned the Republican Nixon’s policy of leaving 
the Haitians to their own fate by not acknowledging their behavior as “freedom 
flights.” Portraying Miami, the closest place the Haitians rushed to, as being “the 
touchstone for liberty” they maintained: “The persecution of peoples under 
communist regimes is no different in quality than persecution by non-communist 
dictatorial governments.” The Democratic Carter Administration’s rhetoric was 
countered even by the members from the establishment as one Peace Corps member 
said the United States should treat the Haitians on par with the “Southeast Asians, 
Cubans, Eastern Europeans, and Russians,” for the reason that the U.S. was “a 
country of first asylum.” Democratic Representatives concurred with this argument, 
maintaining that not all Soviet or Vietnamese refugees flee from their countries out 
of political reasons, but for such reasons as artistic expression and/or economic 
reward. A surprising fact was that, as many Cuban refugees maintained, they came to 
the United States for scarcity of food in Cuba or for hopes of a decent salary. On the 
other hand, in the words of one State Department human rights officer, the only 
“gleam of light” in Haiti was the freedom of religion. Articles in The New York 
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Times and The Washington Post also highlighted the racial dimension of 
discriminatory refugee policies in which the white Cubans were favored in contrast 
to black Haitians. Acknowledging that Haiti was one of the poorest countries of the 
world, these articles contended that national poverty enabled no protection against 
being prosecuted for being a regime opponent. Periodicals like Philadelphia Inquirer 
and Saturday Review juxtaposed Haitians with other more preferable “boat people” 
like the Vietnamese and the Indochinese, and found no difference between these 
cases. The color factor was raised also by the Hispanic congress members of the 
Democratic camp, contending that the Haitian experience might have its roots with 
this case’s being “predominantly a colored nation, and a colored immigration.” One 
major contribution to redress the injustice towards the Haitians came from various 
lawsuits. Their conclusions were united under one common denominator that Haitian 
economics was “a function of the political system:” “Duvalier has made his country 
weak so that he could be strong.” The Reagan era also witnessed active involvement 
from various human rights and civil rights groups’ initiatives such as those of the 
Haitian Refugee Center, or the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. 
Through publicizing their legal investigations, they revealed the unjust imprisonment 
of the Haitians in faraway, unhygienic detention centers, some of which resembled to 
“concentration camps” like “those in Siberia.”  
 It was Federal judiciary action and civil rights advocates that resumed from 
where black activists had left in the pre-Cold War period. The black press during the 
Cold War was preoccupied mostly with the civil rights issues or issues related with 
Africa, and was remarkably absent from the debates regarding U.S. behavior towards 
Haiti. Compared to the pre-Cold War period in which the black press had 
vehemently fought against the U.S. occupation and exploitation of Haiti, only a few 
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black magazines and newspapers of the Cold War era touched upon Haiti, ironically 
celebrating the American presence there without which the country would have 
become a desperate place. In their words, Haiti was “the paradise of the greater 
Antilles,” in which black Americans could feel themselves like a native prince. Some 
articles also maintained that Haiti had not experienced stability since the U.S. 
Marines’ departure in 1934. It was only after 1970 that African American members 
of Congress organized themselves around the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), 
and voiced resentment about the U.S. Government’s view of affairs in Haiti. They 
continously criticized the consecutive State Department human rights reports, which 
gave a rosy picture of affairs in Haiti with only minor criticisms in passing. In 
contrast, CBC’s own analyses revealed that there was little attention devoted by the 
Haitian Government “to reduce opportunities for corruption,” that press freedoms 
were “minimal,” or “political activity [was] not permitted.” CBC also tried to 
strengthen their arguments by evoking major tenets of Americanism like the 
“nation’s fundamental tradition of equal protection for all persons under law.” In 
another case, they reminded the inscription on the Statue of Liberty which went as 
“Give me your tired, your poor/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” CBC 
members also quoted from official statements, like the Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance’s address which recognized food, shelter, health care and education as among 
basic human rights that could be violated by “a government’s action or inaction.” 
They also publicized the United States’s breach of international treaties, like the 
regulations of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights under OAS or the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the UN, by withholding equitable 
treatment of Haitian refugees. In collaboration with such organizations as the 
National Center for Immigrant Rights or the Freedom House, CBC members 
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publicized that Duvalier in fact had halted political activity, censored Catholic 
Church radio broadcasts and expelled some bishops.    
This account of Cold War official and oppositional rhetoric in U.S.-Haitian 
relations showed different interpretations of the communist factor by the actors 
involved. Even though Haiti occupied less space and attention during this period, the 
discriminatory, condescending and racial elements borrowed from the pre-Cold War 
era were present in the official portrait of Haitian affairs. The United States’ 
preference of working with anti-communist dictators at the expense of the people 
there who bore the burden of such a policy would not have generated due concern 
among the public without the alternative accounts by critics, especially at the level of 
Congress, or human and civil rights organizations. As in the previous period of 
bilateral relations, the oppositional action refuted the basic tenets of Americanism 
that the Cold War Administrations repeatedly boasted of.  One, and perhaps the main 
difference was the dissipation of Black press activism in fighting the cause of the 
Haitians. Nevertheless, beginning with the 1970s, the African-American members of 
congress would resume the task from where they had left.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA, 1990-2004 
 
 
4.1 The “New World Order”?  
As a new era unfolded, the George H. W. Bush (1989-1993/Republican) 
Administration saw hopeful developments in Haiti. Richard Melton, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Caribbean Affairs told he was “encouraged by the 
progress” General Prosper Avril’s government had made to crack down on the 
narcotics trade.459 Washington also noted with satisfaction the efforts towards 
holding democratic elections in Haiti during the successor provisional government 
under Ertha-Pascal Trouillot.460 Haiti’s first free and fair election in December 1990 
which brought to power Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide seemed to confirm that 
the “New World Order” coined by President Bush to denote the post-Cold War era 
had really come. Nevertheless, hopes vanished again with Aristide’s being ousted 
from office in late September 1991 by the Haitian military under General Raoul 
Cédras.461 
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The Bush Administration initially responded with economic sanctions against 
the de facto regime, declaring on October 4, 1991 “a national emergency to deal 
with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States caused by the events that had occured in Haiti to disrupt the legitimate 
exercise of power by the democratically elected government of that country.”462 
Nevertheless, when asked about the possibility of a U.S. intervention there as 
observed upon Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President Bush responded negatively: 
“We are interested in the restoration of the democratically elected government in 
Haiti, and the situations are not parallel at all, entirely different.”463 However, the 
Bush Administration’s initial unequivocal support for the restoration of Aristide 
soon gave way to statements prioritizing the restoration of democracy in Haiti no 
matter who ruled the country: “Our interest is not in trying to say who’s going to 
run Haiti . . . The hemisphere’s moving towards democracy, and Haiti started 
moving back towards totalitarian dictatorship. We have a keen interest in that.”464 
Moreover, the U.S. named Aristide as “uncooperative” and “intransigent” from 
November 1991 through February 1992 as he refused to abide by the U.S. advice to 
try to come to terms with the pro-coup Haitian parliamentarians. Such behavior, in 
the official view, added to the chaos in Haiti multiplying the refugees rushing to 
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American shores.465 Meanwhile, as the Haitian military launched a massive attack 
especially against Aristide supporters and created havoc all over the country, a 
renewed refugee flow reached its climax by February 1992.466   
The legacy of treating Haitian refugees as economic refugees, and relegating 
them to secondary status vis-à-vis the refugees from formerly communist countries 
endured in the post-Cold War era. President Bush reiterated that such distinctions 
were fair, and that distinguishing between economic and political refugees was not 
based on “some race or double standard.” In his words, if there happened a renewed 
Cuban refugee flow, those that would qualify as economic refugees would not be 
admitted into the United States.467 Washington began in January 31, 1992 to deport 
by force Haitians who arrived after the 1991 coup.468 Soon, the Bush Administration 
went as far as permitting the U.S. Coast Guard “to begin returning Haitians picked 
up at sea directly to Haiti.” The reason for the issuing of Executive Order 12807, also 
known as the Kennebunkport Order, was conveyed as “to protect the lives of the 
Haitians, whose boats are not equipped for the 600-mile sea journey,” underlining 
the exceeded capacity of temporary processing center at the U.S. Naval Base in 
Guantanamo, Cuba and the Coast Guard cutters on patrol.469 As Washington argued, 
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they were not rescinding the 1967 UN Refugee Convention and Protocol’s ban on 
forced return, as this principle “applie[d] only to refugees within the territory of the 
contracting state,” not to those refugees interdicted in international waters.470 Those 
repatriated were offered the option of in-country (that is, in Haiti) refugee processing 
beginning in February 1992.471 According to President Bush, the Haitian situation 
was still better compared to what was happening in Cuba: “There’s only one holdout 
against democracy in this hemisphere really, except for the problems in Haiti. It’s 
Cuba.”472 His major justification for his policy of return was that, as he remarked in 
Marietta, Georgia on May 28: “I am convinced that the people in Haiti are not 
physically oppressed.”473 However, one late September 1992 statement by the White 
House still underlined the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”474 
 
4.2 The second intervention in Haiti 
The presidential candidate who made his way through the White House, 
William J. Clinton (1993-2001/Democratic) turned from critical to concurring with 
regards to his predecessor’s policy of continuing relations with the interim military 
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government and repatriating Haitian refugees. He especially reneged on his 
campaign promises to rescind the forced return policy, and left intact President 
Bush’s rhetoric and policy on Haitian refugees:475 “[I]t is necessary to avert a 
humanitarian tragedy that could result from a large boat exodus. Hundreds, if not 
thousands, could lose their lives in overloaded, unseaworthy vessels if the United 
States reversed the practice of direct return precipitiously.”476 However, when the 
refugee flow came to the full brim, President Clinton revised his policy in order to 
restore Aristide via tough measures if needed.   
In line with this new approach, the Clinton Administration helped broker an 
agreement between Haitian President-in-exile Jean-Bertrand Aristide and 
Commander Raoul Cédras named the Governors Island Agreement on July 3, 1993. 
The plan involved the restoration of Aristide to power on October 30, 1993.477 
However, the plan turned to ashes when the USS Harlan County, a cargo ship 
carrying unarmed U.S. and Canadian troops to help train the Haitian police and 
army, and help rebuild the country’s infrastructure in line with the Governors Island 
Agreement, was prevented from landing by Cédras’ forces.478 The Clinton 
Administration’s initial response was conciliatory towards the military regime in 
Haiti though. While Aristide called for a blockade of Haiti and other tougher 
measures, Washington was insistent on appeasement techniques. The Haitian Prime 
Minister Robert Malval was not discouraged to include pro-coup supporters in his 
cabinet. Meanwhile a CIA report conveyed Aristide’s alleged mental instability. By 
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February 1994, President Clinton still accused Aristide of being “uncooperative” and 
“intransigent” for rejecting a plan including a broad coalition government, an 
amnesty law for the coup-makers, and lifting of the embargo.479 Deputy Under 
Secretary for Policy Walter Slocombe talked of Aristide as “that psycopath,” whose 
restoration to power was not worth risking U.S. soldiers’ lives.480 However, as the 
UN imposed new sanctions on Haiti, Clinton agreed in May 1994 that interdicted 
Haitians would be taken to a location in the region to be processed as potential 
refugees.481 He also gave hints for using U.S. military force to restore Aristide: “I 
don’t think it’s useful to rule out any option.”482 Stiffer economic sanctions initiated 
in June 1993 also assumed wider forms in May and June 1994, including a tighter 
embargo against Haiti as well as limitation of transport by air to this country for the 
reason of “the essential foreign policy interests of the United States” in “restor[ing] 
the democratically elected Aristide government.”483  
In Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s words, there were two 
“principal ways in which the Haitian crisis impinge[d] on the vital interests of the 
United States.”  
 
First it represents an affront and a potential reversal to the trend of democratization 
in this hemisphere . . . And second, of course, because that catastrophe so severe, 
one of the results is an outpouring of refugees, any of whom of course do want to 
come to the United States. And if all of them came . . . that would put a considerable 
burden on the United States.484  
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Meanwhile, President Clinton continued to urge Haitians “to avoid risking their lives 
in treacherous boat voyages,” encouraging them to apply for refugee status at the 
U.S. facilities within Haiti.485 For his part, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
(1993-1997) briefed the congressional leaders on July 13, conveying the “very 
strong” American interests in Haiti as being “U.S. support for democracy in the 
hemisphere, maintaining stability in the region, prevention of the overthrow of 
democratically-elected governments, protecting the lives of several hundred 
Americans in Haiti, and stopping the massive flow caused by conditions in Haiti.”486 
President Clinton spoke in more serious terms on the Haitian situation in mid-
September, on the eve of a U.S. invasion. 
 
 
This is plainly the most brutal, the most violent regime anywhere in our hemisphere. 
They have perpetrated a reign of terror in Haiti, and it is just getting worse . . . So 
the human rights violations and the situation there, right on our back door, is very 
very significant . . . [T]he United States clearly has an interest in preventing another 
massive outflow of refugees.487   
 
 
 
When a negotiating team of former President Jimmy Carter, former chairman 
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and U.S. Senator Sam Nunn 
returned from Haiti with empty hands (September 16-18), the U.S. forces landed on 
Haiti on September 19, 1994 with the UN Security Council resolution at hand dated 
July 31 approving the U.S. plan to raise a multilateral force against the military 
leadership in Haiti.488 The President’s televised address to the nation prior to the 
Operation Uphold Democracy put emphasis on the impending refugee issue. The 
prospective operation was justified as being necessary to rescue the Haitians out of 
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tyranny, and to bring back regional stability to American citizens’ relief by 
preventing further flow of refugees to the U.S. shores.  
 
 
Thousands of Haitians have already fled toward the United States, risking their lives 
to escape the reign of terror. As long as Cédras rules, Haitians will continue to seek 
sanctuary in our nation. . . No American should be surprised that the recent tide of 
migrants seeking refuge on our shores comes from Haiti and Cuba. After all, they’re 
the only nations left in the Western Hemisphere where democratic government is 
denied, the only countries where dictators have managed to hold back the wave of 
democracy and progress that has swept over our entire region and that our own 
government has so actively promoted and supported for years. Today, 33 of the 35 
countries in the Americas have democratically elected leaders. And Haiti is the only 
nation in our hemisphere where the people actually elected their own government 
and chose democracy, only to have tyrants steal it away.489 
 
 
 
Operation Uphold Democracy ended with success, with President Aristide 
returning to Haiti on October 15. In the Adminitration’s view, a new era began for 
the Haitians: “The coup leaders are gone from Haiti and the thugs are no longer in 
control. Haiti’s Parliament is open. It has enacted an amnesty law and is busy laying 
the legislative groundwork for stronger democratic institutions . . . [T]he state media 
are back at the service of the people.”490 Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration 
continued its presence in Haiti through the Multinational Force (MNF)491 “to further 
the national security interests of the United States” in the face of occasional attacks 
on U.S. soldiers by the Haitian Armed Forces.492 President Clinton also announced 
that he would keep U.S. military troops in Haiti despite the fact that the last UN 
peacekeepers withdrew in early December 1997. It was claimed that the country was 
“sliding back into political paralysis and economic decay,” under René Préval’s 
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rule,493 but that the U.S. mission would focus on public works projects, not security 
and law enforcement.494 
Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration still continued to make policy for the 
benefit of Haitian refugees. An example to this was related with the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) in November 1997, 
enabling Nicaraguans and Cubans to become legal permanent residents and endowed 
certain unsuccessful Central American and Eastern European asylum applicants to 
seek another form of immigration relief.495 As a compensation, the President called 
for a more inclusionary project to deal with the Haitian refugees: “Before we helped 
restore democracy to Haiti, many Haitians were also forced to flee their country 
because of persecution and civil strife. They deserve the same treatment that this 
legislation makes possible for other groups.”496 In December 1997, Clinton gave 
further support to the Haitians albeit in condescending terms, recounting how the 
United States tried to uplift this country amidst tyranny and chaos. 
 
 
Like Central Americans, Haitians for many years were forced to seek the protection 
of the United States because of oppression, human rights abuses, and civil strife at 
home. Many of them have established strong ties and made significant contributions 
to our communities. And while we have been encouraged by Haiti’s progress 
following the restoration of democratic government in 1994, the situation there 
remains fragile. Staying the deportation of these Haitians and obtaining for them 
permanent legislative relief will help support a stable and democratic Haiti –which, 
in turn, is the best safeguard against a renewed flow of Haitian migrants to the 
United States.497  
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It was with the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (HRIFA) of 1998 that 
Haitians who filed asylum claims or who were paroled into the United States before 
December 31, 1995 could adjust to legal permanent residence.498 The President also 
supported the proposed Central American and Haitian Parity Act of 1999, even 
though it failed to become a law. 
 
 
Like Nicaraguans and Cubans, many Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans and 
Haitians fled human rights abuses and unstable economic conditions in the 1980s 
and 1990s . . . The United States has a strong foreign policy interest in providing the 
same treatment to these similarly situated people. Moreover, the countries from 
which these migrants have come are young and fragile democracies in which the 
United States has played and continue to play a very important role. The return of 
these migrants to these countries would place significant demands on their economic 
and political systems. By offering legal status to a number of nationals of these 
countries with long-standing ties in the United States, we can advance our 
commitment to peace and stability in the region.499 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Relations in the shadow of 9/11 
U.S. President George W. Bush’s (2001-2008/Republican) first and Haitian 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s second term in office began in January and 
February 2001 respectively. Haiti was not a region of concern for the Bush 
Administration until the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, in the immediate 
aftermath of the incident, Washington’s first and foremost policy toward the Haitians 
was one of indefinite detaining of all Haitian refugees arriving by boat during the 
processing of their immigration claims. The issues in consideration were the 
heightened sensitivity toward foreigners as potential terrorists, the fact that extensive 
military and law-enforcement sources were diverted to homeland security, and the 
unavailability of the Guantanamo Center now holding alleged Al-Qaeda members. 
The policy that began in December 2001 was applied to no other nation. At that time, 
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Haiti was in an unstable situation, having endured two alleged coup attempts, one in 
July and the other in December 2001.500 The Administration remarked that admitting 
Haitians who met the credible fear requirement may encourage other Haitians to dare 
the “risky sea travel” hence “potentially trigger a mass asylum from Haiti to the 
United States” –a rhetoric reminiscient of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton’s. 
Moreover, Washington argued that migrants arriving by sea might pose a national 
security threat since terrorists may pose as Haitian asylum seekers.501  
This period of tension coincided with opposition to President Aristide, who 
effectively curbed down criticism against his rule. His term also witnessed numerous 
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs.502 As 
turmoil reached unbearable rates, renewed refugee flows loomed on the horizon. The 
Bush Administration responded with the ordinary Cold- and post-Cold War tactic of 
condoning the present conditions in Haiti. Although in February 2002 the State 
Department announced its withholding the release of an Inter-American 
Development Bank aid until President Aristide ended the country’s political crisis,503 
by August 2002, the sanctions dating back to the Clinton Administration to correct 
the allegedly rigged elections that brought Aristide to power was to be lifted.504 
Moreover, in a November 2002 interview, President Bush made a distinction 
between the Haitian and Cuban experience couched in Cold War rhetoric. 
 
 
[T]he immigration laws ought to be the same for Haitians and everybody else, 
except for Cubans. And the difference, of course, is that we don’t send people back 
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to Cuba because they’re going to be persecuted. And that’s why we’ve got the 
special law on the books as regards to Cubans. But Haitians and everybody else 
ought to be treated the same way. And we’re in the process of making sure that 
happens.505  
 
 
However, as criticism against the Aristide rule culminated in great upheaval and 
instability, the United States again couched the Haitian regime in very unfavorable 
terms. The State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report 
maintained that the “Haitian government’s human rights record remained poor, with 
political and civil officials implicated in serious abuses.”506 The Bush Administration 
further pressured Aristide to resign, on account of “his failure to adhere to 
democratic principles [which] contributed to deep polarization and violent unrest in 
Haiti today.”507 In President Bush’s terms, “this long-simmering crisis” was largely 
of Aristide’s making, and that “his own actions have called into question his fitness 
to continue to govern.”508 President Aristide resigned on February 29, 2004 and on 
the same day, Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as 
President. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who shaped U.S.-Haitian relations from the early 
post-Cold War onwards, would never reappear on bilateral relations.   
 
4.4 Enter new threats  
The post-Cold War era was also a period in which new threats were addressed 
in National Security Strategy documents from 1990 onwards. Among these were 
terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, sustainable development, and 
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spread of diseases like AIDS.509 Haiti’s being a hub for drug trafficking, as well as 
Haitians’ being singlehandedly labeled as the utmost foreign source for AIDS 
transmission had already been observed in the late Cold War period. These 
phenomena echoed also in the post-Cold War era. In late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Washington kept certifying that the drug problem with Haiti was getting better. 
However, from April 1993 onwards, the Clinton Administration acknowledged that 
corruption of Haitian officials as regards the drug issue continued to be a major 
problem. The State Department also publicized reports indicating involvement of 
government and military personnel in Haiti in narcotics trafficking. Reports pointed 
at Columbian organizations using Haiti as a drug-transshipment venue.510 From 1995 
to 2004, Haiti was regarded as among the countries to be major illicit narcotics 
producing and/or transit countries.511 According to a U.S. Government interagency 
assessment on cocaine movement, the total amount of cocaine coming to the United 
States through Haiti jumped from 5 percent in 1996 to 19 percent by the end of 
1997.512 From 1999 onwards, Haiti was listed among those countries having “failed 
demonstrably” in fully cooperating in or complying with U.S. drug control efforts. 
Nevertheless, it was pointed out that it was in the national interest to grant a waiver 
to this country so that U.S. aid would continue. The reason behind this decision were 
several signs of hope that Haiti would perform better in terms of narcotics control 
such as “putting into force a bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction agreement with 
the United States, establishing a financial intelligence unit, and extraditing four well 
known traffickers to the United States” in 2002 and 2003. In view of the George W. 
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Bush Administration, the root cause of this problem was again economic in nature: It 
was “Haitian poverty and hopelessness” that triggered Haitian involvement in the 
drug trade. However, the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report of 2004 still maintained that “serious allegations persisted that high-level 
government and police officials [were] involved in drug trafficking.”513  
As for the AIDS pandemic, when asked about the U.S. immigration policy 
that restricted HIV-infected people from entering into the United States borders, and 
about the allegation that this conveyed a wrong message to people about 
discrimination, President George H. W. Bush answered as such: “Well, this is a 
health problem, and that part of it should be treated in a health manner.”514 
Consequently, one late 1991 federal announcement pointed at a situation at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba that, a high incidence of the virus that caused 
AIDS among Haitians who had been cleared to apply for political asylum may 
indefinitely delay or prevent their entry into the United States.515 Moreover, the 1987 
ban on HIV-infected immigrants that barred their entrance into the U.S. was signed 
in June 1993 into law in the Clinton period, despite the President’s occasional efforts 
from February onwards for the contrary, on the grounds that the disease did not 
spread casually, and that people inflicted with it did not threaten public health.516 
Nevertheless, the President eventually announced that he was afraid of lost lives at 
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sea, and hence, measures for restricted admission into the country were in order.517 
Eventually, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Reauthorization Act codified the 
exclusion of AIDS-afflicted people from the United States.518  
 
4.5. Clash of discourses 
4.5.1. Counterarguments in general 
 While the George H. W. Bush government saw promising developments in 
Haiti during Prosper Avril’s rule, a report by the Americas Watch, National Coalition 
for Haitian Refugees and Caribbean Rights demonstrated that  Haiti was “no closer 
to an elected lawful government,” and that General Avril had “halted significant 
efforts to disband the paramilitary forces.”519 Representative Ted Weiss (D-NY) 
criticized the Administration for its hesitancy to condemn the coup against President 
Aristide in due time, whereas it had “acted decisively to stem the tide of tyranny in 
the Persian Gulf.”520 Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) used a pre-Cold War analogy 
when he admonished the Government for taking into account the Amnesty 
International report on intolerable conditions in Kuwait to act against Iraq, while it 
was overlooking a similar report on Haiti. Warning against appeasement policies 
toward Haitian dictators, Graham argued as follows: “Haiti could become the 
Munich of the Caribbean for its own struggle for democracy and for other similar 
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fledgling democracies throughout the hemisphere.”521 Senator Graham also 
underlined that there were serious human rights abuses in Haiti after the overthrow of 
Aristide, that almost matched those in Bosnia. He furthermore criticized Washington 
on racial terms, for being only “interested in the white, rich man’s war,” and 
adopting passivity in a conflict “involving an impoverished country, particularly a 
country that [was] not Caucasian.”522 Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) also touched upon 
the Bosnian case, and questioned the United States’ being the keeper of democracy 
all over the world: “If we can’t stand up for democracy and human rights in our own 
hemisphere, then what do the Bosnian Serbs have to fear? What do the Chinese have 
to fear?”523 
 Apart from criticism as regards U.S.’ slowness in applying countermeasures 
towards Aristide’s overthrow, there were many others who denounced Washington 
for trying to reinstall a president who was communist leaning and tyrannical.  
Representative Tom DeLay (R-TX) revealed that Aristide had been necklacing (the 
practice of igniting gasoline-soaked tires around the neck and burning the victim 
alive) his political opponents, and added that: “He is a lifelong leftist, a fervent 
nationalist and a strong advocate of liberation theology, which promotes the ideals of 
Communism thinly veiled with religion.”524 Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-
CA) concurred that Aristide was “an anti-American Marxist President.”525 
Complementing remarks admonished the U.S. military action in Haiti, both before 
and after the Operation Uphold Democracy. Senator Bob Dole (R-TX) argued that 
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Haiti did not pose a strategic threat for the U.S., and that the American citizens there 
were safe and sound. He further remarked that: “But, if human rights violations were 
enough reason for the United States intervention, we would be invading most 
countries in the world: Rwanda, Sudan, China, Syria and many more.”526 
Representative James A. Leach (R-IA), reminded President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy and concluded that “if a combination of human rights abuses 
and geographical propinquity [was] the controlling standard for U.S. military 
intervention in the Western Hemisphere,” then the United States should better invade 
Cuba rather than Haiti. He further underlined that U.S. intervention “in a setting 
where no tangible threat to international peace and security exist[ed] . . . may set a 
precedent for the use of force by Russia, China, or other regional powers such as Iran 
or Iraq in their own backyard.”527 Participation in “a U.S.-led, U.S.-munitioned, and 
largely U.S. financed UN army” in the aftermath of the Haitian intervention also bred 
criticism on the part of Representative Christopher Cox (R-CA): “Haiti has no 
military airfields, no naval ports, no missile sites like those in Cuba that enemies of 
America might use. Militarily, Clinton’s invasion was a classic case of using a billion 
dollar hammer to crack a 20-cent nut.”528 Representative Porter J. Goss (R-FL) drew 
attention to the ongoing violent rioting and mob rule in Haiti, and questioned 
whether Operation Uphold Democracy made any difference.529  
Meanwhile, several reports revealed inside information on U.S. collaboration 
with the Haitian hit squad Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti 
(FRAPH), whose leader Emmanuel Constant worked for the CIA. In the words of 
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Constant, the U.S. forces still used FRAPH for “crowd control,” “understanding the 
neighbors,” and to learn what Aristide’s Lavalas Party was doing.530 A 1997 report 
by Human Rights Watch and the National Coalition for Haitian Rights demonstrated 
that, the U.S.-trained Haitian Police Force (HNP) first deployed in 1995 were 
committing “serious abuses including torture and summary executions.”531 In a 
similar vein, Representative Steve Chabot (R-OH) underlined the Clinton 
Administration’s failed Haiti policy as the HNP was “just a new version of the old 
one,” with its arbitrary killings and involvement in drug trafficking.532 President 
Préval’s rule was equally contested by Senator Porter Goss (D-FL), who quoted from 
the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti that: “Haiti is a long way from getting democracy.”533 
Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) concurred, saying that Préval’s term was associated 
with ruling by decree, stagnant economy and political intimidation.534 During the 
George W. Bush era, some critics underlined that more should be done for Haiti. As 
the Administration prevented Haiti from receiving assistance from the Inter-
American Development Bank, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) argued as such:  
 
 
Even in the United States, with our proud history, peaceful transition of power, 
orderly elections, and representative governments, we have had significant troubles 
with our own elections. Merely look at what happened in the year 2000 in this 
country with our elections. . . By not providing basic help, by the United States 
blocking the assistance reaching the desperately poor people, we are not 
strengthening the institutions but making it worse and harder for the Nation to get 
back on its feet.535  
 
 
 
As public criticism climaxed during President Aristide’s last term, U.S.’ hesitancy to 
get involved again raised some critical voices. One article commented that Aristide’s 
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liberation theology built on providing “a preferential option for the poor,” coupled 
with his Marxist preaching and criticisms of the United States were the developments 
behind the U.S. policy of not supporting him wholeheartedly. It was maintained that 
the United States moreover helped create the main political opposition against 
Aristide, namely the Democratic Convergence.536 Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) spoke 
in similar terms by drawing parallels with the last Iraqi invasion: 
 
 
We can send $160 billion to Iraq. We can send our young men and women to Iraq to 
die . . . Do we only believe in [rule of law, human rights and dignity] when the 
country has a lot of oil, for example? . . When it comes to a small, black, 
impoverished nation where people are poorer than dirt, where they have been 
subjected to centuries of dictatorial rule, where they have been ignored by their 
neighbors and us for centuries, . . . I guess it just means that we can turn a deaf ear 
and a blind eye to what is happening.537  
 
 
 
The Congressional Black Caucus was also vocal in denouncing Washington 
for its ineffective handling of the Haitian affairs, with Representative Major R. 
Owens (D-NY) being the main spokesman for Haitians. He called for cutting off all 
U.S. support for the military regime under General Avril. 
 
[T]he Haitian people paid for their constitution in blood, just as the American people 
fought and died for their own freedom against oppression and tyranny. Our 
Government should empathize with the Haitian people and cut all economic and 
diplomatic ties with that country until free and fair elections for a civilian 
government are held there.538 
 
 
He also countered Richard Melton, Inter-American Affairs Deputy Secretary of 
State, who spoke about Avril Government’s offering “the best, perhaps the last, real 
chance for democratic reform in Haiti,” and refused to acknowledge “any evidence to 
link [human rights abuses] to policy levels within the Avril Government.”539 
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Why is our Government is willing to settle for so little in Haiti? I feel it is because it 
is worried that any free and fair elections on the island would bring to power one of 
the popularly supported civilian opposition leaders that our Government does not 
like, someone who could not be under our Government’s control, as was the case 
with previous Haitian regimes. Our Government’s experiences with Nicaragua and 
Grenada should have taught us that it is up to the people themselves to determine 
who their leaders are, or will be, and we cannot impose our will on sovereign 
nations.540  
 
 
 
Owens blended both Cold War and post-Cold War rhetoric in chastising the lack of 
genuine interest in the Haitian plight. 
 
 
We are more concerned about democracy in Eastern Europe than in our hemisphere. 
. . Another election is scheduled, so it prompted the present dictators of Haiti to start 
a new reign of terror. . . We should show the Haitian military regime with the new 
reign of terror that the U.S. Government means business about democracy all over 
the world, and democracy in this hemisphere, and cut off all aid to Haiti . . . Drug 
runners are running Haiti. Haiti is a major drop off point, still. If we mean business 
about fighting drugs, we do not need to invade Haiti. We can just apply pressure.541  
 
 
 
 Representative George W. Crockett (D-MI) from CBC joined in the debate by 
quoting from one Boston Globe article which reminded the Haitians’ contribution to 
the American War of Independence, and the U.S. disregard of this country “because 
in 1803 the United States maintained a slave economy and could not tolerate the 
thought of a successful slave revolt spreading to our shores.”542 Crockett maintained 
that similar behavior continued  
 
 
We have supported guerilla movements to the tune of billions of dollars and even 
gone so far as sending U.S. troops to others’ shores –all in the name of democracy. 
Why is it the administration can find discretionary funds for other countries in their 
times of crisis, can request almost a billion dollars for the emerging democracies of 
Panama and Nicaragua and yet remain silent on Haiti?543 
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To the contributions by Haiti to the United States, Representative Owens added the 
conversion of Haitian agricultural economy to the production of trees and plants (to 
the detriment of Haitian soil) that produced latex for American use in World War II, 
and called for genuine help by the U.S. to reinstate President Aristide.544 
Representative Eva M. Clayton (D-NC) argued that the Haitian case was important 
because it was a nation longing for the same democratic principles cherished in the 
United States.545 U.S. help towards President Aristide’s opponents in his second term 
was equally denounced by the CBC members. Representative Maxine Waters (D-
CA) chastised the U.S. Government for blocking aid to Haiti in order to “expand the 
influence of a single political party [Democratic Convergence], that is supported by 
less than four percent of the Haitian electorate.”546 Similarly, Representative 
Edolphus Towns (D-NY) revealed important connections between the United States 
and the Haitian opposition. 
 
 
Despite Aristide’s democratic authenticity, the Convergence’s provocations have 
effectively cut off international resources to Haiti while billions of U.S. dollars flow 
to authoritarian nations such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In January 2001, Ira 
Kurzban, the Aristide Administration’s general counsel in the U.S., claimed that the 
IRI facilitated the allocation of $3 million of NED funds to the Convergence.547  
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The CBC members unequivocally pressured the Bush Administration to take 
effective measures in ensuring Aristide’s stay in power. Representative Diane 
Watson (D-CA) talked of Aristide as  
 
 
. . . a democratically elected leader, one of the few in Haiti’s two violent centuries of 
independence. To turn our back on him would be to turn our back on the values 
America was founded upon, the values which we have guided our foreign policy 
from Jefferson through Wilson, through Truman, through Reagan and Bill 
Clinton.548 
 
 
 
Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA) reminded the Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 
remarks: “We cannot allow thugs and murderers to overthrow the democratically 
elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.”549 For her part, 
Representative Corrine Brown (D-FL) drew an analogy with the U.S. involvement in 
Iraq: “I ask this President, how can he justify our attack of Iraq by claiming we are 
building a democracy while he sits idly by and watches a democracy in Haiti being 
destroyed by thugs?”550 Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) questioned the 
true motives of the U.S. Government in “condemning a man that was elected 
democratically, stepped down, allowed a new President, [returned] and [indicated] 
that he [would] end his tenure in 2006.”551  
 
4.5.2 Counterarguments on refugee affairs 
As for the refugee issue, Haitians fleeing after the deposition of Aristide in 
1991 and their unfortunate discrimination by the U.S. officials were assessed 
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critically by bipartisan effort. Heated debates in the Senate called for a more humane 
treatment of Haitian refugees in line with the United States’ being a role model for 
other freedom-seekers. Senator Connie Mack (R-FL) argued against the selective 
quality of U.S. hospitality. 
 
 
[I]n recent times, we have witnessed an astonishing movement away from socialism 
toward democracy and free market economies around the world. The United States 
has been the symbol of freedom the rest of the world has sought to emulate. 
Freedom, by is nature, and for the sake of its preservation, must be afforded to 
everyone –black, white, yellow, old, young, disabled, man, women- everyone. 
Anything else is simply selective freedom. And in the case of the current treatment 
of Haitians fleeing an illegally formed military government, it is discriminatory and 
unacceptable.552   
 
 
 
Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) similarly addressed the Administration to take 
the initiative in aiding the plight of Haitians.   
 
 
[T]he Administration should urge all countries in the region to refrain from forcibly 
returning Haitians until conditions in Haiti are stabilized, and should press these 
nations to grant temporary protected status or temporary safe haven to Haitians 
entering their country. The Administration has the authority to do this under the 
terms of the Immigration Act of 1990, and it should use it today to protect the 
Haitian people. . .553  
 
 
 
As Kennedy argued, greater contribution by the United States was required in a time 
when the post-Cold War era witnessed new concerns. In the face of Haitians being 
picked up from sea and forced to return, he juxtaposed the Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush Administrations saying that in 1981, the former Administration had accepted 
that Article 33 of the 1951 International Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (principle of non-return) bound the United States even on the high seas. 
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Hence, in Kennedy’s words, formerly no Haitians had been returned without first 
determining whether they were political refugees. 
 
 
At a time when refugee needs are greater than ever before, the United States is 
setting an unconscionable example for the world. With refugees flooding out of the 
former Yugoslavia and Somalia by the thousands, with the alarming riots taking 
place in Germany, with ethnic controversies erupting in violence in many other 
troubled lands, America must not abdicate its role of leadership and compassion in 
accord with international law.554 
 
 
 
Senator Clairborne Pell (D-RI) said the U.S. could not blame Great Britain for the 
repatriation of Vietnamese boat people from refugee camps in Hong Kong, and then 
follow a similar policy for the Haitians itself. He also gave the example of Guinea as 
a role model for the U.S. immigration policy. 
 
 
Guinea, which by almost any measure is one of the poorest countries in the world, 
received 325,000 in 1990 -10 times the number of Haitians received in the 
Guantanamo Bay. Despite international humanitarian assistance, the huge influx had 
a disruptive effect on Guinea, yet there were no known cases of denial of entry or 
involuntary repatriation.555 
 
 
 
Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) quoted from The Star-Ledger in criticizing the Bush 
Presidency. 
 
 
Our problem is not Haiti: It is George Bush. President Bush suffers from Politicus 
Interruptis: He sends us to fight Saddam Hussein but hesitates to deliver the coup de 
grace! He denounces the Haitian military coup but imposes an embargo that starves 
the poor Haitian who came out in the millions at U.S. urging to vote for a president. 
I ask George Bush: When was the last time an embargo brought down an oppressive 
regime? The 30-year embargo against Castro? The embargo against Saddam 
Hussein?556 
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During the Clinton period, Senator Alfonse M. D’Amato (R-NY) spoke disfavorably 
about the Governor Island Agreement by alluding to the former examples of U.S.’ 
rapprochement with tyrants: “Interestingly, the same President that labeled Cedras 
and his cohorts as ‘dictators,’ was quick to make a deal with them. This should not 
be strange for an administration that has concluded an agreement with Fidel Castro, 
negotiated with Hafez Assad, and appeased the Chinese dictators.”557 On the other 
hand, in order to secure the Haitian Immigration Fairness Act, many congress 
members spoke highly of those Haitians welcomed into the United States. In the 
words of Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA): “Like other political refugees, 
Haitians have come to this country with a strong love of freedom and a strong 
commitment to democracy. . .Wherever they have settled, they have made lasting 
contributions to the economic vitality and diversity of our communities and the 
nation.”558  
In the House debates, Representative Gary L. Ackerman (D-NY) reminded 
the embarrassing case of St. Louis ship when, back in 1939, was filled with Jews but 
forced to return to Europe to perish after being denied access to the United States. He 
equally questioned the official view of Haitians as economic refugees while the 
Government “has recognized in various executive orders and official statements the 
brutality of the military in power and called for the return of President Aristide to 
power.”559 Representative Jose E. Serrano (D-NY) reminded the fact that the 
Administration still abided by an “11-year-old agreement negotiated with the 
deposed dictator ‘Baby Doc’ Jean-Claude Duvalier” in repatriating the Haitians. He 
called for the U.S. to promote “international cooperation to support the fundamental 
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rights of all citizens worldwide” as the President explicated in his “New World 
Order” speech.560 Representative Thomas M. Foglietta (D-PA) asked whether it 
would make a difference if Haitians were fleeing a communist regime and, like some 
of his peers in the Cold War period, reminded the words on the Statue of Liberty 
which called for welcoming anyone yearning to breathe free, inside the U.S.561 Cuba 
and Iraq again set the background for criticism by Representative Nicholas 
Mavroules (D-MA), who argued that in-country processing held the possibility for 
Haitians to meet retribution by the ruling junta, adding that it was “clear-cut 
hypocrisy to allow Cubans into the United States and criticize Iraq for its treatment 
of refugees only to turn away Haitians escaping similar crimes against humanity.”562 
To further highlight the contemporary selective treatment of refugees, Representative 
Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) gave examples from his own ancestors’ memorable 
experiences in the United States, which clashed with those of Haitian refugees. 
 
 
Nobody asked my grandfather whether he was Scottish or he came from Ireland or 
came from Canada. They wanted to know if you can handle this eight-horse team. . . 
He delivered on that wagon. All he asked for was a chance to work. . . He did not get 
fingerprinted in any police station. Not in this country. That is not what it was 
supposed to be about. But that is what we are doing today to our neighbors. Is this 
not the country with the good neighbor policy?563  
 
 
 
Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD) ironically contended that the U.S. Haitian 
refugee policy had those illiberal characteristics similarly observed in communist 
regimes. 
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Amnesty International has been denied permission to investigate the asylum 
processing facilities for Haitian refugees in Guantanamo, Cuba. Official responses to 
their request to “monitor government asylum procedures in light of international 
refugee standards” remind me of evasive doublespeak the Commission routinely 
heard from Communist authorities. The State Department deferred judgement to the 
Department of Defense, yet added that logistical problems made the visit unwise. 
The Department of Justice, citing ongoing litigation concerning the Haitians, 
declined to comment on the proposed visit. The Department of Defense never 
replied to the request.564  
 
 
 
After the 9/11 incident, the December 2001 decision by the Administration 
which stipulated that no Haitian should be paroled from detention without approval 
from Washington met considerable disapproval. As Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-
MA) argued, this fell counter to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ advisory 
opinion that “deter[ring] future arrivals does not fall within any of the exceptional 
grounds for detention and is contrary to the principle underlying the international 
refugee protection regime.” The Senator also contended that, Haitians’ being singled 
out for restrictive treatment clashed with a 1995 Supreme Court decision, which 
called for policy based on “individualized parole determinations without regard to 
race or national origin.”565 The United States’ heightened military cooperation with 
the Dominican army in terms of U.S. technical and training aid was also subject to 
criticism. It was claimed that the United States aimed at sealing off the border in 
order to forestall further refugee flows. The U.S. was accused of exploiting the 
Dominicans’ historic fear of the “black Haitian” through the offers of joint exercises 
and free weaponry, thus adding to the instability in the region.566 
Meanwhile, during the congressional hearings on Haitian refugees in 2002, 
various witness reports enumerated the high qualities of Haitians, or the 
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discriminatory policies in refugee detention and processing centers. As Thomas G. 
Wenski, auxiliary bishop of Miami, Florida maintained 
 
In my work with Haitians in South Florida, I have found them to be hard-working, 
honest and God-fearing members of our communities. They have been a positive 
influence in South Florida and elsewhere. In recent years, Haitian Americans have 
distinguished themselves in all areas of our community’s life, and indeed today 
several are elected public officials. In other words, whatever fears there might have 
been that led to the early policies of the 1980s have not been realized.567  
 
 
 
Dina Paul Parks, Executive Director of National Coalition for Haitian Rights, New 
York made a complementary remark. 
 
 
Despite the treatment that sometimes we receive in this country, our community had 
produced individuals such as Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large 
for War Crimes Issues; Dr. Rose-Marie Toussaint, the first African American 
woman to head a liver transplant service in the world; Mr. Dumas Simeus, Chairman 
and CEO of Simeus Food International; the largest black-owned business in Texas 
and one of the top in the country; Mario Elie, the power guard that helped the 
Houston Rockets to back-to-back NBA championships in the mid-1990s.568 
 
 
 
In the words of Marie Jocelyn Ocean, a Haitian asylee and former detainee, Haitian 
women were humiliatingly detained in a former jail TGK, and were subject to strip-
searching, banging on jail doors and flashlights that interrupted their sleep. She also 
argued that many of them lacked language and legal assistance.569 As for the Krome 
Service Processing Center where Haitian men were gathered, Cheryl Little of Florida 
Immigrant Advocacy Center contended that the lawyers found it hard to get access to 
their clients on such reasons as long head count hours or limited confidential 
visitation space.570  
The CBC members were also active in challenging the official viewpoint on 
Haitian immigration. In the face of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s overthrow from office 
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and the ongoing chaos there especially against Aristide supporters, Representative 
Charles B. Rangel (D-NY) argued that it was difficult to distiguish economic fear 
from political fear, and that the Haitians now lived in fear of both.571 He also pointed 
at the action of many religious organizations regarding the crisis in Haiti, “showing 
the kind of moral leadership that has been sadly lacking in [the U.S.] Government.” 
Rangel quoted from many of these leaders’ speeches as they drew parallels with the 
oft-used St. Louis and the British treatment of Vietnamese refugee cases.572 
Representative Major R. Owens (D-NY) called for genuine efforts to secure 
Aristide’s return as he was elected by 70 percent of the voters, whereas in the United 
States, of those who voted for President Bush comprised only 52-53 percent of the 
total votes. Moreover, Owens maintained that the U.S., originated as a refugee 
country itself, should especially welcome those Haitians fleeing their homes just 
because they had supported Aristide.  
 
 
[Our] country was founded by people fleeing oppression. We have been consistent 
most of the time, whether they are Hungarian Freedom Fighters fleeing communist 
oppression in Hungary, or Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, people fleeing oppression in 
Central America or South America, we have always opened the doors. People from 
Lebanon, Palestine, all over we have consistently opened our doors to political 
refugees. Only the Haitians have been treated differently, only the Haitians. . . Could 
it be the fact that the Haitians are black that has elicited this special inhumane 
treatment? . . There is no more clear definition of a political refugee than a person 
who is fleeing from bullets and bombs of his own government.573  
 
 
 
Owens’ rhetoric became bitter as the number of fleeing Haitians rose daily, 
associating U.S. refugee policy with Hitler’s fascism. 
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[T]he Administration’s plan to forcibly deport 14,000 Haitians and return them to 
the terror of the police state controlled by Haitian military thugs is a racist act with 
deadly genocidal consequences. . . Refugees in much greater numbers have been 
allowed to enter into this country. Fourteen thousand is not a large number. Not 
14,000 but 61,826 Hungarians have been admitted to this Nation at the time of the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary. Not 14,000, but 488,796 anti-Castro Cubans had been 
admitted to this country between the time that Castro came to power and 1981.574    
 
 
 
Representative Charles A.  Hayes (D-IL) contended that the U.S. Embassy itself had 
ample proof regarding killings, police harassment, illegal searches and looting of 
private homes and arrests without warrants by Haiti’s de facto Government in order 
to qualify for a case of political repression. As Hayes argued, hundreds of Haitians 
returning to their country were being monitored by fingerprinting.575 Representative 
Alan Wheat (D-MO) again reminded the inscription on the Statue of Liberty, adding 
that “this refusal to recognize repression and support its victims is not in the great 
tradition of American compassion.”576 Representative Lucien E. Blackwell (D-PA) 
played on the “New World Order” theme to admonish the hypocritical policy of 
repatriating the Haitians.  
 
 
[T]he United States has a new policy in today’s “new world order.” The woman, 
with her child, was dragged off the boat, dragged across the dock, and then dragged 
into the repatriation station, as she screamed in harmonious agony with her young 
son. . . The new United States, you know, the one with the barbed wire fence around 
the perimeter of the country?”577  
 
 
 
Representative Edolphus Towns (D-NY) equally condemned the U.S. refugee policy 
as being racially discriminatory: “Never before has the United States had a policy of 
                                                 
574
 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, February 4, 1992. 
222. 
575
 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, 102nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, February 7, 1992. 261. 
576Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, 102nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, March 25, 1992. 823. 
577
 Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, 102nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, June 5, 1992. 1713. 
 191 
return for any group suffering from civil strife other than these black refugees. How 
can we allow these refugees who are fleeing tyranny to be turned back?”578  
 CBC members continued their attacks well into the Clinton era. 
Representative Carrie P. Meek (D-FL) once again challenged the ever-enduring 
“economic” quality of the Haitian plight.  
 
 
While I agree that after years of dictatorships and corruption Haiti’s economy is a 
disaster, I disagree that the people of Haiti are not fleeing the violence they are being 
subjected to at the hands of the military and the violent political movement known 
as FRAPH, the Front for Advancement and Progress of Haiti, a paramilitary anti-
Aristide force; the acronym means “hit” or “strike” in Creole. . .[It] is modeled after 
the feared Tonton Macoutes, a private right-wing militia employed by “Papa Doc” 
Duvalier to help keep power.579 
 
 
 
 The CBC also sought equitable relief for Haitians, who were left outside the 
framework of the Victims of Communism Relief Act, or NACARA. Representative 
John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI) was the author of the Haitian Refugee Immigration 
Fairness Act, so that the Haitians would be treated on par with Nicaraguans, Cubans, 
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and certain Eastern European refugees who now had the 
opportunity to apply for suspension of deportation.580 In the face of September 11 
attacks, CBC members criticized the December 2001 decision of detaining all 
Haitians seeking or having been granted asylum in Haiti, whereas 91 percent of 
refugees from other nations were given parole in American communities while they 
sought asylum. As Representative Edolphus Towns (D-NY) argued, many Haitians 
chose “to face detainment here rather than face terrorism at home.” As he continued, 
“we were attacked on that day because of our principles, if we retract on them, we 
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are only allowing ourselves to lose in the war on terrorism.”581 Representative 
Kendrick Meek (D-FL) shared his personal observations on the allegation that 
Haitians were related with terrorist activities:  
 
 
[B]eing on the Committee on Homeland Security, being on the Committee on 
Armed Services, I have not yet heard or seen an FBI report or a CIA report to show 
any level or any indication of terrorism in Haiti, or any member of its government 
that condones terrorism in Haiti, or the Haitian people in general . . . But Castro 
sided with Saddam Hussein. Cuba is also a communist country, and every day we 
have individuals that are migrating to South Florida. We should be very careful as a 
country when we start using homeland security against individuals who cannot harm 
this government.582  
 
 
 
Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) argued that it would be a shame for the 
Bush Administration to withhold aid from its neighbor in the face of its generosity 
towards Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo refugees.583  
 Parenthetically, the NAACP also showed remarkable presence in the form of 
several resolutions condemning the unjust treatment of Haitian immigrants. By two 
resolutions on the issue in 1980 and 1982, together with those introduced in 1993, 
1994 and 2002, its members called upon the Congress to enact permanent legislation 
to designate Haitians as political refugees. They also asked the U.S. President to 
demonstrate his commitment to human rights and called for fair and just hearings in 
addition to due counseling facilities for the Haitian refugees. Reminding the Federal 
Government that the United States had been a haven for the tired, the poor and the 
homeless, giving blanket refugee status to hundreds of thousands of Cubans, 
Cambodians, Vietnamese, Eastern Europeans and others, the NAACP called for 
same benevolence to be extended to the Haitians. 
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4.5.3 Counterarguments on new threats 
On the issue of Haiti’s affliction with the new post-Cold War problems like 
drug trafficking and AIDS pandemic, the opposition shared the same view with the 
U.S. Government on the former topic –that Haiti was a hub for drug transit. 
However, challenges to federal accusations regarding Haiti as a brewing source for 
AIDS transmission continued in the post-Cold War era. According to critics, the 
George H. W. Bush Administration’s blood policy unfairly singled out Haitian 
nationality, when other groups including black and Hispanic Americans in several 
major cities, not to mention other Caribbean nationalities including the Bahamans 
and Jamaicans, actually had a higher rate of AIDS.584 Despite the fact that a 
government advisory panel had found no scientific basis for the blanket 
categorization of Haitians as likely carriers of the virus, and that the FDA was 
reviewing its policy toward Haitian blood donors, Ringo Cayard, a leading Haitian 
business and political leader in Miami believed a more effective propaganda was 
needed to exonerate Haitians of being potential AIDS transmitters: “We have more 
problems than other groups. . . We get stigmatized not only as blacks, but also as 
illiterates and disease-carriers who come from an underdeveloped country.”585 Upon 
the news that even those Haitians cleared for political asylum at the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base in Cuba may be denied entry into the United States on account of AIDS 
risk heightened criticism against the Administration: “The Government is obliged to 
bring the Haitians quickly to shore after they are identified as potential refugees so 
that they can meet with their lawyers and begin their asylum claims. . . Asylum laws 
provide no mandate for HIV screening,” said Cheryl Little.586  
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 Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) joined in these pleas by quoting a 
report by the National Minority AIDS Council, in which it was enumerated several 
reasons that hindered effective collaboration with the U.S. Government on the AIDS 
issue: “1. previous efforts to identify nationality as a risk factor for HIV 
transmission, as was the case with the Haitian population; 2. inadequately addressed 
deficiencies in data collection; 3. discriminatory immigration policies. . .”587 Many 
articles condemned the United States as being one of the few nations in the world 
that excluded HIV-positive immigrants, among which were China, South Korea, 
Russia, and Saudi Arabia.588 It was also claimed that no special travel restrictions 
existed in most European nations for HIV-contracted people.  
 
 
This summer, Americans thrilled to the performance of the Dream Team in 
Barcelona. But if Spain had our immigration policy, which prevents anyone infected 
with HIV from entering the U.S., Magic Johnson would never have been allowed to 
play. Last month, Mr. Johnson quit the National Commission on AIDS. How can 
you justify this country’s continued discrimination against the world’s Magic 
Johnsons?589 
 
 
 
 During the Clinton Administration, the conciliatory stance of the President 
about admitting AIDS-infected Haitians into the U.S. met with remarkable sarcasm. 
In the view of Representative Marge Roukema (R-NJ), such action would further 
cause burden on the American health-care system, while exposing the country to the 
disease through another avenue.590 Senator Don Nickles (R-OK) concurred, thinking 
that it would not be compassionate to say “Come to America and Uncle Sam is going 
to take care of your medical expenses,” with Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) believing 
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that compassion began at home.591 On the other hand, the Clinton Administration’s 
hesitance to use further initiative to admit Haitians on the basis of their HIV-positive 
status caused some people to wage hunger strikes. As Haitian Olden Polynice of the 
Detroit Pistons argued: “We’re talking about the Bosnians and the Somalians and 
everybody else, but nothing is being said about the situation in Guantanamo, or in 
Miami, or the Haitian plight, period.”592 Articles also pointed at the U.S. hypocrisy in 
immigration policy, and called for genuine interest toward the Haitians. 
 
 
Their illusions about a voyage to freedom seem pathetic now. Immigration officials 
determined that all of them had credible claims for asylum. But the Haitians have 
had to prove that not only their blood, but their blood is pure. . . “Huddled masses,” 
it says at the base of the Statue of Liberty. “Wretched refuse.” Not “perfect 
specimen.”593 
 
 
 
Another article demonstrated that even Thailand, Costa Rica and South Africa lifted 
bans on such travelers.594  
The CBC members also attacked the Administration as regards banning 
Haitians’ admission into U.S. borders on account of their affiliation with AIDS. 
Representative Carrie Meek (D-FL) pointed at the injustice toward selective labeling 
of potential immigrants by referring to the Cuban immigrants’ experience as 
observed in the Cold War period. 
 
 
Indeed, Cubans who have made it to the Guantanamo Naval Base are being brought 
to the United States and allowed to enter the asylum program without any medical 
testing at all. . . These HIV positive Haitians pose less of a public health threat than 
the millions of untested Americans who unknowingly infect others through high risk 
practices.595  
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Another CBC member, Representative Major Owens (D-NY) concurred in similar 
lines, arguing that the Hungarian refugees running from the Soviet invasion were 
never tested for any kind of disease for admission to the United States.596 
 
4.6 Analysis 
The U.S. official discourse on Haiti during the post-Cold War period mostly 
revolved around the refugee issue. As the Haitian influx into the U.S. borders 
reached new heights after the Cold War, U.S. Administrations couched any Haitian 
ruler in favorable terms who could ensure stability in the country to stem the refugee 
tide. This period was also differentiated from the earlier periods for the extended 
attention given to the newly emerging and widely spreading threats of drug 
trafficking and the AIDS pandemic, whose roots had already been observed in the 
late Cold War era. Despite the ever-changing metaphors attributed to Haitian rulers 
as they complied or not with the U.S. interests, Haiti’s being a major drug transit 
country and the foremost source of AIDS remained constant. The AIDS pandemic, 
and terrorism, the latter bearing its indelible mark especially after the 9/11 incident, 
also had their impact on the attributes ascribed to the Haitian refugees.  
Interestingly, the refugee rhetoric of Washington showed remarkable 
continuity with that observed in the Cold War era. The main repetitive element was 
the arbitrary definitions of the terms “refugee” and “persecution.” Haitians fleeing 
their country were still evaluated by the United States through an economic, not 
political perspective. Despite rare instances of official acknowledgement of terror 
and dictatorship in Haiti, U.S. governments in both the Cold War and post-Cold War 
period conceived of political repression as emanating only from communist 
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countries. Cubans and refugees from the former Soviet countries were prioritized at 
all times. It was only when refugee crisis first climaxed in the early 1990s that the 
U.S. regarded the situation in Haiti as constituting a “national emergency,” and 
decided to rescue Haitians out of “tyranny.” Only in this and other instances of 
refugee influx that the U.S. Administrations criticized the breach of democracy and 
rule of law in this country, even intervening in Haiti for reinstituting liberalism and 
human rights there.  
Another attribute of the official portrayal of Haiti in general, and the Haitian 
refugees in particular, was its condescending nature, which boasted of the United 
States’ benevolence in uplifting this conflict-ridden nation. As a borrowed theme 
from the Cold War, the United States was portrayed as embracing “the difficult task 
of helping these newcomers as productive members.” Moreover, Washington 
chastised other “civilized” countries like Britain for turning back immigrants. Being 
a refugee country itself, the United States posed as the role model for others. After 
the Operation Uphold Democracy, it was still claimed that Haiti should be kept under 
close vigilance as the situation there remained volatile. The country was described as 
one of the “young and fragile democracies” in which the U.S. played and should play 
a very important role. 
Challenges against the official portrait of refugee affairs brought into light 
various truths that Washington evaded. The critics backed up their arguments with 
field studies, witness reports, references to protocols and conventions that the U.S. 
were party to, and allusions to the founding tenets of America. Post-Cold War 
allegations against the U.S. still borrowed heavily from Cold War metaphors. In both 
periods, it was mainly the Democratic congress members from the House of 
Representatives who mounted fierce attacks against U.S. Administrations regardless 
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of the party in power. Civil rights advocates, whose early efforts were seen in the last 
years of the Cold War, became more visible in the post-Cold War era just like black 
activism in the body of the Congressional Black Caucus. The CBC resumed from 
where the black press, now preoccupied with civil rights at home, had left in the pre-
Cold War era.  
During and after the Cold War, the critics contended that Haitians’ economic 
deprivation was a direct impact of the brutal regime. They backed their arguments 
quoting from official statements condemning the breach of human rights in Haiti as 
well as the irreconcilability of the dictators there. The critics’ main conclusion was 
that, persecution of peoples under communist regimes was no different in quality 
than persecution by non-communist dictatorial governments. They challenged 
Washington for its selective treatment of refugees, welcoming the Cuban, 
Indochinese, Vietnamese, Afghani and Iranian people while keeping the Haitians off 
hand. Inscription on the Statue of Liberty became one of the oft-repeated themes in 
both periods, calling for the United States to stick to its motto of “life, liberty and 
pursuit of happiness” for all. The U.S. was also depicted as behaving counter to the 
responsibilities described in various protocols and conventions that it was signatory 
to. It was repeatedly articulated that international law stipulated admission of 
refugees who were able to present a credible fear of persecution upon return to their 
homeland. Critics also mocked Washington for chastising Britain for returning 
Vietnamese refugees to suffer in their country, while it was doing the same thing for 
the Haitians. Within this framework, talking about inhumane conditions in refugee 
detention centers, many attorneys and civil rights activists found similarities with 
“concentration camps in Siberia.” Difficulties that human rights groups faced in 
order to screen the U.S. detainment facilities were also likened to “evasive 
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doublespeak of communists.” Counter-discourses in both periods also highlighted the 
racial dimension of refugee policies in which white Cubans, or people from the 
former Soviet satellites were highly favored in contrast to black Haitians.  
In the post-Cold War era, despite occasional remarks of criticism against 
relaxing restrictions on the inclusion of Haitian refugees as bearing a potential 
burden on the U.S. health care system, the main critique rested with the U.S. turning 
its back to its “New World Order” responsibilities and commitments by ignoring the 
Haitians’ plight. New elements of challenge included Haitians’ contribution to the 
U.S. economic vitality and social diversity as “hardworking” and “God-fearing” 
public officials or businessmen. The case of St. Louis ship, filled with Jewish 
refugees to seek shelter from the Nazi regime but returned from the U.S. shores was 
also used abundantly to condemn the time-honored hypocricy of U.S. immigrant 
policies. The U.S. aid toward Bosnians, Somalians and many others, but not Haitians 
were underlined. Discrimination on the basis of AIDS diagnosis was more fiercely 
countered in the post-Cold War era, with the U.S. juxtaposed with dictatorial regimes 
such as China or Russia, which also barred immigration with respect to AIDS. The 
U.S. was also pitted against Thailand, Costa Rica and South Africa which lifted bans 
on such travelers. It was underscored that no Cubans or Hungarians were screened 
for HIV, but Haitians, whereas the rate of AIDS was higher among many black and 
Hispanic United States citizens, not to mention Bahaman and Jamaican immigrants. 
Revealing the non-professionality of investigations, and hesitancy of some federal 
agencies in coining the relation between the disease and Haiti was also used as a 
critical method. Lastly, the indefinite detainment of Haitians after the 9/11 was 
challenged on the ground that the U.S. would lose the war on terrorism if it failed to 
abide by the principles for which it was attacked.
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 General overview 
 This analytical narrative of argumentative exchange between official and 
oppositional interpretation of events, offered a complementary account of the U.S.-
Haitian relations. Despite the changes in domestic and international context, Haiti 
was almost always depicted by the establishment rhetoric as “needy” or “inferior,” 
requiring caution and guidance, with rare occasions of affirmative portrayals so long 
as the Republic complied with U.S. policies. In return, counterarguments to the 
official view of the state of affairs presented invaluable data based upon on-site 
observations, witness reports, references to international law, and the basic tenets of 
Americanism like life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for all. Through a web of 
predicates, presuppositions, comparisons and metaphors, each party fought to have 
the final say over policymaking on Haiti.  The study also showed the variety in 
perspective and rhetoric even within the establishment or the opposition, while 
paying due attention to one of the underrated themes in international relations, that is, 
the role of black Americans in  foreign policymaking process. 
The U.S. official rhetoric during the subject period began with racial 
prejudices and inferiority associated with it. Haiti’s incapability to raise its economic 
standards and the incessant domestic turbulence associated with this, are often  
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attibuted to the colored aspect this republic. Respective U.S. administrations took 
these notions for granted despite changes in the threat perceptions of Washington. 
Haiti’s non-recognition stemmed from the fear of its setting a precedent for slave 
insurrection within the U.S. borders in the pre-Civil War period. According to 
Washington, a “black republic” was nothing other than an anomaly. Haiti’s failure in 
living up to the example of those so-called “high civilizations” naturally set the stage 
for the benevolent America to intervene in order to deter profit-seeking Europeans 
from destabilizing the region in the pre-Cold War era. During the Cold War, it was 
believed that, Haiti’s natural incapacity to ameliorate its social and economic 
conditions might be taken advantage of by communist forces. Lastly, it was Haiti, 
with all its deficiencies and turmoil, being treated as the scapegoat for almost all the 
dangers having its mark on the post-Cold War period like drug trafficking, AIDS and 
terrorism. It was for these reasons that Haitians suffered the harshest restrictions on 
immigration to the United States. Accordingly, the U.S. Administrations couched 
any Haitian ruler in favorable terms who could ensure stability in the country, so that 
foreign intervention or mass immigration could be prevented. Parethetically, the 
element of race gradually dropped off the official agenda on the eve of the Cold War 
period. It was the oppositional camp in the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods 
that countered the U.S. foreign policy behavior as being tainted with racial 
considerations. In their perspective, the discrimination against Haitians was mainly 
based on race, especially in the realm of immigration. 
The critics contended that Haitians’ were a “civilized” nation, having chosen 
the republican form of government over servitude to foreign powers. After the 
independence, Haiti was and would have continued to be a competent actor, if it had 
not been beset by compensation to France and by authoritarian political figures 
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taking advantage of the power vacuum during Haiti’s transition period. According to 
the critics, economic deprivation was a direct impact of short-term brutal regimes, 
fuelling instability and insecurity in Haiti. They backed their arguments quoting from 
official statements admitting the breach of human rights in Haiti as well as the 
irreconcilability of the dictators there. In the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, 
the critics’ main conclusion was that, persecution of peoples under communist or 
former communist regimes was no different in quality than persecution by non-
communist dictatorial governments. They challenged Washington for its selective 
treatment of refugees. 
As times and threats changed, so did the actors involved, especially in the 
oppositional camp. It was Federal judiciary action and civil rights advocates that 
resumed from where black activists had left in the pre-Cold War period. While the 
black press had formerly fought against the U.S. occupation and exploitation of 
Haiti, they were preoccupied during the Cold War mostly with issues like civil rights 
issues or Africa. The Congressional Black Caucus also appeared in the early 1970s to 
advocate for the cause of Haitians. Congressional critique became more active during 
the Cold War and the post-Cold War, while it was mainly the Democrats in the 
House of Representatives that were visible in the debates on U.S-Haitian affairs.  
The evidence offered by the opposition through field studies were often 
shared by the U.S. Embassy in Haiti. Telegrams and policy papers from the Embassy 
to the Department of State added to the occasional admissions by Washington that, 
especially the Duvalier regime, incapatitated the Haitian people. Embassy sources 
from 1963 to 1967 in the Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XXXII on 
Dominican  Republic, Cuba, Haiti and Guyana portrayed the vicious rule of Duvalier 
and provided advice on the measures that the U.S. should follow:  
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Duvalier has made it clear over past year he intends remain in control of Haiti until 
he dies, that he will use any means to this objective, and will not tolerate any threat 
to his political control. Latter, of course, based primarily on fear, terrorism and 
threats even toward his close followers.597 
 
 
In the Embassy’s view, “Government of Haiti will remain Government of Haiti, that 
is to say, basically devious and untrustworthy.”598 The foremost intention of Duvalier 
was believed to be “injection of dollars” into Haiti by the U.S. It was acknowledged 
that “money would simply go into pockets of regime without benefit to the Haitian 
people.”599 The proposed plan of action was conveyed in these lines: 
 
 
The United States is now faced with the prospect that the Duvalier regime will 
continue to rule Haiti for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances it is in the 
United States interest to seek to bring about at least a minimum level of mutual 
accommodation, realizing that room for such accommodation may be very limited 
and of dubious duration . . . The United States also has an abiding interest in the 
social and economic welfare of the Haitian people, although past experience shows 
that effective cooperation with the Duvalier regime in these fields is beset by very 
great difficulties . . . In any event, the well-being of the Haitian people or lack 
thereof has an important long-term bearing on the key United States interest of 
denying Haiti to the Communists . . . 2. If, as a result of the fact that the United 
States is not prepared to resume immediately bilateral aid to Haiti, Duvalier reverts 
to his usual tactics of reprisals against United States representatives in Haiti, or 
attempts to blackmail the United States in the OAS, it should be made clear that the 
United States will not be intimidated.600  
 
 
 
It is essential to draw attention to the fact that, both sides portrayed Haiti in 
line with their respective interests. While the U.S. Administrations made decisions 
about Haiti sometimes for solely strategic, national security and economic reasons, 
they reverted to race and prejudice rhetoric to justify their actions. Likewise, the 
opposition, especially the African American arguments on Haiti carry with them the 
hope for more rights and freedoms at home if similar rights were attained for other 
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immigrants. Their hope was that improvement, particularly in Africa’s position, 
would in turn culminate into these countries’ help for better social and political 
conditions for black Americans.601 
If they supported a restrictionist immigration, they might strengthen doctrines 
against themselves. Hence, while there were different opinions among the African 
American community, intellectuals and press (Age, Amsterdam News) regarding 
immigrants as they would render them jobless, the dominant view was to welcome 
them.602 Black leaders like Frederick Douglass, W. E. B. DuBois and Booker T. 
Washington were critical of curbing immigration, on grounds that the African 
Americans’ plight was not related with the immigrant flow. Again, many in the black 
community and in the press stood fervently against the 1924 National Origins Act, 
whose one obscure clause specified that immigration from colonies would be 
counted as part of the mother country’s quota, meaning the exclusion of the growing 
numbers of black West Indian immigrants. On the other hand, even though most 
NAACP members in the early 1990s, for example, argued for solidarity with 
immigrants, many others were against it. Even the black congresswoman from 
Texas, Barbara Jordan, appointed by Clinton to head the U.S. Commission on 
Immigration Reform had put forth discriminationist arguments.603  
Nevertheless, especially those immigrants having a strong diaspora in the 
U.S. were welcome by the American blacks. The CBC’s two successful campaigns 
that challenged Washington were the South African and Haitian cases in the 1980s 
and 1990s respectively. The Rwanda case did not raise due attention on account of  
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weak diaspora network. In the Haiti case, the CBC made the diasporic call to 
mobilise African American communities because of similar ancestry. They 
succeeded in creating a solidarity despite the fact that many African Americans were 
concerned not only over the economic consequences of Haitian immigrant influx, but 
also over the political tensions between some Haitian American and African 
American communities in New York and Florida, for example. On the other hand, 
unfamiliarity with Rwanda, and the total failure of the U.S. mission to Somalia as 
well as Rwanda’s association with those “irrational” and “tribal” Somalians, led to 
indifference to this country’s plight. In sum, the African Americans did not 
necessarily campaign for the immigrants’ own sake, but especially for the interests of 
the African American people.604  
In another vein, the U.S. behavior toward other black immigrants, such as 
those from Africa, strikes another point. The African immigrants often had more 
impressive education credentials than Caribbean blacks, African Americans, and 
non-Hispanic whites. Most African students came from former British colonies 
where English is commonly taught in school. Immigrants from Sub-Saharan 
countries, in particular from Anglophone Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, figured 
prominently in all refugees admitted between 1983 and 2005.605 Furthermore, the top 
11 countries sending immigrants to the U.S. between 1974 and 1995 were mostly 
African. Of those who were admitted from Africa, the overwhelming majority were 
from Marxist Ethiopia. Ethiopia once had long standing political ties to the U.S. 
going back to World War II. During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. was the main ally 
of Ethiopia, providing the U.S. with a major communications base near Asmara in 
return for U.S. aid. In 1983, while there were 2456 refugees from Africa, the 2209 of 
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them were Ethiopians. Those next with the most refugees to the U.S. were Sudan, 
Angola, and Zaire. Sudan and Zaire were close Cold War allies of the U.S., while 
Angola was a Marxist state against which the U.S. government was covertly 
supporting civil war.606 
 
5.2 Epilogue: Haiti and the Dominican Republic compared 
 In order to understand fully the United States’ approach toward Haiti, one 
should compare and contrast this country with its light-skinned, and relatively 
prosperous neighbor, the Dominican Republic. Like Haiti, the Dominican Republic 
was treated like a U.S. dependency or satellite for most of its existence. It was also 
occupied twice by the U.S. forces, first between 1916-1924, and then for a brief 
period in 1965-1966 (Operation Power Pack). In other times though, the United 
States frequently intervened in the internal affairs of this Caribbean Republic, fearing 
i) intervention by major European powers seeking repayment for their loans, ii) 
immigration to the U.S. in the face of authoritarian rule and economic downfall, iii) 
flourishing of communism in the country, and iv) regional instability triggered by 
drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism. Nevertheless, there are also some 
contrasts between the two cases, which should be elaborated for the purposes of this 
paper. Despite occasional declarations of disapproval as regards the Dominican state 
of affairs, this country, having cast its fate with the United States on many important 
issues, and integrated rather competently with the global economy, ranks comparably 
higher than Haiti on Washington’s favored partners list.  
 Intervention by and annexation to Haiti has always caused anxiety on the part 
of the Dominican Republic. Formerly a Spanish colony, this country gained 
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independence in 1821, only to be occupied by Haiti between 1822-1844, which 
abolished slavery throughout the Republic to the dismay of the United States. In 
contrast to the black Haiti’s independence which caused great anxiety on the part of 
the United States, the Dominican independence from its Spanish masters was 
applauded and immediately recognized. The Republic’s incorporation into Haiti soon 
afterwards, further alarmed the American leaders. After the second independence, 
two self-appointed generals, Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Báez alternated in 
presidency for the next forty-five years. While both sought foreign protection in 
order to stave off the Haitian threat and to restore former order and prosperity, 
Santana looked to Spain while Báez favored the U.S. rule.607 After the Spanish 
restoration of power in the Republic between 1861-1865, Báez’s third reelection 
brought in the American card.608 The President’s appeals to his U.S. counterpart 
Ulysses Grant did not pay, however. In Grant’s view, the Civil War had shown the 
weakness of the Union navy, and the necessity for a base in the Caribbean to make 
up for this deficiency. Here was the Dominican Republic: a geostrategically 
profitable country, with a willingness to be incorporated into the United States. 
President Grant also talked about the fertility of the island along with the strategic 
and military benefits associated with the prospective annexation. In his words, the 
Republic would not only facilitate the practice of the Monroe Doctrine, but would 
also be a giant step toward realizing Manifest Destiny. Grant further mentioned about 
the Dominican Republic’s weakness, and the necessity of U.S. guidance and 
watchfulness for humanitarian reasons. Finally, he conveyed his belief that, trading 
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with this republic would cast a blow to the slaveholding Cuba and Brazil, major 
exporters to the United States. Grant’s plans, however, witnessed a great deal of 
opposition by the Congress, mostly on the need to steer away from a colored, inferior 
race for the sake of the preponderance of the Anglo-Saxons, or on anti-imperialist 
grounds. In his last annual adress to the nation, President Grant would admit that he 
had also thought of this annexation for transferring African Americans there (like 
Jefferson and Lincoln had thought of Haiti), where they could find a “congenial 
home,” in which their “civil rights would not be disputed.”609  
 After the fifth presidency of Báez, a “modernizing dictator” Ulises Heureaux 
assumed power, under whose role the Dominican Republic thrived. Yet, his 
autocratic rule soon paved the way toward his assassination, followed by a return of 
political factionalism and personal rivalries which translated into social upheavals 
between 1899 and 1906. During this period, the Republic came to the brink of 
bankruptcy in view of instability, huge debts (to France, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands), and the threat of foreign intervention to collect these. Hence appeared 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous corollary (1904) to the Monroe Doctrine: It 
was the duty of the United States to act as “international police power” in cases of 
the “impotence” and “wrongdoing” of regional governments which may attract the 
attention of European warships. This act also coincided with the United States’ other 
interests in the Caribbean, like the Panama Canal. Eventually, the countries made an 
agreement ratified in 1907, by which the United States sought to alleviate the 
country’s economic burdens through administration of its customs revenues. Along 
with this began the US presence in the Domican Republic as revenue agents, tax 
experts and some troops to guard the agents. Even this did not help, since, until 1916, 
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the Republic slided further deep into financial and economic turmoil in the face of 
presidential rivalries and corruption, culminating into the US intervention, done in 
the name of such limited goals as “restoring order” and the violated custom 
management –reminiscient of those reasons enumerated for the Haitian intervention 
in 1915. 610  
Interestingly, the Monroe Doctrine had refused to extend protectorship to 
Haiti against encroachment by foreign powers, on the grounds that this black country 
was not recognized by the U.S. On the other hand, the Roosevelt Corollary to this 
doctrine was announced in the face of Dominican bankruptcy and the prospect of 
European intervention, which ended up with the U.S. Customs Receivership. In 
terms of similarities in these two cases, it can be enumerated that both were regarded 
by President Woodrow Wilson as having African racial traits and both were occupied 
in the end by the United States. Eventually though, Washington granted the 
Dominican Republic its independence sooner than they did to Haiti. This behaviour 
was countered by the critics on the basis of the Dominicans’ being relatively light-
skinned, and hence closer to the European standards –a factor which stood for their 
inherent capability to reach to the level of civilization. Haiti was much of a nuisance 
for the United States compared to the Dominican Republic, an example of which was 
its hesitation to declare war to Germany (which it finally did in mid-July 1918) in the 
First World War context, advising simply that diplomatic relations with this country 
would be broken.  
 As observed similarly in Haiti, this eight-year occupation led to relative 
modernization and stability, through which foreign debt was decreased, and public 
works facilities were improved. Within this framework, it was mostly the U.S. sugar 
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firms that profited most by expanding their holdings. Simultaneously though, an 
intense anti-Americanism swept across the whole country. It was only after the end 
of the First World War that Washington would lose interest in this country, finally 
withdrawing from the Republic, while leaving a notorious National Guard trained by 
the U.S. Marines behind to seal the fate of Dominican politics. General Vásquez, 
accused by the opposition for being the puppet of the United States, would rule for 
six years after the U.S. forces left the Republic. After Vásquez was toppled, Rafael 
Trujillo would assume power between 1930-1961, whose rule can be likened to that 
of Duvaliers’ in Haiti. Respective U.S. Administrations did not refrain from 
cooperating with Trujillo because, no matter how despotic his rule was, he was still 
able to maintain a degree of order and stability in the country. Throughout his term, 
Trujillo cultivated close relations with the United States even leading to major 
economic concessions, as he believed it was only through American power that could 
save the Republic from ruin. To the advantage of the United States, he crushed all 
independent trade unions, and appeared as the most fervent anti-Communist in the 
Western Hemisphere. In the late 1950s, Trujillo’s curbing of opposition, the 
plummeting of sugar prices (main source of foreign revenue), together with his order 
of Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt’s assassination led to a trade and arms 
embargo against the Dominican Republic. President John F. Kennedy himself,  
authorized CIA assistance to a clandestine group preparing to topple Trujillo. 
Washington also went as far as being involved in his assassination on May 30, 
1961.611 
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 Ironically, the Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt Administrations’ Good 
Neighbor initiatives, which finally translated into policy in 1933, had different 
implications for Haiti and the Dominican Republic. While it enabled the termination 
of Haitian occupation in 1934, it led to the ossification of Trujillo’s rule in the 
Dominican Republic in line with the policy of nonintervention in the affairs of 
America’s neighbors –yet, the U.S. custom receivership remained in place. 
Condoning Trujillo’s regime was also against the rules and regulations of the 
Washington Treaty of 1923, which called for nonrecognition of rulers in Central 
America, coming to power on illegal means. As the State Department argued in 
1930, Trujillo might be recognized “even were the elections palpably fraudulent or 
the result due to intimidation by the military forces.”612 In January 1931, the official 
rhetoric applauded Trujillo for the “order being maintained throughout the length and 
breadth of the country.”613  
 Washington went as far as overlooking the Haitian massacre, done on the 
orders on Trujillo in the early October 1937. Not only the Haitians resident in the 
Dominican Republic as sugar cane workers, but also those living at the border area 
bore the brunt of Trujillo’s hatred toward the neighboring country. In response, the 
United States expressed its “considerable concern,” and the Roosevelt administration 
declared that it was “ready to help if an invitation is received.” When Trujillo 
accepted the arbitration procedure, President Roosevelt felt relieved (for there was no 
more need for the U.S. good offices), and even congragulated him publicly. Yet, in 
the end, Trujillo evaded the arbitration procedures in return for $750,000 
compensation to Haiti for the losses incurred. Trujillo’s getting away with impunity 
raised many critical voices. The main critique rested with the belief that  the United 
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States condoned the Trujillo regime so as not to lose an ally in the war against 
fascism; however, Trujillo was a fascist “neighbor” or “miniature Hitler” himself to 
be dealt with.614 Nevertheless, Trujillo’s declaration of war on the Axis powers and 
granting the United States naval bases, positioned him as one of the cherished allies 
of the United States.615 His posing as a humanitarian leader for volunteering to 
accomodate those Jews running from the Nazi regime was widely acclaimed by 
Franklin Roosevelt, who had begun to show interest in the plight of European 
refugees in mid-1938. Trujillo also welcomed those refugees running from the 
Spanish Civil War. His main rationale was to attract light-skinned immigration to 
replace Haitian and West Indian laborers in his country. He even sought guidance by 
the U.S. State Department “to facilitate ‘neo-white’ immigration,” and his request 
was honored. However, this humanitarian initiative proved to be mere rhetoric.616 
 The United States also courted the Dominican Republic in the face of 
Trujillo’s occasional winks at an alliance with Germany. In order to forestall such a 
prospect, Washington not only showered the Republic with economic incentives such 
as the Lend-Lease agreement (same with Haiti), but also abrogated the U.S. Customs 
Receivership on grounds that this “stick” or “sore thumb” clashed with the idea of 
the Good Neighbor policy. The Dominican Republic’s location on the Mona Passage 
was one of the main shipping lanes to the Panama Canal, and was extremely 
important at the time of war in the face of German submarine activities in the 
Caribbean. By 1948, Trujillo had amassed a huge deal of armaments and had built 
the most powerful air force in the region thanks to American aid. This development 
tipped the scales in favor of the Dominican Republic in its fight against the 
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neighboring Haiti.617 Trujillo also granted the United States missile-tracking sites in 
the Cold War context, and in 1953, the Dominican Republic became the first state in 
the region to sign a bilateral Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United 
States. It was also the only country in the region whose voting record paralleled that 
of the United States. However, these did not prove enough as compensation for his 
repressive rule.618  
 After the infamous Trujillo period, the United States began to put more 
pressure on the Dominican Republic on democratic reforms. The foremost concern 
was to prevent another Castro-like coup. In the 1962 elections, Juan Bosch came as 
the winner from the social-democratic Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). 
President Bosch soon proved to be a nuisance for Washington though, as he sought 
to allow more freedom for the Marxist groups within the framework of his 
democratic reform program. Gradually criticism mounted against his rule by 
conservative forces like the church, military, economic elites, and not to mention, the 
U.S. embassy. Finally, Bosch was deposed in a military coup in 1963. As corruption 
and repression became unbearable under the rule of the interim three-man civilian 
junta, some PRD activists took the initiative on April 24, 1965 to restore Bosch to 
power. This made Washington more than anxious on the prospect of another 
Communist victory in the Hemisphere, despite the fact that the Dominican 
Communist groups were weak and disorganized. This led to the second intervention 
by the U.S. forces on April 28 under President Lyndon Johnson’s orders. The 
President saw the necessity of preventing “another Cuba” in order to be reelected; in 
hindsight, he was also preparing for the massive buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam. 
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In early May of 1965, the number of US troops stationed in the Dominican Republic 
and in South Vietnam equaled each other.619   
 The second Dominican intervention was a benchmark in U.S.-Caribbean 
relations. The Western Hemisphere was devoid of any U.S. troops between 1934-
1965 in line with the Good Neighbor Policy pronounced by President Franklin 
Roosevelt in 1933. Hence, this set a precedent for other regional countries that 
Washington always stood on alarm to pounce on its backyard with its massive 
military capabilities. While it was this policy that had caused the U.S. withdrawal 
from Haiti, now it was breached at the hands of the Johnson Administration in the 
Dominican case. The rationale for intervention was initially declared as “protecting 
American tourists” and “preventing further loss of life” during the popular uprising. 
It was also articulated that the U.S. was a “neutral force interposed between the two 
sides” and that the troops would remain there “as a guarantor of civil peace and 
democratic elections.” President Bosch was coined in such terms as “erratic”, 
“egotistical” and “politically unrealiable.”620 In President Johnson’s words, before 
the U.S. military intervention, “1500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and 
their heads cut off.” In fact, most of the American tourists had already returned home 
long before hostilities exacerbated. Moreover, those murdered people had died 
mostly at the hands of the junta’s air force, supplied with fuel by the U.S. 
government. On April 30, the official rhetoric assumed an anti-communist tint. 
President Johnson talked about some signs that “people trained outside the 
Dominican Republic” were intent to take control of the popular revolt. The State 
Department also spoke in similar terms, arguing that “chaos and terror in the streets 
can make a country ripe for a conspiratorial group” of communist militants. It was 
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remarked that Third World countries were vulnerable to “demagoguery and to the 
use of force,” and that the United States was ready to come to the aid. This portrait 
did not reflect the true state of affairs in the Dominican Republic though. According 
to a CIA report dated April 25, it was contended that the leader of the rebel forces 
was “a strong anti-Communist.”621   
 In 1966, Joaquin Balaguer, a Trujillo puppet, became the new president, to 
rule for most of the next 30 years, at the end of which international reaction to flawed 
elections forced him to curtail his term in 1996. His term witnessed an authoritarian 
rule coupled with economic disasters on account of 1973 and 1979 oil crises, as the 
Dominican Republic, like Haiti, was totally dependent on oil exports. In time, the 
United States economic aid was also curtailed especially during the Carter 
Administration, which criticized the Balaguer rule in the context of human rights. 
The Dominican Republic gradually steered towards austerity measures offered by the 
IMF. The country distinguished itself from Haiti in terms of opening to globalization 
and following the path of Western style liberal market economy; but it also paid 
dearly for doing so. In the post-Cold War period, the United States saw Balaguer’s 
despotism as very anachronistic in the “New World Order,” and pushed him toward 
relinquishing his power. His successor was Leonel Fernandez Reyna, who ruled 
between 1996-2000, to be reelected after Hipolito Mejia for a second term in 2004 
following a constitutional amendment allowing presidents to serve more than one 
term.622  
 In the post-Cold War era, the Dominican immigrants received a more 
favorable treatment than the Haitians. However, the INS and the U.S. Coast Guard 
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cooperated with the Dominican Navy and immigration authorities to reduce the 
smuggling of migrants to Puerto Rico, and thence to the United States. The country 
stood as a major source especially in trafficking of women. Dominican immigration 
began in the 1970s, and in the 1990s, about 200,000 Dominican and 75,000 
nonimmigrants a year was admitted.623 In 2002, these numbers were 186,800 and 
81,558 for the Dominican Republic and Haiti respectively. In mid-2003, 1970 
Dominicans were intercepted, compared to 1045 Haitians. Generally speaking, there 
was an increase in immigrant admission in 2002 from Cuba, the Dominican Republic 
and Guyana.624 It should also be remembered that the United States collaborated with 
the Dominican Republic in order to forestall Haitian immigration to the United 
States.  
On the other hand, in September 2004, President George W. Bush designated 
the country as one of the four major drug transit countries in the Caribbean, claiming 
that 8% of all the cocaine entering the U.S. through the Dominican Republic. The 
Republic also appears on the list of major money-laundering countries. However, the 
Dominican Republic has been in close collaboration with the U.S. in order to stem 
such illegal activities. In 2002, it adopted a tough anti-money-laundering law to 
combat drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism, while in 2004, it enacted a new 
Criminal Procedure Code.625 Last, but not least, despite some progress, the 
Dominican Republic was still regarded as having a poor human rights record 
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according to the U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
(2004 data). The Report conveyed the continued use of torture and physical abuse, 
and prison conditions ranging from “poor to harsh.”626 
 Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic and the United States act 
harmoniously in many other realms. President Hipolito Mejia (2000-2004) joined in 
the “coalition of the willing” by participating in the U.S.-led war on Iraq. 
Accordingly, several hundred Dominican troops were dispatched to help patrol 
southern Iraq between mid-2003 to mid-2004. In return the George W. Bush spoke 
very highly of the Dominican Republic, and furnished the country with favors in 
trade, but not in immigration.627 The Dominican Republic is the most fortunate 
beneficiary of U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative-related programs. The United States 
has been the country’s main trading partner, with a U.S. sugar quota of 180,000 tons 
(2004 data). The Dominican Republic also signed the Dominican Republic-Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) in August 2004, hoping to improve 
access for its exports to the U.S. markets and to encourage new investments in its 
Free Trade Zones (FTZ).628  
 Concisely, despite the similar context in which Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic were situated, the dissimilarities in the United States’ stance toward the two 
cases are striking. The Dominican Republic’s light skin-color and modern behavioral 
traits are judgmentally juxtaposed with those so-called inferior black Haitians and 
their voodoo ceremonies. The Dominican Republic, though it was beset with similar 
problems that Haiti faced, was evaluated by Washington in a more positive light for 
its relative stability, prosperity, willingness to interlink with the global economy and 
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to act coordinately with the United States on some burning issues. Although it was 
underlined that the Dominican Republic also needed the U.S. involvement and 
guidance, it was never deemed as a pathetic actor suffering from insurmountable 
problems, or deserving constant criticism and correction by Washington. In 2008, 
this rhetoric and behavior are still in order, in the face of Haiti whirling in poverty 
and chaos despite the UN presence to alleviate the problems, vis-à-vis the Dominican 
Republic, gradually thriving through tourism and export revenues by generous U.S. 
support. 
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